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INTRODUCTION
Corporate America needs better monitoring. Even in the postSarbanes-Oxley era, managers of public companies remain largely
insulated from outside influence.
They are protected by a
combination of takeover defenses and the business judgment rule
and have little to fear from either hostile raiders or their own
shareholders. The pendulum remains stuck in favor of managerial
discretion. It will swing back toward greater accountability to
shareholder interests only if managers are subject to more effective
oversight.
In the early 1990s, a group of corporate governance scholars led
initially by Mark Roe and Bernard Black believed they had at last
identified corporate law’s white knight. So-called institutional
investors—large pools of capital invested by professional fund
managers—appeared to have amassed the resources necessary to act
1
as a check against corporate wrongdoing. Remove the barriers that
make shareholder activism so expensive, they argued, and
institutional investors would happily provide the oversight that
2
seemed to be missing from corporate America.
Among institutional investors, mutual funds and public pension
funds displayed the greatest potential as monitors. They therefore
received the bulk of the scholarly attention and took on increased
3
importance in America’s overall system of corporate governance.

1. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major
Changes But Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 353–57 (2000) (tracing the growth
of institutional investors from 1950–2000); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 449–51 (1991)
(discussing the growth of institutional investors in the 1980s).
2. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
523 (1990) (arguing that “institutional shareholders are hobbled by a complex web
of legal rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally risky to own large
percentage stakes”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1336 (1991) (arguing that
public pension funds are closer than any other market player to the ideal corporate
monitor); Rock, supra note 1, at 449 (arguing that “the institutional investor would
seem to have both the incentive and the abilities to constrain management”); Mark J.
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11, 31–53
(1991) (arguing that “American law and politics deliberately diminished the power
of financial institutions to hold the large equity blocks that would foster serious
oversight of managers”). The first modern support for institutional investor
monitoring appears to have come from Alfred Conard. See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond
Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 175–76 (1988)
(arguing that “institutional investors . . . offer the best hope of restoring to private
enterprise the vigor that is inherent in the design of capitalism”).
3. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1292–93 (arguing that public pension funds and,
to a lesser degree, mutual funds are the most likely institutional investors to engage
in criticism and opposition of corporate management); Rock, supra note 1, at 450
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Moreover, like public companies, they aggregate the capital of retail
investors and are the subject of extensive federal regulation. I
therefore refer to mutual funds and public pension funds collectively
as “public equity funds.”
Despite their obvious promise, however, most institutional investors
have remained stubbornly passive. As explained in Part I of this
Article, banks and insurance companies suffer from too many
conflicts of interest to oppose management prerogatives. The same is
true for private pension funds, those that are sponsored by corporate
employers. Meanwhile, despite being free from most obvious
conflicts, public equity funds generally prefer to follow the Wall
Street Rule—sell when performance begins to lag—rather than
4
expend resources to influence corporate policy.
Not all institutional investors are passive, however.
As
demonstrated in Part II, venture capital, leveraged buyout (“LBO”)
5
and certain hedge funds —known collectively as private equity
funds—are the antithesis of passive investors. Denoted the “kings of
capitalism” by The Economist, they generally seek to acquire control
over a limited number of target companies in order to actively direct
6
corporate policy. In other words, they compete based on their
7
relative ability to squeeze agency costs out of inefficient companies.
(“The heads of public employee pension funds have become high profile players in
the corporate governance process.”).
4. See K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 230
(2005) (observing that mutual funds have no preference between improving the
value of a portfolio company and selling to invest elsewhere).
5. In recent years, hedge funds have increasingly invested in leveraged buyouts
and other traditional private equity transactions. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC HEDGE
FUND REPORT] (noting that a number of hedge funds “adopt traditional, long-only
strategies similar to those used by most registered investment companies”); see also
Alan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2005, at
A2 (“Any risk-averse company that wants to sit on a big pile of cash waiting for a rainy
day is likely to find itself under quick attack from [hedge funds] that will come in,
buy up stock, and agitate for change.”); Emily Thornton & Susan Zegel, Hedge Funds:
The New Raiders, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 32 (“Flush with hundreds of billions
of dollars in cash from investors and hard-pressed to maintain the double-digit
returns they promise as competition stiffens, many hedge funds are reinventing
themselves as private investment firms . . . . [T]hey’re seizing control of
companies.”). Thus, to the extent a hedge fund invests in corporate equities with a
view to acquiring control, it may properly be categorized as a private equity fund. See
infra notes 203–207 and accompanying text. Notable examples of this trend include
the acquisitions in 2004 and 2005 of American icons Sears and Kmart by ESL
Investments. See infra note 207.
6. Kings of Capitalism: A Survey of Private Equity, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, at 2.
7. Industry insiders generally articulate this concept by noting that private
equity funds compete based upon four factors: their access to deals, their access to
leverage, their ability to manage costs, and their ability to pick deals. Considered
from the light of corporate governance, however, it seems clear that at least the first
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In doing so, they have effectively resolved corporate law’s
8
fundamental agency problem by reuniting ownership and control.
The result has been annual returns that can be as high as twenty to
9
forty percent or more.

and last of these factors, and probably the third as well, are really just aspects of the
broader competition to minimize agency costs. In other words, the term “deal” in
this formulation must really be interpreted as meaning “deal that presents the
opportunity to identify and minimize agency costs.” Thus, competition in actuality
revolves around the fund managers’ ability to access and select (and manage)
investment opportunities that present excess agency costs.
For examples of research supporting the industry’s success at minimizing agency
costs, see George P. Baker & Karen H. Wruck, Organizational Changes and Value
Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of the O.M. Scott & Sons Company, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 163, 189 (1989) (arguing that the pressure created by a high debt load and
the incentives created by management equity ownership following an LBO lead to
improved firm performance); Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies have an
incentive structure that is superior to that of public corporations); Krishna G.
Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 247, 248–56 (1990)
(summarizing the existing evidence and finding that leveraged buyouts create value
through significant operating performance improvements); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang,
Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance 31–32 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper
No. 139/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=948907 (finding that
activist hedge funds create value for target company shareholders). See also JOSH
LERNER, FELDA HARDYMON & ANN LEAMON, VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE EQUITY: A
CASEBOOK 1 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that private equity funds “protect the value of
their equity stakes by undertaking careful due diligence before making the
investments and retaining powerful oversight rights afterwards”); Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1021, 1062–69 (2007) (discussing the nature of hedge fund monitoring);
Walter Kiechel III, Private Equity’s Long View, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2007, at 18,
19 (arguing that private equity managers, “in their treatment of the businesses they
acquire, are merely putting to use many of the best ideas and analytic techniques that
have been developed in the corporate strategy revolution”).
8. For background on the agency problem that lies at the heart of America’s
separation of ownership and control, see infra Part I.A.
9. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS:
KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 207–09 (1998)
(reporting returns of twenty-five to forty percent on a portfolio of LBO investments);
KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING 74 (William M. Mercer,
Inc. ed. 1996) [hereinafter MERCER REPORT] (finding that “annual returns range
from 0% to more than 30%, with an average of 10% to 20%, far surpassing that 9%
to 10% average returns historically realized by common stock investors”); Michael
Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and The Privatization of Bankruptcy, 2 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 35, 39 (1989) (testifying to Congress that returns on successful LBOs ranged
from forty percent to fifty-six percent); Greg Ip & Henny Sender, Cash Machine: In
Today’s Buyouts, Payday for Firms is Never Far Away, WALL. ST. J., July 25, 2006, at A1
(reporting that buyout funds had average annual returns of twenty-four percent in
2004 and 2005, triple the return of the S&P 500). In 2006, the nation’s highest paid
hedge fund manager posted a forty-four percent return, net of fees, while the second
and third posted returns of around thirty percent and twenty-four and one-half
percent, respectively. Stephen Taub, Top 25 Moneymakers: The New Tycoons, ALPHA,
Apr. 2007, at 39, 42–43.
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Surprisingly, however, most corporate governance scholars have
10
thus far ignored the important role played by private equity funds.
In fact, some have gone so far as to warn against attempts to imagine
a counterfactual world with different legal rules that encourage
11
institutional investor monitoring.
Yet public and private equity
funds are closely related in that both are simply pools of money that
professional fund managers use to purchase securities on behalf of
their investors. As a result, their different approaches to corporate
governance create a sort of natural experiment that is unburdened by
12
differences in culture or time.
By contrasting the various
characteristics and regulatory regimes impacting public and private

10. For three very worthwhile exceptions, see William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds
and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403 (2007) (examining empirical
evidence regarding hedge fund activism); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note
7, at 37 (arguing that “hedge funds are better positioned to act as informed monitors
than most other investors”); and Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1021 (examining the
nature of hedge fund activism and its implications for corporate governance and
regulatory reform). Coffee and Black also made implicit references to private equity
funds when they identified the monitoring role played by fund managers in
leveraged buyouts. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 924–25 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Empirical
Evidence]; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1315 n.159. Finally, Black and Henry Hu have
been critical of the role of hedge funds in decoupling voting rights from economic
ownership at many large corporations. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811,
907 (2006) (analyzing the potential benefits and costs associated with the
increasingly common practice of vote buying).
11. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 830–31 (1992) (“We can’t today answer the
counterfactual questions: How much monitoring would the institutions do if legal
rules were different? How valuable is institutional oversight?”); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative
Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017,
1019, 1031–32 (2005) (arguing that the unique features of mutual fund governance
suggests that “judges and policymakers should not even try to reason by analogy to
governance in other kinds of corporations”).
12. This term was used by Coffee to describe a comparison between U.S. capital
markets and those of Great Britain, the foreign economy most closely resembling
that of the United States. John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A
Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 844 (1994). However, the dichotomy
between public and private equity funds is superior and presents a cleaner
comparison than either a historical or cross-cultural analysis.
While such
comparisons are undoubtedly helpful and provide valuable insights, they suffer
obvious impediments resulting from differences in culture, history and language. See
Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law,
102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2036 (1993) (noting that it is difficult to judge which country’s
system produces the best economic performance); see also Edward B. Rock, America’s
Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 368
(1996) (tracing the emerging interest of comparative corporate governance
scholarship). For this reason, this Article does not attempt to draw any conclusions
based on the distinctions between American private equity markets from those of
Europe or Asia.
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equity funds, I seek to uncover in Parts III and IV important insights
about the continued passivity of public equity funds.
My thesis is that the key difference between public and private
equity funds lies in the types of compensation that fund managers are
13
permitted to charge. Private equity fund managers charge a fee
based on performance, typically retaining for themselves twenty
percent of any profits they produce through effective corporate
14
oversight. By contrast, the individuals who administer mutual funds
and public pension funds are generally limited to charging a flat
15
percentage fee based on the assets they manage. Thus, whereas
managers of private equity funds are entitled to share directly in any
profits that accrue from efficient monitoring, public equity fund
managers have at best an indirect incentive to monitor. Indeed, with
mutual fund fees generally peaking at around one or two percent of
assets under management, the costs of shareholder activism are
almost certain to outweigh such limited benefits.
Put succinctly, private equity funds invest in active corporate
monitoring because the structure of their compensation provides
their managers with a direct financial incentive to do so. As I argue
in Part V, it is not only the high cost of oversight that discourages
monitoring, as some scholars have suggested, but the fact that
monitoring is not profitable for the fund managers in light of such
costs. Like their public company brethren, public equity funds are
fictional legal entities that suffer from their own internal agency
problems, with the interests of fund managers and their investors
16
often differing. Permit the fund managers to share in the profits
from monitoring and you give them a direct financial interest in
more active oversight. The result would be to engage public equity
13. John Coffee made the same point. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63
(arguing that the compensation of public equity fund managers “does little to align
incentives between the manager and the fund it serves . . . incentive compensation
based on capital appreciation would work far better”). However, this Article takes
Coffee’s argument one step further, by expressly comparing the fee structure of
public equity funds with that of private equity funds. It also extends the argument by
concluding that deregulating fund manager compensation would have the effect of
fostering a system of institutional investor control, not merely voice. Cf. Paul G.
Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 179–80
(2004) (raising the possibility of trying to “harness the monitoring efforts of
institutional investors for the benefit of unsophisticated investors” by relaxing the
restrictions on incentive compensation); Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Pay-forPerformance Bedevils Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2005, at C1 (arguing that more
mutual funds should copy hedge funds in adopting performance fees).
14. See infra Part II.D.
15. See infra Part IV.C.3.
16. Rock, supra note 1, at 469–72 (describing the agency problem existing
between public equity fund money managers and their depositors); see also infra Part
V.A (examining existing incentives for public equity fund managers).
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funds, with their vast store of retail dollars, in competition to impose
greater discipline on corporate managers. Indeed, the continued
willingness of sophisticated investors to pay the outsized fees of
private equity fund managers attests to the power of their
compensation model.
In addition to my primary thesis, an important theme of this Article
is that a system characterized by institutional investor voice—as
opposed to institutional investor control—would be too subtle to
succeed. Voice is the term used by scholars to describe a system
wherein shareholders are limited to small, fractional stakes but able
to combine their energies so as to wield greater collective influence
17
over management. It can be contrasted to the private equity model
of acquiring direct control over individual corporations in order to
dictate policy. However, the relatively minor benefits attainable
through the exercise of voice may not be sufficient to justify the
increased expense. Rather, the impetus to monitor requires a much
greater incentive: that which comes from exercising control. Thus, it
may not be possible to obtain the benefits sought by proponents of
increased voice without going one step further and adopting a system
18
of institutional investor control.
Before continuing to the substance of my argument, it is important
to note that a significant debate continues with respect to the
19
advisability of enlisting institutional investors as corporate monitors.
17. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 816 (“Institutional voice means a world in
which particular institutions can easily own 5–10% stakes in particular companies,
but can’t easily own much more than 10%; in which institutions can readily talk to
each other and select a minority of a company’s board of directors, but can’t easily
exercise day-to-day control or select a majority of the board.”). Under some
circumstances, the term “shareholder voice” may also include informal means of
communication between shareholders and corporate managers occurring outside of
the formal voting and proxy system but aimed at and supported by the corporate
franchise. Black, supra note 2, at 522 n.3. It is sometimes used synonymously with
the concept of “investor capitalism.”
18. Part of the explanation for the persistence of our current system of corporate
governance may be attributable to a lingering discomfort among scholars and
policymakers with the notion of financial institutions exercising control over major
American corporations. This, of course, is exactly the point that Mark Roe made
with respect to the nation as a whole. See Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (“Opinion polls
show Americans mistrust large financial institutions with accumulated power and
have always been wary of Wall Street controlling industry.”); see also Kahan & Rock,
supra note 7, at 1042–45 (comparing the nature of hedge fund activism favorably to
the more traditional types of monitoring engaged in by public equity funds).
19. To borrow John Coffee’s typically colorful prose:
One side in this debate tends to see institutional investors essentially as
Gulliver tied down by a host of Lilliputian regulations. . . . Free Gulliver, they
argue, and the market will work. The other side not only believes that the
market today is working satisfactorily, but that it is threatened by . . . [a]
nightmar[ish] vision of the future . . . in which invisible coalitions of
institutional investors can form virtually overnight . . . .
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A group of reform-minded scholars, among them Black, Roe and
Lucian Bebchuk, believe that federal proxy regulations should be
amended to lower the costs associated with institutional investor
activism. For them, managers remain unaccountable and the
increased discipline that would likely come with greater institutional
20
shareholdings would be a net positive. By contrast, a great many
scholars, many of them prominent in the law and economics
21
movement, believe otherwise. There is also a related question as to
whether activist monitoring strategies would impose undue risk on
22
the retirement savings of retail investors.
Finally, not everyone

Coffee, supra note 12, at 842. For an assessment of some of the risks associated with
institutional investor monitoring, see id. at 871–75; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1329–36.
See also Roe, supra note 2, at 53–67 (“Concentrated financial capital does not mix well
with a broad-based egalitarian democracy in which interest groups can acquire great
influence . . . .”).
20. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 835–36 (2005) (advocating proxy reform in order to encourage the
exercise of institutional investor voice); Black, supra note 11, at 812–15 (arguing that
institutional investor oversight of corporate wrongdoing is not only possible but
desirable); see Roe, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that when General Motors faced
bankruptcy due to mismanagement in the 1920s, Pierre DuPont—who owned twentyfive percent of GM—relocated to Detroit and reorganized the company without a
proxy fight or hostile takeover (citing ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. & STEPHEN SALISBURY,
PIERRE S. DU PONT AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 457–560 (1971)));
see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1489, 1502–17 (1970) (arguing at an early date that five-percent shareholders should
be entitled to use management’s proxy materials); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43
STAN. L. REV. 863, 883–92 (1991) (recommending a program of increased
institutional investor activism).
21. For a sample of critiques of proposals to increase shareholder power, see
generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for
Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Politics]; Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and
Institutional Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
977, 1038–39 (1993); K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in
Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1425 (2004); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
Election Contests In the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW.
67 (2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response
to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006).
22. See Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate
Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing that the primary purpose of institutional
investors is to shield their customers from undue risk). But see Gregory S. Alexander,
Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112 (1993) (arguing that the
regulation of retirement plans combines passivity with paternalism in a manner that
“denies pension participants the political and moral virtues that historically have
been associated with the two great models of ownership that have competed since
the nineteenth century: liberalism and socialism”).
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believes that private equity funds have a positive impact on either the
23
companies in which they invest or society as a whole.
I do not attempt to answer such questions in this Article, nor do I
attempt to make any type of cross-cultural analysis of foreign
regulatory systems. Rather, the purpose of this Article is to provide a
roadmap for those who would enlist public equity funds as monitors
of corporate America, thereby bringing retail investment dollars into
the market for good corporate governance. Existing research on
public equity funds provides an inadequate explanation for their
continued passivity. Thus, my goal is to advance the scholarly
thinking on the subject by offering a new methodology of
comparison and a new exemplar of corporate discipline.
Private equity funds engage in the kind of aggressive monitoring
that is absent from the investment strategies of most public equity
funds. By building on their example, regulators can fundamentally
alter the relationship between corporate managers and their
shareholders. In particular, they can help promote a competitive
marketplace for good corporate governance.
I.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR MONITORING

Part I of this Article explores the puzzle presented by public equity
funds: given their size and resources, why have they remained such
passive investors? After presenting some general background on
corporate governance in Part I.A, Parts I.B and I.C review the existing
scholarship regarding institutional investor monitoring. Part I.D
then considers various efforts that have been undertaken to reform
the federal proxy system in order to encourage public equity funds to
engage more actively in oversight activities. Finally, Part I.E examines
the current landscape and concludes that, even after substantial legal
reform and scholarly attention, public equity funds remain as
stubbornly passive today as when they were first “discovered” by
scholars in the early 1990s.

23. As an example, a number of legal scholars have been critical of the structure
of leveraged buyouts undertaken by LBO funds. See Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged
Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (1987) (summarizing
arguments against LBOs); see also Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1366 (1978) (arguing that LBOs
offer little more than an opportunity for management to benefit at the expense of
stockholders); Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating
or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 218–23 (1988)
(summarizing potential abuses of the use of leverage).
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A. Background
It is by now an old and familiar story that America’s system of
corporate governance is characterized by a separation of ownership
and control. As we have known since the 1930s, shareholders, despite
being the corporation’s residual claimants, possess little to no direct
power over the officers and directors who control its day-to-day
24
affairs.
The cause is atomization: unlike their counterparts in
Europe and Japan, American shareholders tend to own small,
fractional stakes in any given corporation, preferring instead to
25
diversify their investments across a wide number of stocks.
The result of our system of dispersed share ownership is a collective
26
action problem that leads inexorably to rational shareholder apathy.
For any one shareholder, the cost of monitoring corporate
27
management almost certainly outweighs the potential benefits. This
24. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (offering the first complete description of the separation of
ownership and control); see also Bainbridge, Politics, supra note 21, at 674–78 (arguing
that “shareholders of a public corporation have neither the legal right, the practical
ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful
monitoring of the corporation’s agents”). This separation has been embedded in
the corporate statutes of all fifty states in the statutory delegation of power to the
board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (“The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation
shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board
of directors. . . .”).
25. See Roe, supra note 2, at 12–16 (recounting the traditional Berle-Means story).
The American system is often contrasted with those of Germany and Japan. In
Germany in 1985, for example, banks effectively exercised control over thirty-four
percent of the voting power of the top one hundred companies, and over fifty
percent of the voting power of the top ten. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1303. Japanese
financial institutions have similarly dominated industrial firms through the keiretsu
system. Id. at 1294–1302. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 641, 641 (1999) (noting that “contemporary empirical evidence finds that, even
at the level of the largest firms, dispersed share ownership is . . . largely limited to the
United States and Great Britain”).
26. For a superb explication of corporate law’s agency problem and collective
action problem from the law and economics tradition, see Rock, supra note 1, at 453–
63 (summarizing the work of Mancur Olson, Russell Hardin, Albert Hirschman and
others). See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organizations, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972) (arguing that it is
neither desirable nor feasible for individual shareholders to participate in each
decision in a corporation); Black, supra note 2, at 526 n.10 (cataloguing law and
economics scholarship that views passivity as inevitable and therefore opposes
legislative efforts to reform the proxy system).
27. Roe gives the example of the shareholder who owns $10 million of the stock
of a $10 billion company. Such investor should rationally decline to invest $100,000
in monitoring activities even if such amount would create $100 million in additional
value for the company. Roe, supra note 2, at 14.
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is because those benefits must be shared pro rata with one’s fellow
shareholders. Thus, when an investment turns sour, American
shareholders rationally prefer to sell their shares rather than attempt
28
to influence management to improve its performance.
The fundamental problem of corporate law is that this separation
of ownership and control causes the interests of shareholders and
29
managers to diverge, thereby producing agency costs. For example,
shareholders would generally prefer that managers work diligently,
competently, honestly and efficiently. Managers, on the other hand,
often use their discretion over a corporation’s affairs to benefit
themselves, either through lawful mechanisms such as high salaries
and lavish benefits, or occasionally through unlawful means such as
occurred most recently and spectacularly at the likes of Enron and
30
WorldCom. The result is a loss of value for shareholders and a
31
disincentive for the optimal level of investment.
Admittedly, the traditional image of countless small investors each
32
owning a few isolated shares is outdated. Today, over sixty percent
of all securities in the United States are held by large and
28. See generally Black, supra note 2, at 526–29 (describing what he terms “The
Passivity Story”).
29. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1 (1970) (“Under any economic, social, or
political system, individuals, business firms, and organizations in general are subject
to lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional
behavior. No matter how well a society’s basic institutions are devised, failures of
some actors to live up to the behavior which is expected of them are bound to
occur. . . .”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors 7
(UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-20, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (arguing that “agency costs are the inescapable
result of placing ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of someone other
than the residual claimant”).
30. Roe, supra note 2, at 12 (“Managers want high salaries, nice offices, and, if
the firm is large enough, corporate jets. Occasionally they take corporate
opportunities for themselves. Much more perniciously, many managers pursue
operating policies that diminish social wealth.”). For a discussion of executive
compensation issues, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Mark J. Loewenstein,
The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000); Charles
M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271 (1999).
31. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976)
(discussing the economic theory behind the divergence of interests between
principals and agents). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION
63–68 (1974) (examining the conflicting goals of those in authority and those not in
authority within various societal organizations).
32. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (“The passivity story also assumes a company
with thousands of anonymous shareholders, each owning a tiny fraction of the
company’s voting stock. That assumption, never wholly true, is increasingly obsolete.
Institutional investors have grown large enough so that a limited number of
institutions own a sizeable percentage of the shares of most public companies.”).

2007]

WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA

237

33

sophisticated institutional investors.
However, so long as
institutional investors continue to pursue passive investment
strategies, the fact of their higher ownership percentages will remain
largely irrelevant for corporate governance purposes. Their function
is to provide retail investors with the benefits of a diversified
portfolio, not to act on their own behalf as independent players in
34
the financial markets.
For most companies, then, ultimate
beneficial ownership remains widely dispersed.
Moreover, the underlying agency problem has been exacerbated
because management has used its power over the corporate purse to
protect itself from outside discipline. Not only is management’s
35
discretion increasingly shielded by the business judgment rule, for
33. See Institutional Investors Snap Up U.S. Stocks, REUTERS, Jan. 22, 2007, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com.news/business/20070122-155-investors-ownership.h
tml (summarizing 2005 data collected by the Conference Board); see also INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 10 (47th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK] (reporting that registered investment companies
held twenty-five percent of the outstanding stock of all U.S. companies at the end of
2006, and were also the largest holders of U.S. commercial paper). U.S. investment
companies also play an outsized role in foreign capital markets. See INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra (reporting that, in 2006, “U.S. investment companies
purchased approximately 55 percent of the $290 billon in foreign stocks and bonds
that U.S. residents acquired”).
34. See Allan F. Conwill, Blight or Blessing? The Wharton School Study of Mutual
Funds, 18 BUS. LAW. 663, 667 (1963) (“[A]n investor of moderate means cannot
achieve the diversification provided by most funds by individual investment in
selected stocks. Unless he has substantial funds available, he cannot buy each of the
one hundred or more securities which are in the portfolio of the typical mutual
fund. Thus, the mutual fund provides the modest investor with an easy and
convenient vehicle for achieving diversification.”); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 180
(“Mutual funds give investors the benefit of diversification and, if the fund is actively
managed, professional money management.”); Smith, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing
that the primary purpose of institutional investors is to shield their customers from
undue risk via diversification).
35. The business judgment rule is a presumption that managers, when making a
business decision, do so “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). It is generally understood as protecting managerial
discretion by barring courts and shareholders from second-guessing board decisions
unless certain exceptions apply. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123
(1986) (noting that “the mere mention of the business judgment rule brings smiles
of relief to corporate directors”). The adoption by the Delaware legislature of
section 102(b)(7), which authorizes corporations to limit or eliminate the personal
liability of directors for breaches of their fiduciary duty of care, as well as recent
caselaw regarding the duty of good faith, appear part of a trend to minimize the
impact of those exceptions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Stone
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006) (holding that defendant directors could
not be found liable for failing to prevent employee actions that led to $50 million in
fines because the directors had exercised their oversight responsibility in good faith
by implementing what the court considered a reasonable reporting system, despite
the fact that system had ultimately proven to be ineffective); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (holding that the business judgment
rule protected the actions of directors of The Walt Disney Company in agreeing to
terminate then-president Michael Ovitz on a no-fault basis, thereby allowing him to
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example, but managers have shown themselves to be adept at
36
37
manipulating politics and the press, as well as at co-opting their
leave the company with a lucrative severance package); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 267 (Del. 2000) (holding that the business judgment rule protected the actions
of directors of The Walt Disney Company in approving what plaintiffs characterized
as an extravagant and wasteful employment agreement for Michael Ovitz as the
company’s president).
For an interesting take on how existing law regarding the duty of care could be
interpreted expansively, see Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging
Due Care for Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOV. L.
REV. 438, 468–69 (2007) (arguing that, in order to satisfy the duty of care, a manager
must inform herself as to the environmental and social impacts of corporate
decisions).
36. Management’s successful lobbying of state politicians during the “takeover
wars” of the 1980s is well known and resulted in a wide variety of anti-takeover
legislation. See, e.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Del. 1988)
(summarizing the operation and effect of various anti-takeover statutes). Many of
these statutes were written and adopted in haste at the request of a local firm that was
facing the threat of a hostile takeover. According to Dale Oesterle:
When rumors circulated about a takeover of Boeing Corporation, for
example, the Washington legislature met in emergency session and
approved a bill, signed immediately by the governor, that had been drafted
by Boeing counsel. Arizona state officials, at the request of Greyhound
Corporation, introduced, adopted, and signed into law the Arizona Control
Share Act in three days. It took Illinois only two days and Minnesota only
one to pass their statutes. The governor of Massachusetts signed the
Massachusetts statute in the offices of Gillette, a takeover target at the time.
DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 615 (3d ed. 2005). More
recently, management has scored notable successes by quashing a proposal to
significantly overhaul the proxy process and convincing the SEC to water down new
rules on reporting executive compensation. With respect to the SEC’s proposed
overhaul of the proxy system, see infra Part I.D. With respect to the rules on
executive compensation, see Gretchen Morgenson, Weird and Weirder Numbers on Pay
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, (Sunday Business) at 1; John Schwartz,
Transparency, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C1.
There has also been a great deal of lobbying aimed at lessening the impact of
Sarbanes-Oxley on small businesses. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Investors’ Suits Face
Higher Bar, Justices Decide, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1 (reporting that, with the
end of the Bush Administration looming, “industry groups and allies in academia
have urged the Administration, Congress and regulators to make it harder for
investors and consumers to sue companies [and] have also sought to relax some of
the provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”). In fact, until the failure of
WorldCom, it appeared that management might be successful in staving off any
effort at reform proposed in the wake of Enron’s collapse. Ironically, one event that
may have helped to change the then-dimming prospects for reform was a speech by
President Bush that was intended to reassure markets but that instead coincided with
a sharp fall on Wall Street. See David E. Sanger, How a Clear Strategy Got Muddy Results,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at C1 (noting that the Dow Jones industrial average
dropped 473 points, or five percent, in the three days following the President’s
speech); see also Floyd Norris, Real Reform: What Bush Might Have Said, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2002, at C1 (suggesting that a speech proposing stronger corporate reforms
would have gotten a better market reception); David E. Sanger & David E.
Rosenbaum, White House Moves to Limit Corporate Scandals’ Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2002, at A1 (describing political maneuvering by the Bush Administration aimed at
containing fallout from the accounting scandals and the volatile stock market). The
Senate approved its version of Sarbanes-Oxley 97–0 only hours after a second speech
by President Bush, this one in Birmingham, Alabama, in which he again attempted
to reassure investors even as the Dow Jones industrial average plunged another 440
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supposed gatekeepers. In the judicial arena, corporate managers
continue to score impressive victories against class action lawsuits,
including the recent Supreme Court decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
39
Issues & Rights, Ltd. They have apparently “won” the takeover wars,
effectively insulating themselves from all but the most costly of proxy

points. David E. Sanger & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Approves a Broad Overhaul of
Business Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at A1.
37. Corporate public relations efforts currently appear aimed at laying the
groundwork for a further rollback of Sarbanes-Oxley. They are spreading the notion
that America’s share of the worldwide initial public offering (“IPO”) market is being
diminished by its draconian recordkeeping and certification requirements. See, e.g.,
Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at C1
(reporting on a speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox in which Cox blames
Sarbanes-Oxley for America’s perceived loss of IPO market share). In fact, America’s
share of global stock-market activity has increased, rather than fallen, over the past
decade, with the U.S. market for equities growing at almost twice the pace of many
foreign exchanges. See James Surowiecki, The Financial Page: Over There, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 5, 2007, at 29; see also Greg Ip, Maybe U.S. Markets Are Still Supreme, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 27, 2007, at C1 (reporting on a study conducted by investment management
scholars Andrew Karolyi, Rene Stulz, and Craig Doidge, which concluded that there
is no evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley has led to foreign companies listing their shares
in London instead of New York). For an almost farcical example of management’s
manipulation of the media, see Stewart’s Prison Life: Martha Popular with Lunch Crowd,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 2004, at A12 (painting a domestic picture of prison life for “the
famous homemaker” by highlighting the fact that she was serving time—and having
lunch—with an anti-war Catholic nun).
38. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 55–56 (2006) (summarizing several theories explaining the failure of
gatekeepers—auditors, attorneys, etc.—to avoid the scandals at Enron and
WorldCom, including the theory that corporate managers pressured or seduced
their advisers into abetting their wrongdoing). Post-Sarbanes-Oxley examples of
apparently legal manipulation by management include using record-breaking
corporate profits to redeem shares—and hence push up the value of management
stock options—rather than make capital or other long-term investments, and
deliberately underestimating corporate profits so as to minimize the risk of liability
for a subsequent restatement of financial reports. See, e.g., Buttonwood: Companies Are
Buying Back Their Own Shares at a Record Rate, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2007, at 87 (noting
that “businesses are buying back shares, rather than investing in new plant and
equipment”); Paul Krugman, Editorial, Another Economic Disconnect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2007, at A21 (“Instead of investing in physical capital, many companies are using
profits to buy back their own stock. And cynics suggest that the purpose of these
buybacks is to produce a temporary rise in stock prices that increases the value of
executives’ stock options, even if it’s against the long-term interests of investors.”);
Floyd Norris, Why Won’t Companies Invest More?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at C1
(quoting public remarks by Robert W. Parenteau, the chief U.S. economist and
strategist for a subsidiary of Allianz, the German bank and insurance company, to the
effect that American companies are using historically high corporate profits to buy
back shares, thereby pushing up the value of management stock options).
39. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (ruling 8–1 that shareholders must show “cogent and
compelling evidence” of intent to defraud in order to sustain a securities class action
lawsuit); see also Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1 (quoting an executive at the National Chamber
Litigation Center, which represents the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in the Supreme
Court, as stating that the 2006–2007 Roberts Court was “our best Supreme Court
term ever”); Stephen Labaton, Investors’ Suits Face Higher Bar, Justices Decide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1 (discussing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.).

240

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:225

contests and generally reducing even successful shareholder
40
Even the adoption of the
proposals to a merely advisory role.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has had only marginal impact on the level
41
of managerial accountability.
As Mark Roe has demonstrated, however, the American system is
most likely the product of a political choice, rather than an inevitable
42
result of market or other historical forces. Americans appear to
have long distrusted large accumulations of capital, fearing the power
43
of wealth more than they feared the power of industrial capacity. As
a result, over the years, American corporate law has slowly
accumulated a series of rules that discourage shareholders from
acquiring more than five (or sometimes ten) percent of any given
44
corporation.
The separation of ownership and control has thus
40. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1993) (announcing famously:
“The takeover wars are over. Management won.”). For a recent example of the
ability of a corporate board to thwart a takeover attempt that is popular with its
shareholders, see Gretchen Morgenson, A Board That Knows Two Words: No Sale, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2007, (Sunday Business) at 1 (reporting on a $400 million offer for
Midwest Air Group: “While Midwest’s stockholders are jumping up and down for the
deal, its directors have staunchly rejected it. As a result, some Midwest shareholders
wonder whether the board is performing its duty to the company’s owners or acting
instead to benefit a management with whom it has long been associated.”).
41. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight,
31 J. CORP. L. 39, 60 (2005) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley set modest goals—
deterring and catching illegal acts—and is still unlikely to meet them); Robert W.
Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 49–52
(2003) (describing the mostly unfavorable reactions of commentators following
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). For a more critical view of the Act, see
Robert Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (“An extensive empirical literature suggests that
[the] mandates [imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] were seriously misconceived,
because they are not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise enhance firm
performance and thereby benefit investors as Congress intended.”).
42. Roe, supra note 2, at 10. Roe has also extended his analysis of the political
roots of corporate governance and applied it to the international stage. E.g., MARK J.
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT,
CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
43. See Roe, supra note 2, at 31–53 (arguing that restraints on the power of
institutional investors arose from a combination of populist distrust of financial
institutions, interest group politics, and the federalist structure of the American
constitution); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 89, 89–90 (1990) (stating that the theme behind state and federal government
efforts to limit investors’ influence over the governance of publicly traded
corporations is that “society cannot trust stockholders and bondholders to promote
the ‘public interest’”). But see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1280 (arguing that “the
populist image of a domineering J.P. Morgan seems to have been forever erased
from the public’s mind” and that bank weakness, not bank strength, is the greater
concern).
44. See Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that “American law and politics
deliberately diminished the power of financial institutions to hold the large equity
blocks that would foster serious oversight of managers”); see also Bainbridge, supra
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become deeply embedded in the fundamental workings of our legal
system.
And yet, despite Roe’s admonition, much of the history of
corporate governance reform has been directed at empowering some
intermediary body to serve as a check against excessive managerial
45
discretion. Thus, scholars and policymakers have, at various times
46
and often at the same time, sought to enlist independent directors,
note 29, at 4 (describing how current laws discourage the formation of large stock
blocks as well as communication and coordination among shareholders); Black,
supra note 2, at 530–64 (cataloguing the rules governing shareholder voting). Coffee
has added to this analysis the suggestion that various non-legal factors, such as
conflicts of interest, also discourage shareholders from amassing too large a stake in
any one company. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1317–29.
45. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 817 (explaining that “institutional voice
means asking one set of agents (money managers) to watch another set of agents
(corporate managers)”). It is worth noting that this search for an effective monitor
has not been linear, nor has it focused exclusively on one agent. Rather, it has
jumped from agent to agent, occasionally re-discovered a previously discarded agent,
and often taken a shotgun approach, seeking to enlist the power of several monitors
at once. See, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 38, at 1–5 (attempting to enlist as monitors,
simultaneously, auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and
investment bankers, among others).
At the same time, it should also be recognized that there has been a countervailing
push to expand managerial discretion and thus insulate managers from what is
sometimes viewed as too much oversight. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–74
(2003) (presenting a theory of corporate governance, director primacy, which is
based on the notion that “the board of directors is not a mere agent of the
shareholders, but rather is a sui generis body—a sort of Platonic guardian”). This
trend can be seen, for example, in the expansion of the business judgment rule and
the more recent rollback of the fiduciary duties of care and good faith. See supra
note 35 (discussing Delaware caselaw that expanded protections for corporate
directors). In a more practical application of the trend, the founders of Google,
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, took an unconventional approach to broad managerial
discretion when they inserted in their IPO registration statement a letter to investors
stating that its corporate structure “is likely to leave [the management team] with
significant control over the company’s decisions and fate . . . . New investors will fully
share in Google’s long term growth but will have less influence over its strategic
decisions than they would at most public companies.” Letter is Manifesto of Founders,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2004, at A10; see also Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Google Baloney,
WALL ST. J., May 5, 2004, at A15 (critiquing Google’s efforts to “entrench insiders in
control of the company” when it went public in 2004); Richard Waters, Google in Plan
for $2.7 Bn Flotation, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A1 (describing Google’s unusual
stock offering).
46. See, e.g., JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 173–75 (1989) (recommending a reduced
role for the CEO in selecting directors as a way to increase director independence
and thereby improve corporate governance); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at
883–92 (proposing that institutional investors take an active role in electing
independent, professional directors). But see, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent
Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 658 (1982)
(analyzing past performance of independent directors and concluding that it is
unrealistic to suggest that the independent director can be successful in fostering
social responsibility). For a more nuanced view, see Donald Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence
and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810–14 (2001) (arguing that the small group
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hostile raiders, debtholders, institutional investors, and, most
50
recently, gatekeepers as substitute corporate monitors. The idea has
been that, if it is impossible to completely align the interests of
shareholders and managers, it may be possible to better align the
interests of shareholders and these various market players, thus
51
minimizing overall agency costs. In effect, by seeking to interpose a
dynamics of the board could be disrupted by too great a concentration of
independent directors).
47. See Grundfest, supra note 40, at 869–73 (discussing the power of takeovers as
a disciplinary mechanism); see also Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory,
Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 122–33 (1992) (analyzing two valuemaximizing efficiency explanations of takeovers: realizing synergy gains and
reducing agency costs); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (arguing that takeovers protect the interests of noncontrolling shareholders by providing some assurance of efficiency among corporate
managers).
48. See Baker & Wruck, supra note 7, at 163, 169 (arguing that the pressure of
servicing a high debt load following an LBO leads to improved firm performance);
Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (arguing that a high debt load forces managers to
become more disciplined in order to make periodic debt payments and meet
quarterly financial goals); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1995) (proposing a
theory of interactive corporate governance that is not centered on equity). But see
Roe, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that creditors tend to avoid exercising control
because of the increased risk of liability).
49. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 812–17 (arguing that legal reforms should be
undertaken to facilitate oversight by institutional investors); Coffee, supra note 2, at
1336 (stating that the benefits of institutional monitoring would outweigh the costs).
50. See COFFEE, supra note 38, at 6–8 (“Effective corporate governance requires a
chain of actors: directors, managers, and gatekeepers.”).
51. It is important to note, however, that an alternative thread of corporate law
reform has been aimed at reducing agency costs by effectively reuniting ownership
and control. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31, at 309 (stating that “the
issues associated with the ‘separation of ownership and control’ . . . are intimately
associated with the general problem of agency”). For example, a number of scholars
have argued that business executives should be compensated primarily through
grants of stock options that would serve to better align the interests of managers and
shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How
Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138–39 (arguing that
basing CEO salaries on a pay for performance structure would lead to a substantial
increase in corporate performance). Charles Elson has extended this argument to
directors, and it was picked up by Bill Clinton as far back as his initial bid for the
presidency. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 164–73 (1996). It has
since been incorporated into the federal tax code. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2007)
(imposing an excise tax on compensation paid to certain “covered employees” to the
extent it exceeds $1 million, other than “remuneration payable solely on account of
the attainment of one or more performance goals” including stock options).
More recently, options have come under attack as creating perverse incentives for
managers. See, e.g., Roger L. Martin, Taking Stock, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2003, at 19
(“Motivating managers with company stock can do damage on a grand scale,
encouraging them to pursue strategies that fatten their wallets at shareholders’
expense.”); M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic
Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1605–07 (2007)
(noting that when a manager participates in backdating, “shareholders may be
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monitor between shareholders and managers, each of these reform
efforts has sought to convert our two-tiered system of corporate
governance into something more closely approximating a threetiered system.
Rather than merely involve managers and
shareholders, such a system would involve managers, shareholders
and monitors. Each such effort, however, has disappointed, been the
52
object of easy manipulation, or been defeated politically. Corporate
managers therefore remain largely free of any significant oversight
and the goal of enlisting an outside corporate monitor has remained
both elusive and ongoing. Thus, because shareholders are unable to
discipline errant managers on their own, a new monitor is required
53
to engage in discipline and oversight on their behalf.
B. The “Discovery” of Public Equity Funds
Near the end of the 1980s, observers had begun to realize that the
much-heralded market for corporate control would fail as a
mechanism for causing managers to adhere more closely to
misled into believing that management’s interests are firmly aligned with theirs
through the compensation package, when in fact executives can receive additional
compensation without stock prices rising”); Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect
Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2003) (noting that “stock option programs not only
failed to meet their avowed goal of aligning managerial and shareholder interests,
they created perverse incentives for abusing shareholders”).
Interestingly, many important legal scholars have advocated both approaches to
corporate governance reform, making it an overstatement to refer to them as
different or competing schools of thought. Rather, attempts to reunite ownership
and control have lived side-by-side with attempts to add an additional layer of
monitoring. The goal of each has been to minimize net agency costs, and the
internal conflict between the two approaches seems not to have been given much
thought in the literature.
52. For example, it turns out that not only are gatekeepers and independent
directors easily co-opted, but they also suffer from various innate psychological and
other infirmities that impair that ability to serve as effective monitors. See, e.g.,
Langevoort, supra note 46, at 810–14 (arguing that too much independence in the
boardroom can create overly adversarial relationships and interfere with the board’s
effectiveness). Similarly, the market for corporate control was crushed in the late
1980s by the political power of management, making the threat of hostile takeovers
no longer effective at disciplining underperforming managers. See, e.g., Lucian A.
Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889–91 (2002)
(tracing the antitakeover protection that U.S. public companies now enjoy to
shareholders’ approval of staggered boards prior to 1990).
53. Regarding what is meant by the terms “monitor” and “discipline,” see Rock,
supra note 1, at 453–54:
I use the term “discipline” rather than the more common term “monitoring”
because effective oversight requires more than monitoring management’s
performance; it requires doing something about suboptimal performance.
“Discipline” thus encompasses a wide range of activities, from the subtle
constraining influence of a watchful analyst, through the informal pressure
of a large shareholder, to the drama of a change of management through a
proxy fight or a sale of the firm.
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54

shareholder interests. By then, corporate managers had begun to
55
successfully fight back against most unfriendly takeover attempts.
Thenceforth, they would be protected by a combination of poison
pills, staggered boards, and the wide discretion granted them by the
56
business judgment rule.
If management discretion was to be
checked, a different monitor was clearly needed.
Enter the institutional investor. By the early 1990s, a series of
forces had conspired to generate the incredible vastness that now
epitomizes banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and pension
54. See, e.g., Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 896 (noting that “hostile
takeovers are nearly dead, killed by a combination of lender retrenchment and
political hostility. And hostile bids were no panacea: our corporate landscape is still
littered with the carcasses of the overpriced deals of the late 1980s”); Grundfest,
supra note 40, at 858 (“Although hostile tender offers remain technically possible,
the legal and financial barriers in their path are far higher today than they were a few
short years ago. As a result, it will be difficult for hostile bidders to prevail in
takeover battles, even if shareholders support the insurgents’ efforts.”); see also
Coffee, supra note 2, at 1278 (noting the changes in academic thinking that were
arising even “[a]s the takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs”). A mere four percent of
deals struck in 2000 were either hostile or unsolicited, although that number has
climbed back up to twenty percent in 2007. The Global Merger Boom: The Beat Goes On,
ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 77. Interestingly, the decline in takeover activity may
also have encouraged academics to consider the question of the role that politics—as
opposed to markets—play in shaping corporate governance. Coffee, supra note 2, at
1278.
55. Management’s war against hostile takeovers resulted in significant legal
reform as well as repeatedly favorable judicial opinions, especially in Delaware.
Examples of 1980s-era court victories by defenders of corporate prerogatives include
Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1348 (Del. Ch. 1985) (upholding the
validity of the poison pill), Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del.
1985) (upholding the validity of certain discriminatory defensive techniques utilized
by the target board and establishing a new fiduciary standard of review), and CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 70–71 (1987) (upholding the
constitutionality of certain state antitakeover statutes). For a lively description of the
pro-management politics behind these statutes, see supra note 36. See also R. Franklin
Balotti & Michael J. Feinstein, State Takeover Statutes, in 2 HOSTILE BATTLES FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 119, 126–62 (1990) (compiling state antitakeover statutes
adopted in the wake of the takeover wars of the 1980s).
56. In order to combat the efficacy of the poison pill, bidders began in the late
1980s to combine tender offers with proxy fights. The idea was that, after a
successful proxy fight, the new directors could redeem the pill, thereby permitting
the tender offer to move forward. This was the strategy at issue in Blasius Industries,
Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). In order to thwart this strategy,
companies began having staggered boards, so that it would take two successive proxy
contests to take control of the board. This combination, together with the
protection of the business judgment rule, has proved almost unbeatable. See
Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 889–91 (discussing how the
combination of staggered boards and poison pills drastically reduced the success of
hostile takeovers). Nonetheless, unsolicited bids still do occasionally work, provided
the suitor offers a high enough premium (known as a “bear hug”) to convert an
unfriendly deal into a friendly one. See, e.g., David Carr, Once Again, Murdoch’s Siren
Song, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at C1 (correctly predicting at the outset that Rupert
Murdoch’s hostile bid to acquire the Dow Jones Corporation “will be [completed] at
some point, regardless of what the [controlling shareholders] said last week. Bruteforce capital, like flood waters, always finds a way to break through”).
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funds. The Baby Boom generation had begun saving for retirement,
57
and stocks seemed to be the best place to put their money. Then, in
what became something of a virtuous cycle, the more the public
invested, the more dollars were available for advertising, which in
58
turn attracted more capital. At the same time, Congress accelerated
the flow of funds into institutional investor coffers by creating certain
tax advantages for fund investments, most notably the 401(k) savings
59
account and the individual retirement account.
The results amounted to nothing less than an explosion in the size
of American capital markets. According to numbers that were in use
at the time, institutional ownership of U.S. stocks surged from about
60
eight percent in 1950 to over forty-five percent in 1989. In terms of
dollars, the total value of institutional investor holdings grew from
around $673 billion in 1970 to over $11 trillion in 1996—a sixteen-

57. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 353; see also Michael J. McDermott, Boom Time
with the Boomers, FIN. PLANNING, Oct. 1996, at 38 (“From now into the next century,
one American will turn 50 years old every 8 seconds. That makes the country’s 76
million baby boomers the mother lode of financial planning.”).
58. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS
UNDOING 116–17 (2004) (describing this cycle).
59. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 353. The moniker 401(k) refers to a section of the
tax code adopted by the Internal Revenue Act of 1978. IRAs were created in 1974 by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and expanded under President
Reagan by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Both sections establish tax
advantages for retirement savings and were subsequently expanded and/or
enhanced by rule and by statutes, including the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001.
As an interesting side note, section 401(k) was originally intended to expand
profit-sharing opportunities, rather than retirement savings. It was only when
Theodore Benna, an employee benefit consultant in Newtown, Pennsylvania,
realized that the provision could be used by employers to create savings plans that its
true impact began to be understood. See Robert Metz, Market Place; Little-Noticed Tax
Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1981, at D8 (explaining contemporaneously the benefits
of this heretofore unknown tax shelter); Fred Williams, R. Theodore Benna: Founder,
the 401(k) Association, Jersey Shore, Pa., PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 16
(noting that “Ted Benna didn’t set out to revolutionize the world of retirement
saving . . . . Still, he wound up being credited with creating the first 401(k) plan”). At
the end of 2006, U.S. investors maintained approximately $2.7 trillion in 401(k)
accounts, up from $385 billion in 1990, and $4.2 trillion in IRAs, up from $637
billion in 1990. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 73, 77.
60. Rock, supra note 1, at 447 (citing the NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FACT BOOK 4 (1990)). Because of the difficulty associated
with compiling accurate data regarding fund activities, and because definitions
sometimes vary, estimates as to size also frequently vary. According to another
contemporary source, for example, institutional investor holdings represented thirtyeight percent of all U.S. markets in 1981 and approximately fifty-three percent in
1990. Black, supra note 11, at 827 (citing CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & PATRICK A.
GAUGHAN, THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS tbl.10
(1991 update)).
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61

fold increase in under a generation.
Today, various estimates
suggest that institutional investors hold as much as $24 trillion in U.S.
stocks, or over sixty percent of the market capitalization of all U.S.
62
companies. Moreover, the trend continues to accelerate. In 2006,
$474 billion of new capital flowed into mutual funds, a rate that is up
63
from the pace of the prior four years. All told, approximately half of
all U.S. households now own shares in one or more investment
64
funds.
It was in this context—the failure of hostile takeovers and the rise
of the institutional investor—that a group of scholars began to think
seriously about the potential for institutional investors to act as
65
corporate monitors. Mark Roe, Bernard Black and John Coffee,
each then teaching at Columbia, along with Ed Rock of the University
of Pennsylvania, together produced a voluminous literature in the
early 1990s regarding the potential for institutional investors to be
66
enlisted in the quest for better corporate governance.
Other
67
scholars concurred in their support or argued closely related points.
61. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 354 (citing a series of “Institutional Investment
Reports” published in 1998 by the Global Research Council of the Conference
Board).
62. Institutional Investors Snap Up U.S. Stocks, supra note 33 (summarizing 2005
data collected by the Conference Board). Because of variations regarding how to
define the various categories, different sources suggest different numbers. The
Reuters figures, for example, included “U.S. pension funds, money managers,
insurance companies and foundations.” Id. Thus, bank holdings were omitted from
these figures, as were the holdings of private equity funds.
63. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 17.
64. Id. at 57.
65. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 1, at 448 (noting that “dramatic developments”
regarding institutional investors “hold the promise of enormous changes in the
nature of corporate law”). Coffee described the new attention being devoted to
institutional investor monitoring as amounting to a “paradigm shift.” Coffee, supra
note 2, at 1278–79. Interestingly, at the time of the discovery of the size and power
of institutional investors, contemporaries estimated their combined holdings at $7.5
trillion, or less than one-third of today’s estimates. See Roe, supra note 2, at 16
(noting—with some degree of awe—that commercial banks, mutual funds, insurance
companies and pension funds held, respectively, assets worth $3.2 trillion, $548
billion, $1.8 trillion, and $1.9 trillion).
66. Black, supra note 2, at 520 (1990–1991); Black, supra note 11, at 811 (1991–
1992); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 895 (1991–1992); Coffee, supra note
2, at 1277 (1991); Coffee, supra note 12, at 837 (1993–1994); Rock, supra note 1, at
445 (1990–1991); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7, 29–35 (1990); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the
Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1991) [hereinafter
Roe, Mutual Funds]; Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (1991); Mark J. Roe, The Modern
Corporation and Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 76–79 (1993) [hereinafter Roe,
Private Pensions].
67. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate
Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1991) (assessing the advantages of increasing
institutional investor participation in corporate governance and recommending
strategies for such participation); Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 836 (arguing
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The hope was that institutional investors—and in particular, public
equity funds—had the size, sophistication and, potentially, the
68
incentive to serve as ideal corporate monitors.
It is important to note that the model of governance that these
69
scholars contemplated was one of institutional investor voice. For
the most part, they were comfortable with the common practice by
institutional (and other) investors of owning a small fraction of the
stock of any given company. What they proposed was not for
institutional investors to seek to acquire control over individual
companies, but rather for them to work together to become more
active in voting campaigns and more effective in informal
70
communications with management. Thus, to this group of scholars,
enlisting institutional investors as corporate monitors would only be
an incremental change. The fundamentals of the system would not
be altered. Rather, individual companies would continue to be
owned by a large number of shareholders, but those shareholders
71
would pool their resources to provide better oversight.
Put
differently, the hope was to obtain some of the benefits of a threetiered approach to corporate governance while retaining as much as
possible of our two-tiered system.
Black in particular, along with Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman, also imagined that institutional investor voice would focus
not on company-specific performance but on issues of corporate
72
governance that affected the entire marketplace. This was because a
shareholders should be able to initiate and vote to adopt changes on a company’s
basic corporate governance); Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How
the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a
Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 32–33 (1991) (arguing that appropriate barriers
should be lowered to encourage institutional investors to nominate a minority of a
company’s directors to serve as professional monitors); Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 20, at 883–92 (proposing actions that institutional investors could take, without
the need for legal reform, in order to exercise greater influence over portfolio
companies).
68. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 815–16 (discussing the arguments in favor of
institutional monitoring); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336, 1367–70 (arguing that
pension funds are “the optimal corporate monitor”). But see Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 20, at 864 (noting that many corporate and money managers viewed
institutional investors as poor candidates for monitors); Kahan & Rock, supra note 7,
at 1048–62 (discussing the pluses and minuses of public equity fund monitoring).
69. See supra note 17 (discussing and defining “institutional investor voice”).
70. See Black, supra note 11, at 815 (“I believe that there is a strong case for
measured reform that will facilitate joint shareholder action not directed at control, and
reduce obstacles to particular institutions owning stakes not large enough to confer
working control.”).
71. E.g., id. at 816–17; Rock, supra note 1, at 448–49.
72. Black, supra note 11, at 834–35 (“Institutional shareholders can’t and
shouldn’t watch every step a manager takes . . . . In contrast, shareholders have
stronger incentives to take an active interest on issues for which scale economies will
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campaign to encourage all companies to, for example, eliminate
73
Thus, if
confidential voting would create economies of scale.
barriers to shareholder voice were lowered, the first areas to succumb
to shareholder activism would be those that yielded most readily to
the reduced costs associated with repeated, and sometimes parallel,
proxy campaigns. To Black, these were “process and structural
issues” and included topics such as those related to board structure
74
and composition as well as antitakeover defenses. Coffee concurred
insofar as he believed that institutional investor oversight could best
be expressed through the formation of monitoring coalitions, led by
75
public pension funds but joined by other institutional investors.
C. Passivity Explained
Institutional investor voice had a flaw, however. By the early 1990s,
institutional investors—despite their great size and obvious
76
potential—had not yet shown themselves to be active investors. If
they truly were the ideal corporate monitor that some had suggested,
they should already have begun to be more assertive. Admittedly,
there were anecdotal stories of activist shareholders, as well as
additional reasons to hope that shareholder self-confidence would
77
increase. However, given that the institutional investors had already
partly offset the incentives for passivity created by fractional ownership.”); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 20, at 866–67 (arguing that institutional investors hoping to
increase the value of their entire portfolio must focus on “improving the corporate
governance system rather than by attempting to improve the management of
particular companies”).
73. See Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91 (factoring economies of scale into
his equations as to the costs and benefits of shareholder activism). Black believed
that economies of scale would be the largest for process and structural issues, such as
issues relating to board structure and composition, confidential voting, asking
managers to seek shareholder approval before taking various actions, rescinding or
weakening poison pills, antitakeover amendments, and reincorporating in states with
more desirable antitakeover statutes. Black, supra note 11, at 836. But see Rock, supra
note 1, at 489–90 (arguing that fund managers do not care about confidential voting
because the widespread adoption of confidential voting would benefit their
portfolios equally and so provide them no selective benefits).
74. Black, supra note 2, at 836.
75. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 850–51, 856–57 (assessing the feasibility of
forming institutional investor coalitions to monitor management and arguing that,
“because institutional investors cannot hold large blocks and because they value
liquidity, they can influence control only to the extent they can form broad-based
coalitions”).
76. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 1, at 451 (acknowledging that “the actual
manifestations of institutional shareholder activism have been puzzling and do not
unambiguously support an optimistic scenario”). Indeed, despite the hopes of
scholars such as Rock, institutional investor passivity has remained the norm to this
day. See infra Part I.E.
77. See Black, supra note 2, at 570–75 (discussing the apparent rise in shareholder
activism in the 1980s); Black, supra note 11, at 828–29, 840–42 (same); Rock, supra
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grown to well beyond critical size before attracting the attention of
legal scholars, the results were far less than had been predicted. An
explanation for their general passivity was needed.
With respect to banks and insurance companies, there appears to
be a general consensus that their passivity results from their close ties
78
to management. Taking a position against a particular corporation
might mean the loss of a potential customer for lucrative consulting,
79
risk-management or other services. More significantly, however, it
might also give the impression that the bank or insurance company
was generally anti-management in its outlook, thereby jeopardizing
its relationship not merely with the company in question but with all
80
companies. The same is true for private pension funds, which are
81
almost universally controlled by their corporate sponsors.
Thus,
significant conflicts of interest make banks, insurance companies and
private pension funds poor candidates as corporate monitors.
Mutual funds and public pension funds have been viewed as having
the greatest potential as monitors. For example, because they
typically market themselves directly to individual investors, public
82
equity funds probably suffer from fewer conflicts of interest. As a
result, the search for an explanation for the continued passivity of
institutional investors generally has focused on public equity funds.
For Black and Roe, the passivity of public equity funds results from
in the mesh of legal rules that make the exercise of shareholder voice

note 1, at 449–51, 481–90 (describing contemporary examples of shareholder
activism, including a detailed examination of the 1987–1990 proxy seasons).
78. See Black, supra note 2, at 600 (noting that banks often vote with management
because they usually own stock in companies with which they do business).
79. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Politics, supra note 21, at 725 (noting that “corporate
managers are well-positioned to buy off most institutional investors that attempt to
act as monitors”); Black, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting, for example, that “banks
have been relentlessly passive”); Coffee, supra note 12, at 857 (“By general consensus,
banks and insurance companies have not been active investors and rarely oppose
management.”); see also Roe, supra note 2, at 17–18, 22–23 (discussing regulatory
impediments to activism on the part of banks and insurance companies).
80. See Black, supra note 2, at 600–01 (noting that a bank will not “want to
develop a reputation for casting antimanager votes, lest it lose current or prospective
banking clients”).
81. See Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 77 (“Few managers want their
pension more active in the corporate governance of other companies than they
would want their own stockholders to be active in their firm.”); see also Coffee, supra
note 12, at 857–62 (comparing the corporate governance potential of public and
private pension funds).
82. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 858 (“As a class, public pension funds are
pressure resistant, because they have few (if any) conflicts of interest.”). But see
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993) (arguing that “public pension funds face distinctive
investment conflicts that limit the benefits of their activism”).
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83

costly, burdensome, and sometimes risky. For example, increased
reporting requirements, insider trading liability and other burdens
all apply to shareholders who hold more than five (or sometimes ten)
84
percent of a public company’s stock. Thus, although such rules
were probably designed in good faith to address other unrelated
abuses, they add significant costs and legal risks to anyone who
85
chooses to exceed the five percent threshold.
No one rule
specifically prohibits monitoring, but their cumulative effect is
86
sufficient to deter most shareholder activists. Moreover, even if a
particular rule would not necessarily lead to liability, the culture of
money management is such that the mere risk that a rule could lead
87
to liability is often enough to deter the conduct in question. And
83. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (“In fact, institutional shareholders are
hobbled by a complex web of legal rules that make it difficult, expensive, and legally
risky to own large percentage stakes or undertake joint efforts.”); Roe, supra note 2,
at 11 (arguing that “American law and politics deliberately diminished the power of
financial institutions to hold the large equity blocks that would foster serious
oversight of managers”). Black also blamed management’s ability to control the
agenda and conflicts of interest within institutional investor groups. Black, supra
note 2, at 591–607. However, the main thrust of his argument was that legal rules
were the most significant barrier to shareholder voice. See id. at 566 (“Shareholder
passivity may be partly a function of legal rules. Institutional shareholders who want
to become active face costs, legal limits, and legal risks wherever they turn.”). But see
Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate Management by
Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 332 (1996) (analyzing
shareholders’ use of state corporate law inspection statutes as a means for obtaining
the information necessary for active monitoring).
84. For example, under sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78m(g) (2000), any person or group that acquires
more than five percent of a public company must file, and periodically update, a
schedule 13D or schedule 13G. Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007). Other
impediments generally apply once the investor has reached the ten-percent level.
For example, section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits
beneficial owners of ten percent of a public company’s stock to forfeit any “shortswing” trading profits that accrue from buying and selling, or selling and buying,
shares of that company in a six-month period. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000). The
impact of this rule is to significantly reduce the ability of ten-percent holders to exit
their position if the company’s performance begins to sour. In other words, shortterm liquidity is sacrificed for additional control. See generally Black, supra note 2, at
530–66 (surveying the rules governing shareholder voting and discussing the
obstacles to shareholder action they create); Roe, supra note 2, at 16–31 (discussing
the various regulatory impediments to activism on the part of institutional investors).
85. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 565 (“Through much of the period from 1934
to the present [1990], SEC staffers genuinely believed that the Proxy Rules helped
shareholders by ensuring complete and accurate information as a basis for voting.
The costs of disclosure rarely were part of the equation.”); Roe, supra note 2, at 11
(“Many legal restraints had public-spirited backers; some rules would be those that
wise regulators, unburdened by politics, would reach.”).
86. See Black, supra note 2, at 533, 542–45 (“The obstacles faced by shareholders
who would be active are many. No single rule is a show stopper, but their cumulative
impact is large.”).
87. See id. at 532 (“Cultural factors reinforce the legal obstacles to shareholder
action. Money managers . . . expect to take market risk, but legal risk is beyond the
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finally, to make matters worse, Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) crafted the various rules broadly so as
not to be easily circumvented by joint action. As a result, they not
only create disincentives for shareholders to accumulate large stakes
in a given corporation, but they also make it more difficult for
88
fractional shareholders to communicate and work together. Thus,
for Black and Roe, institutional investors remain passive largely
because a host of overlapping legal rules make monitoring too
89
costly.
Coffee told a somewhat different, though related, story. He
compared the American system of corporate governance with those
of Japan and various European countries and concluded, among
other things, that American institutional investors are not subject to a
significantly greater level of regulation than are their more active
90
foreign counterparts. Instead, the concentration of share ownership
is significantly higher, even in economies as similar to the United
91
States as Great Britain, Canada, and Australia. As a result, without
rejecting the significant role that legal rules play in causing
institutional investor passivity, he argued that extra-legal factors also
92
discourage active monitoring. In particular, he believed that there
is an inherent tradeoff between exit and voice, such that an increase
in influence (voice) would generally be coupled with a decrease in
93
liquidity (exit).
He therefore proposed a series of deregulatory
pale.”); see also id. at 562–64 (noting that, based on various informal discussions,
money managers often overestimate the strength of legal obstacles).
88. See id. at 531 (noting that legal rules make it difficult for “shareholders who
individually own smaller stakes [to] readily act together on a voting matter”); Black,
supra note 11, at 817 (noting that “institutional voice requires a number of
institutions, including different types of institutions, to join forces to exercise
influence”); Roe, supra note 2, at 25–29 (arguing that four specific problems would
afflict efforts of institutional investors to work together in joint ventures, including
organizational fragility, regulatory costs, and fear that control would be criticized and
politicized).
89. See Black, supra note 2, at 523 (summarizing his argument that “institutional
shareholders are hobbled by a complex web of legal rules that make it difficult,
expensive, and legally risky to own large percentage stakes or undertake joint
efforts”); Roe, supra note 2, at 11 (“[L]aw prohibits or raises the cost of institutional
influence in industrial companies.”).
90. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1287, 1313–17.
91. Coffee, supra note 12, at 852–56.
92. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1280. He described the extra-legal factors as
including an institutional investor’s need for liquidity, conflicts of interest, concern
over the threat of political retaliation, desire for continued access to soft information
and short-term thinking, as well as agent apathy and managerial manipulation of the
agenda. Id. at 1317–28.
93. Id. at 1286–89. Coffee’s thinking on liquidity and control builds upon Albert
Hirschman’s well-regarded earlier work. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 3–5
(presenting his argument that managers become aware of criticisms of their activities
either through “exit,” e.g., customers stop buying the company’s products or staff
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reforms—aimed primarily at public pension funds—intended to
make the exercise of voice more attractive, while at the same time
94
making exit somewhat more difficult. He also proposed positive
95
incentives for monitoring, including incentive compensation. For
Coffee, however, the separation of ownership and control is unlikely
to disappear even if legal constraints on shareholder activism are
96
removed. Thus, he argued, “to create a truly activist institutional
97
investor, it may be necessary to invent a new one.”
Although Rock also saw great promise in the rise of the
institutional investor, he recognized that institutional investors
themselves suffer from their own agency costs and so doubted
whether they could be sufficiently incentivized to overcome the
98
regulatory hurdles facing activist shareholders. Contrary to some of
the others, he believed that individual fund managers have little
incentive to engage in oversight activities that would improve the
99
overall economy. This is because public equity fund managers are
generally evaluated in comparison to other managers (or to market
100
Any efforts to improve overall corporate performance
indices).
would therefore be of little benefit to the fund managers as they
101
would not impact their relative performance.
Although Black, Roe, Coffee, and Rock differed in the details of
their explanations for the persistence of institutional investor
passivity, they shared much common ground. In particular, they all
believed that public equity funds had great potential as corporate
monitors. For them, the problem was simply how to tweak the costbenefit equation until it could be tipped in favor of shareholder
102
voice.
In their view, then, public equity funds wanted to exercise

leave the company, or “voice,” e.g., customers or shareholders or staff voice their
dissatisfaction directly to the managers or through the form of protests).
94. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336–67.
95. Coffee, supra note 12, at 845, 903–05.
96. Id. at 845.
97. Id. at 905.
98. Rock, supra note 1, at 452, 464 (summarizing his argument that “the
collective action analysis indicates that as the concentration of shareholding
increases, discipline by [institutional] shareholders becomes more rational”).
99. Id. at 473.
100. Id.
101. See id. (“To the extent that money managers are evaluated in comparison to
other managers and to market indices, such money managers will have no selective
incentives to engage in actions that improve the performance of widely diversified
funds across the board.”) (citations omitted).
102. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 905 (noting that “the issue is how to lure
into the money management market new entrepreneurs who will offer monitoring
services in return for incentive compensation”).
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voice, they simply could not justify the expense given the rather
meager rewards then available to them.
There can be little doubt that this body of scholarship was correct
in its essential message—there are significant legal and other barriers
that make shareholder activism unnecessarily burdensome and
103
expensive. I in no way dispute this basic insight. In fact, I seek to
identify several additional legal reforms that are necessary to permit
public equity funds to engage in active oversight through control
104
acquisitions.
However, a comparison between public and private equity funds
suggests that many of the legal rules that make activism so expensive
for public equity funds apply equally to private equity funds. What
remains to distinguish them, therefore, are primarily the rules that
limit the ability of public equity fund managers to share personally in
105
the rewards that accrue from active corporate monitoring. Permit
such managers to charge incentive fees similar to those charged by
private equity funds, and one creates direct financial incentives that
can be expected to result in aggressive oversight. Passivity, therefore,
may be explained not solely or even primarily by the combination of
rules that make activism so expensive. Rather, passivity may be
explained by the fact that it is not currently profitable for public
equity fund managers to compete based on their ability to discipline
underperforming corporations.
D. Efforts at Reform
In the decade or so that followed publication of the first important
articles on institutional investor monitoring, the SEC made no fewer
than four major proposals to expand the power of shareholder voice
103. As Black alluded to, however, their different analyses of shareholder passivity
were based entirely on theory. After all, one could not create a real-world
experiment to test their various hypotheses. See Black, supra note 11, at 815 (“Pure
theory can’t tell us whether we’d be better off if imperfectly watched money
managers did more watching of corporate managers.”). However, this Article, while
not an empirical study, seeks to use the activist investment strategies of private equity
funds as a sort of naturally occurring experiment. Unlike comparisons to foreign
systems of corporate governance which, though helpful, suffer from the obvious
defects of culture and history, the comparison between public and private equity
funds is extremely direct. Understanding the different incentives and regulatory
regimes facing these two groups of investment funds should therefore shed light on
the underlying question of institutional investor passivity. See discussion supra note
12 (noting that this Article does not attempt to draw conclusions based on
distinctions between American private equity markets from those of Europe or Asia).
104. See infra Parts IV.B and IV.C (discussing two categories of legal rules that
differentiate the monitoring by public and private equity funds).
105. See generally infra Part IV (discussing three categories of legal rules that
explain the different investment strategies of public and private equity funds).
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106

by amending the federal proxy rules.
In all four instances, the
proposals borrowed directly from this body of scholarship—as well as
from work by Lucien Bebchuk—by attempting to eliminate or reduce
107
barriers to the exercise of shareholder voice. Although only three
108
were eventually adopted, proxy reform remains an open issue.
The first proposed amendment came in 1991, when the SEC
recommended rule changes aimed at reducing the costs associated
with shareholder-initiated proxy proposals and opening informal
109
channels of communication among shareholders.
In response to
strong opposition by pro-management groups such as the Business
Roundtable, the SEC was forced to revise the proposal to eliminate its
110
most controversial aspects. However, the final measure, which was
106. In a related effort to enhance the power of institutional investors, Congress
in 1995 included a provision in the landmark Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), which had the stated purpose of
encouraging institutional investors to serve as the “lead plaintiff” in securities fraud
class action lawsuits. See generally Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do
Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 869 (2005).
107. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 833; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) (offering proposals for reforming
corporate elections) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise]; Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1784–85 (2005) (discussing
proposals to increase shareholder oversight of corporate governance). But see
Coffee, supra note 12, at 876 (arguing that the SEC’s attitude towards proxy reform is
“equivocal, that it is torn between the standard impulse of a bureaucratic agency to
expand its jurisdiction and defend its existing turf and the recognition that a
regulatory system must have some relevant end purpose if it is to survive”); Jill E.
Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129,
1132 (1993) (arguing that the SEC’s efforts at proxy reform were subject to
significant political forces).
108. Infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. The proxy rules were also
amended in 2007 to permit companies to utilize the Internet to distribute certain
proxy materials. Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No.
34-55146, [2006–2007 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,745, at 84,137
(Jan. 22, 2007). The amendment did not materially change the rules for
shareholders, however.
109. Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, Investment Company Act Release No. 18,201, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,811, at 81,845 (June 17, 1991). The proposal sought to
eliminate the pre-clearance requirement for most solicitation materials, eliminate
the filing requirements for parties that provide proxy information but are otherwise
disinterested, permit the use of solicitation materials even if they are not
accompanied by a proxy card, and permit shareholders to obtain a full shareholder
list. See id.; see also Black, supra note 11, at 829–30 (discussing the 1991 proxy reform
proposals). For a contemporary critique of the proposal, see Coffee, supra note 2, at
1351–52 (arguing that the proposal “would largely remove the chill on shareholder
communications that the current proxy rules create” but that they would do little to
address the underlying problem of rational shareholder apathy).
110. Black, supra note 11, at 830; Coffee, supra note 12, at 839–40. The proposal
received over 900 comments.
See Regulation of Communications Among
Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849, Investment Company Act Release
No. 18,803, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,002, at 82,825
(June 24, 1992); see also Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy
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adopted in October 1992, significantly eased shareholder
communications by allowing shareholders to publicly announce how
and why they intended to cast their votes without the requirement of
111
filing a formal proxy statement. It was therefore an important early
victory for proponents of shareholder voice.
The second major amendment came in 1997 in response to the
112
SEC’s infamous “Cracker Barrel” no-action letter.
The ruling in
Cracker Barrel had been viewed as a setback by most proponents of
increased shareholder activism because it permitted management to
113
exclude certain shareholder proposals from its proxy statement.
The amendment sought to reverse this decision and at the same time
114
remove some of the existing impediments to shareholder proposals.
Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. 49, 50–53 (1991) (discussing his support, and that of other
corporate law scholars, for the SEC’s original proxy reform proposals); Bernard S.
Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1993) (arguing in favor of proxy
reform); Nell Minow, Proxy Reform: The Case for Increased Shareholder Communication,
17 J. CORP. L. 149, 151 (1991) (presenting arguments by the president of
Institutional Shareholder Services in favor of proxy reform). But see Robert D.
Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for
Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163, 165 (1991) (arguing that proxy reform was
unnecessary).
111. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,326, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, [1992 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,051, at 83,362 (Oct. 16, 1992). On the same day, the
SEC also issued Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962,
Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,032,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,056, at 83,414 (Oct. 16, 1992),
which set new requirements on disclosure of executive compensation. For an
analysis of the rule changes, see Joseph Even Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The
Securities and Exchange Commission’s 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountability,
14 PACE L. REV. 459 (1994). See also Fisch, supra note 107, at 1165–70 (discussing the
1992 rule changes in light of the SEC’s authority to regulate the proxy system).
112. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,961, at 89,848 (Sept. 18, 1997).
113. Exchange Act rule 14a-8 requires management to include certain
shareholder proposals in its proxy statement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007).
However, management may exclude a proposal on the basis that, among other
things, it deals with the “ordinary business operations” of the issuer, is not a proper
subject for shareholder action, or relates to an election of directors. Id. The ruling
in Cracker Barrel reversed a long-standing position of the SEC, by holding that
proposals dealing with rank-and-file employees may be excluded under the ordinary
business matters exception. Cracker Barrel, SEC No-Action Letter, [1992–1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418, at 77,284 (Oct. 13, 1992); see OpEd, Shareholders and Corporate Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998, at A14 (discussing the
proposed changes to the Cracker Barrel decision). See generally GARY M. BROWN,
SODERQUIST ON THE SECURITIES LAWS § 10:4.3, at 10-13 to -15 (5th ed. 2007)
(discussing the process by which corporations are required to disseminate
information on proxy statement proposals and can exclude proposals).
114. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, Investment Company Act Release No. 22,828, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,961, at 89,849 (Sept. 18, 1997) (attempting to clarify the
rules regarding which shareholder proposals were excludable and requiring
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By attempting to be even-handed, however, it attracted criticism from
115
In the
both advocates and opponents of shareholder democracy.
end, the amendment passed, handing shareholder activists their
116
second significant victory in a little under six years.
The most recent and by far the most ambitious effort at reforming
the proxy process to encourage institutional investor monitoring was
117
initiated by the SEC in a pair of related releases in the fall of 2003.
The first was fairly modest and generated little controversy, requiring
only that existing disclosures regarding the practices of the issuer’s
118
nominating committee be expanded and clarified. It was adopted
with minor changes in November of 2003 and thus served as a third,
119
albeit minor, victory for proponents of institutional investor voice.

additional disclosure regarding a corporation’s procedures regarding whether to
include or exclude shareholder proposals).
115. See, e.g., Brett D. Fromson, SEC Criticized for Plan on Shareholder Voting:
Companies, Social Activists Dislike Rule Changes, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1997, at C3
(noting that neither management nor shareholder activists were pleased with the
SEC’s new rules); Michael Schroeder, SEC Expected to Adopt Compromise On Votes For
Shareholder Resolutions, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1998, at C19 (discussing the SEC’s efforts
to develop a compromise on when management can exclude certain shareholder
proposals).
116. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,018, at 80,535 (May 21,
1998). The amendment overturned the Cracker Barrel no-action letter, required
that management disclosures regarding the operation of Rule 14a-8 be drafted in a
“Question and Answer” format that would be easier for a lay person to understand,
and clarified the rules granting management certain discretionary voting authority.
Id. at 80,536. For an analysis of the final rules, see Maya Mueller, The Shareholder
Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel, Institutional Investors, and the 1998 Amendments, 28
STETSON L. REV. 451 (1998).
117. Disclosure
Regarding
Nominating
Committee
Functions
and
Communication Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,301, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,145, [2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,954, at 88,044 (Aug. 8, 2003); Security Holder
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101,
at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003).
118. Specifically, the proposed amendments required management to include in
its proxy statement a statement as to whether the company’s board of directors had a
nominating committee (and if not, an explanation for why not), the names of the
directors serving on such committee, an explanation of the nominating process, and
instructions for how and where shareholders could submit nominations. Disclosure
Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communication Between Security
Holders and Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 48,301, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,145, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 86,954, at 88,047 (Aug. 8, 2003).
119. See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communication Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Securities Act
Release No. 8340, Exchange Act Release No. 48,825, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,262, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,116,
at 88,718 (Nov. 24, 2003); see also Election Changes Approved, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
2003, at E2 (describing the new rules).
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The second proposal of 2003 was nothing short of an attempt to
completely overhaul the role of institutional investors in the proxy
120
process. Building on the work of Bebchuk, the idea was to create a
mechanism whereby shareholders could use management’s proxy to
make substantive proposals, including the nomination of directors
121
opposed by management, if certain triggering events had occurred.
The SEC, however, did not want the proposal to distort the business
function of the proxy process by converting the proxy into a vehicle
for every disgruntled shareholder to give voice to her own personal
122
politics.
Thus, the proposed amendments applied only to
shareholders (or shareholder groups) who had continuously held five
123
Effectively,
percent of the company’s shares for at least two years.
this aspect of the proposal disqualified all but large institutional
investors. Had they been adopted, the amendments would therefore
have constituted a near-direct application of the scholarship on
institutional investor voice, as well as a major victory for proponents
124
of shareholder activism.
The proxy access release attracted the opposition of both the Bush
Administration and business groups, and even generated a party-line
125
126
split within the SEC.
It was ultimately defeated politically.
120. See Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 835–36; see also Eisenberg, supra note 20, at
1502–17 (arguing that five-percent shareholders should be entitled to use
management’s proxy materials). For opponents of increased shareholder access to
the proxy statement, see supra note 21. See also Strine, supra note 21, at 1759
(presenting a critique of Bebchuk’s proposed reforms to increase shareholder
power).
121. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,408 (Oct. 14, 2003). The triggering events included
(1) the receipt by a director of “withhold” votes from at least thirty-five percent of the
shareholders at an annual meeting, or (2) a shareholder proposal that rule 14a–11
should apply be adopted by fifty percent of the shareholders at an annual meeting.
Id.
122. See Thomas J. Donohue, SEC Proxy Plan Is a Threat to Business, Boon to Labor,
INVESTORS’ BUS. DAILY, Dec. 4, 2003, at A14, reprinted at http://www.uschamber.com/
press/opeds/0312donohuesecproxy.htm (presenting the arguments of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce in opposition to the proposal); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 54–56 (2003) (describing
the arguments).
123. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,413 (Oct. 14, 2003). The rule was also inapplicable to
shareholders who sought to acquire control over the issuer. Id.
124. Interestingly, however, the proposal was opposed by some institutional
investor activists on the grounds that it did not go far enough in providing them
access to management’s proxy. Patrick McGeehan, It’s Voting Time Again, But No Isn’t
an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, (Sunday Business) at 4.
125. See Herb Allison, Editorial, Giving Investors a Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2004,
at A25 (advocating a proposed SEC rule which would give shareholders more say in
board elections and oversight); Carrie Johnson, Commissioner Condemns SEC Inaction,
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Interestingly, however, the SEC appears at the time of this Article to
be once again revisiting the subject. In an unusual move that drew
immediate criticism from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the SEC
in July 2007 issued two contradictory releases for public comment—
one granting access to the proxy to five-percent shareholders (i.e.,
127
public equity funds) and the other denying such access. Given the
highly fluid political environment, it is an open question whether
further reform in favor of institutional investor voice is in the
128
offing.
E. The Persistence of Passivity
Despite the rule changes described above, and notwithstanding the
occasional burst of well-publicized shareholder revolt, institutional
investor activism remains today the exception, not the rule. The
number of shareholder-initiated resolutions and proxy contests has
increased only slightly since 1990, and such efforts achieve success
only in rare instances. Huge amounts of money have shifted away
from actively managed funds and into indexed investments, removing
such resources from potential monitors.
Finally, well-known
shareholder activist groups that had been hailed in the early 1990s as
potential change agents have instead merged or closed their doors.
All told, shareholder activism has had only a marginal impact on
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2004, at E1 (reporting on a Democratic SEC Commissioner’s
annoyance with the SEC’s inability to adopt pro-shareholder rule); Stephen Labaton,
Big Pension Funds Object to Proposal On Proxy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at C1
(indicating that many pension funds believed the proposed rules did not change the
status quo and provided no new reform of the system); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. at
Odds On Plan to Let Big Investors Pick Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at C1
(indicating that the SEC was unlikely to adopt a rule allowing large shareholders to
nominate independent directors to corporate boards); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.
Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2 (reporting on the death
of the proposed 2003 rule to give large shareholders a greater ability to nominate
board members); see also Elizabeth Consenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance
Reform: Independence or Democracy?, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43–51 (2007) (advocating
increased shareholder access to the corporate proxy system as the catalyst for
corporate governance reform).
126. See Arthur Levitt, Jr., Editorial, Stocks Populi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2006, at A14
(discussing the defeat and more recent attempts by shareholder advocates to achieve
similar reform through by-law amendments). But see Judith Burns, SEC Proxy-Access
Proposal Draws Fire From Investors, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2007, at D2 (reporting that
proxy reform is still being considered).
127. See Stephen Labaton, A Public Airing for Proposals on Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 2007, at C3 (noting that the text of the proposal has not yet been released);
Kara Scannell, SEC’s Solomon? Cox Splits Vote on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2007,
at C1 (discussing the decision by SEC Chairman Cox to support both proposals,
indicating he did so to gain the perspectives of both sides of the issue during the
decision making process).
128. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 892–905 (setting forth an agenda for further
reform intended to boost the influence of institutional investors).
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corporate governance and has never experienced growth to match its
potential.
1.

Shareholder apathy
As predicted by economic theory, the American system of
corporate governance is presently characterized by shareholder
129
Shareholders in general continue to shun active
apathy.
monitoring.
Georgeson, a leading proxy solicitation firm,
summarized the current mood in its most recent review of the annual
proxy season:
Once again the intensity of shareholder activism and demands for
improved corporate governance boiled below the surface of the
2006 annual meeting season. No records were set for shareholdersponsored governance resolutions and there was only a modest
130
increase in proxy contest activity . . . .

Admittedly, there are positive signs that shareholder activism is
working.
In the first place, proxy contests and shareholder
resolutions are prevalent enough during annual proxy seasons to
131
have taken on an almost ritualistic air.
For example, according to
an annual review of the S&P 1500 by Georgeson, 2006 saw 385
132
shareholder proposals at 189 companies. For the first half of 2007,
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) reported an increase in
support for “say on pay” resolutions that seek an annual shareholder
133
vote on executive compensation.
ISS also reported that major
shareholder insurgencies occurred in 2007 at KB Home,

129. For an explanation of the theory behind shareholder apathy, see Rock, supra
note 1, at 453–63. For an argument that the “old” narrative of shareholder apathy is
no longer accurate, see Black, supra note 2, at 523.
130. GEORGESON, ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 1 (2006), available at
http://www.georgeson.com/en_uk/download/news/2006_ACGR_FINAL.pdf. For a
similar impression of the generally subdued nature of current proxy contests, see
Gretchen Morgenson, Proxy Fights More Muted, for Most Part, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007,
at C1.
131. According to Georgeson’s annual survey, 385 corporate governance
proposals were voted on during 2006. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 9. Of these,
fifty-five percent were related to board composition and structure, while another
twenty-four percent addressed executive compensation. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Reed Walton, U.S. Midseason Review, RISK & GOVERNANCE WKLY., July 2007,
http://www.issproxy.com/governance_weekly/2007/034.html (analyzing support of
institutional shareholders for various corporate board proposals, including say-onpay, majority voting, and poison pill proposals); see also Erin White & Aaron O.
Patrick, Shareholders Push for Vote on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at B1
(stating that shareholders at roughly sixty companies have submitted proposals for
an advisory vote on executive pay).
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International Paper, Mead/Westvaco, McGraw-Hill, Honeywell,
134
Convergys, Blockbuster, and Goodyear Tire & Rubber.
Various well-known contests also provide anecdotal evidence of
135
shareholder interest in corporate governance.
Perhaps the best
known modern example was the attempt by Walter Hewlett to derail
136
the proposed merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq in 2002.
Another was the successful ouster of embattled Walt Disney CEO
Michael Eisner in 2004, where the opposition of Fidelity, T. Rowe
137
Price, and other institutional investors proved decisive.
Both also
138
gave rise to substantial shareholder litigation.
Finally, it is possible that many proposals are not made—or not
voted on—because management chooses to accede to shareholder
demands and so avoid a costly and embarrassing fight. For example,
fully forty-four percent of corporate governance proposals in 2006
were withdrawn or omitted before the date of the annual meeting,
suggesting that many may have been mooted by management
134. See Walton, supra note 133 (listing notable votes on shareholder proposals at
major corporations).
135. For two recent, if otherwise unremarkable, examples, see Erin White, StageManaging the Annual Meeting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2007, at B1 (citing instances of
shareholder activism and alleged intimidation of shareholders by corporate agents at
the board meetings of Home Depot and Brinker International, among others), and
White & Patrick, supra note 133, at B1 (indicating that shareholder activism resulted
in changes in corporate pay at GlaxoSmithKline).
136. See generally Steve Lohr, Clash Over Legacy Fuels Computer Merger Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, (Sunday Business), at 28 (discussing the opposition of the
merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq by the Hewlett and Packard families);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hewletts Vow to Oppose Hewlett-Packard Merger with Compaq, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at C1 (discussing opposition to the merger by the Hewlett
family).
137. See Laura M. Holson, For Disney’s Embattled Chief, a Double Rebuke from Fidelity,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at C7 (noting that Fidelity showed its opposition to
Eisner’s continued tenure twice: once by withholding the votes on the shares it
owned, and once by withholding the votes on the shares it controlled as
administrator of Disney’s 401(k) plan). Much of the opposition by institutional
investors arose because proxy advisor ISS recommended that its members withhold
their votes for Eisner. See Frank Ahrens, Disney’s New Drama: Dissension, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 2004, at A1 (noting that up to thirty-five percent of Disney’s investors would
likely not support Eisner’s reelection). In all, forty-three percent of shareholders
withheld their votes for Eisner. David A. Vise, Some Stockholders Think Disney Stopped
Short, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at E1. Although the no-confidence vote was only
symbolic, Eisner was finally forced to resign a year early on September 30, 2004. See
Richard Verrier & Claudia Eller, Disney Names One of Its Own as New Chief, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2005, at A1 (discussing Eisner’s departure from Disney and indicating that
Eisner was criticized for his authoritarian management style, poor relations with
other partners and companies, and sub-par corporate performance).
138. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 34 (Del.
2006) (shareholder derivative action alleging violations of fiduciary duties in
connection with the termination of Michael Ovitz); Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
No. 19513-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at *2–3 (Apr. 30, 2002) (shareholder
derivative action alleging vote buying and misrepresentation in connection with
shareholder approval of the merger).
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139

acquiescence. Similarly, of the forty-six companies that held a vote
on shareholder proposals to eliminate staggered boards, forty-five of
140
them actually supported the change.
Unfortunately, however, there is no way to know how often
shareholders made informal requests or how effective these informal
communications may be. Also, many shareholder proposals may be
omitted not because of their merit but because of their lack of
141
merit.
Despite these apparent bright spots, the real incidence of
shareholder activism remains quite small. The fact that there were
385 shareholder proposals at 189 companies in the S&P 1500 during
2006 means that there were no shareholder proposals at the other
142
1311 companies. In other words, more than eighty-seven percent of
large U.S. companies were not subject to any level of formal
shareholder activism in 2006. Moreover, those that were generally
143
found it easy to defeat the attempted discipline.
Indeed, Walter
Hewlett’s attempt to defeat the HP-Compaq merger ultimately failed
144
when Deutsche Bank was persuaded to side with management. At
139. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 12; see also Amy Cortese, Better to Switch
Than Fight?, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, July 2004, at 8 (reporting that, during the 2004 proxy
season, “[a] growing number of companies took steps to cooperate with shareholder
groups and head off potentially damaging situations”); Walton, supra note 133
(reporting that twelve shareholder proposals regarding executive compensation had
been withdrawn in the first half of 2007, “indicating companies are more willing to
engage with stockholders in drawing up performance metrics for calculating
executive pay”).
140. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 3.
141. Although Exchange Act rule 14a-8 requires management to include certain
shareholder proposals in its proxy statement, the rule also permits management to
exclude proposals that lack merit or are otherwise not a proper subject for
shareholder action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007) (addressing when a company
must include a shareholder’s proposal in its proxy statement and indicating when it
is proper to exclude a shareholder’s proposal). See generally supra note 113 (noting
that some companies routinely use § 14a-8 to exclude shareholder proposals).
142. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 1 (listing statistics of number of
shareholder proposals at S&P 1500 companies); see also Bebchuk, Shareholder
Franchise, supra note 107, at 682–87 (arguing that the actual number of contested
proxy solicitations is quite low).
143. See Walton, supra note 133 (reporting that, for example, investors had filed
more than sixty proposals in the first half of 2007 requesting that companies more
closely link executive pay and company performance, but that the average support
for such proposals was only thirty-five percent); White, supra note 135 (cataloguing
strategies utilized by management to avoid or defuse potential controversies).
144. This decision, which Walter Hewlett alleged was the result of an illegal votebuying scheme on the part of Hewlett Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, was ultimately
upheld by the Delaware Chancery Court. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19513NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35 (Apr. 30, 2002). As a result of subsequent investigations
by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York,
however, Deutsche Asset Management later agreed to pay a $750,000 settlement for
failing to disclose its conflict of interest. See Deutsche Bank Settles Proxy-Votes Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at C3 (reporting that Deutsche Asset Management agreed to
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the same time, opponents of Michael Eisner were successful in
ousting him only after ten turbulent years of sub-par performance,
the end of Disney’s successful partnership with Pixar Animation
Studios, the announcement of an unpopular takeover bid by
Comcast, and a negative public relations campaign by former board
145
In fact, perhaps
members including Walt Disney’s nephew, Roy.
the greatest indictment against American shareholder activism is the
fact that headlines are made each time even a modest fraction of a
company’s shareholders are roused to express their dissatisfaction
with management.
Overall, the 2006 proxy season saw a fourteen-percent decrease
from 2005 in the number of shareholder resolutions that were
146
submitted. Similarly, although there was a slight increase in actual
proxy contests between 2005 and 2006, there were fewer contests in
147
In fact, the 2006 total of thirty-one proxy
2006 than in 1990.
contests hovered only just above the long-term average of twenty148
seven. Shareholder anger—at least as expressed through the proxy
149
process—has grown increasingly muted.
Equally important as the relative number of shareholder-initiated
proposals is their dismal rate of success. In 2006, for example, only
twenty-nine percent of outstanding shares were voted in favor of
pay $750,000 to the SEC to settle wrongdoing allegations but admitted no fault as
part of the settlement). Carly Fiorina, the prominent CEO of Hewlett Packard
credited with engineering the merger, was ousted in 2005. See Ben Elgin, The Inside
Story of Carly’s Ouster, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2005, at 34 (describing the events that
led to Fiorina’s removal).
145. See Ahrens, supra note 137 (reporting on the company’s poor performance
and Disney and Gold’s efforts to oust Eisner); Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast
Shareholders Have Little Difficulty Containing Enthusiasm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at
C1 (noting that Comcast’s shares tumbled twelve percent after the announcement
that it was offering a nine-percent premium for Disney); Peter Grant, Comcast Will
Adopt Strategy of Patience in Bid for Disney, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2004, at B6 (following
the ongoing takeover attempt by Comcast).
Comcast’s bid was ultimately
unsuccessful. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast Pulls Disney Bid Off the Table, and Wall
Street Breathes a Sigh of Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at C1 (discussing Comcast’s
pulling of its bid for Disney and highlighting that the process put the spotlight on
corporate governance issues at Disney and Comcast). Instead, Disney purchased
Pixar in January 2006. See Mark A. Stein, Carmaking Bites Bullet; Other Industries Dine
Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at C2 (indicating that Pixar’s CEO would be Disney’s
largest shareholder and have a seat on the Disney Board and that Disney’s CEO had
made reconciliation a top priority in the merger). For the full story of Eisner’s
turbulent twenty-one-year reign as CEO, see generally JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR
(2005).
146. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 1.
147. See id. at 45 (providing statistics of contested proxy solicitations for 1982
through 2006).
148. Id.
149. See Morgenson, supra note 130 (“With stock indexes near their record highs,
investor anger, not surprisingly, has been muted.”).
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board-related shareholder resolutions, and a mere twenty-one
percent were voted in favor of hot-button executive compensation
150
Moreover, although a respectable—though still
reforms.
insufficient—forty-nine percent of outstanding shares were voted in
favor of proposals to repeal classified boards as a takeover defense,
151
this level of support remains almost unchanged from prior years.
The numbers are even worse with respect to efforts to repeal poison
152
pills, where there has been a steady decline in support.
Finally,
hidden in the ISS data on the 2007 proxy season is the fact that the
level of support for the much-heralded “say on pay” resolutions was
153
actually down from 2006, although the number of proposals was up.
In fact, ISS reports that shareholder resolutions attracted majority
support at only eight of 1500 U.S. companies in the first half of
154
2007. Thus, even where shareholders are able to successfully launch
some kind of insurgency, such efforts almost never succeed.
The very nature of public equity fund activism also seems unlikely
to produce significant results. According to Marcel Kahan and Ed
Rock, the strategy of seeking governance changes through
shareholder proposals, while perhaps inexpensive, is “unlikely to
155
result in big changes in specific companies.” Likewise, behind-thescenes discussions with company management also seem likely to
156
produce only modest, incremental improvements.
Implicit in this picture of general shareholder apathy is a lack of
activism on the part of institutional investors. If few shareholders are
involved in active monitoring campaigns, it must also be true that few
institutional investors are so engaged. In fact, the available data bear
this out. According to the Georgeson study, for example, pension
funds initiated only nineteen proxy proposals in 2006, while mutual
157
funds, banks and insurance companies initiated none.
Thus, in
2006, fully ninety-nine percent of the S&P 1500 companies were

150. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 15 (listing a summary of figures of selected
voting results for proposals during the 2006 annual meeting season).
151. See id. at 16 (indicating that forty-six percent of outstanding shares were voted
in favor of proposals to repeal classified boards in 2002, while fifty-one percent were
so voted in 2004).
152. See id. (noting that support for efforts to repeal poison pills fell from forty-two
percent in 2002 to thirty-six percent in 2006).
153. See Walton, supra note 133 (reporting that executive compensation reform
proposals averaged thirty-five percent support during the first half of 2007, as
compared to thirty-six percent in the first half of 2006).
154. Id.
155. Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1044.
156. Id.
157. GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 10.
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completely unconstrained by formal institutional investor oversight.
As an added insult, this level of passivity has persisted even as proxy
159
reforms have made institutional investor activism less expensive.
2.

Fewer monitors
Pessimism regarding the level of monitoring would also be
appropriate for those market players that Rock hoped would serve as
160
corporate governance entrepreneurs.
One example is the United
Shareholders’ Association (“USA”), a non-profit advocacy group that
was founded in 1986 with the aim of targeting firms with poor
performance, excessive executive pay, and limited shareholder input.
Despite its initial successes, USA closed its doors only two years after
161
Likewise, the Investor Responsibility Research
Rock’s article.
Center (“IRRC”), a non-profit research center aimed at assisting
investors with socially responsible agendas, was acquired by its rival,
162
163
ISS, in 2005. ISS itself was sold in 2006.
Admittedly, whether these changes can be interpreted as an
unmitigated defeat for advocates of shareholder voice is doubtful.
USA only dissolved after successfully lobbying the SEC to ease rules
governing shareholder communication, while IRRC continues to

158. See id. (listing the names and categories of shareholder groups who
sponsored governance proposals and the number of proposals each shareholder
group sponsored).
159. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 12, at 840–41 & n.18 (citing an estimate by the
United Shareholders Association that a mailing that once cost $1 million could now
be completed for as little as $5,000).
160. See Rock, supra note 1, at 479–81 (discussing the activities of, and the
potential for, providing oversight of corporate governance by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center, the Council for Institutional Investors, and the
United Shareholders Association).
161. See Deon Strickland, Kenneth W. Wiles & Marc Zenner, A Requiem for the USA:
Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 320, 336–37 (1996)
(analyzing the positive contribution of USA to the process of shareholder monitoring
and indicating that it discontinued operations because it had met its goal of giving
shareholders the ability to influence the corporate board decision-making process).
162. See Dean Starkman, Rockville’s ISS to Buy Rival in Cash Deal, WASH. POST, July
14, 2005, at D4 (discussing ISS’s purchase of IRRC). IRRC was conceived of by thenHarvard University President Derek Bok. Victor F. Zonana, Activist Shareholder Spur
Growth of a New Kind of Advice Industry, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at D3. Founded in
1972, its original mission was to assist American investors, who desired to invest in
South Africa without lending assistance to its regime of apartheid. Id.; cf. Thomas W.
Briggs, Shareholder Activism and Insurgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 BUS. LAW. 99,
147–49 (1994) (arguing that proxy reforms aimed at empowering passive
institutional investors had instead empowered shareholder activists).
163. See David S. Hilzenrath, Investor Adviser ISS is Sold to RiskMetrics, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2006, at D1 (discussing the sale of ISS). The acquirer, RiskMetrics Group,
Inc., has since commenced an IPO of its stock. RiskMetrics Group Files for $200 Million
IPO, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/governme
ntFilingsNews/idUSN1929815720070919.
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164

exist (and operate) as a division of ISS.
Moreover, some have
argued that ISS, under its new owner, is more powerful than ever, if
165
In the minds of some
only because it has fewer competitors.
proponents, in fact, “the beginnings of a new corporate social
166
responsibility movement are under foot.”
Even so, Rock’s larger point that monitoring by entrepreneurs was,
in 1991, set to take off, has been disproved by events. For example,
the merger of IRRC and ISS appears to have resulted in a decrease in
167
services for activist shareholders. Similarly, in 2006, only seventeen
168
proposals were sponsored by institutional shareholder activists.
Instead, forty-seven percent of all proposals were sponsored by
individuals, suggesting that shareholder activism remains largely an
avocation, pursued primarily by those without the means to make a
169
truly credible threat against managerial discretion.
Another fortyfive percent of shareholder proposals in 2006 were sponsored by
labor unions and related public pension funds, suggesting as well that
shareholder activism retains a significant political, as opposed to
170
economic, dimension.
164. See Strickland, Wiles & Zenner, supra note 161, at 320–21 (indicating that
USA did not disband until it had met its goal of positively influencing the
relationship between shareholders and corporate boards); Starkman, supra note 162
(indicating ISS intended to operate IRRC as a subsidiary). For a discussion of the
SEC’s rule change easing stockholder communication restrictions, see supra notes
108–110 and accompanying text.
165. See John Plender, ISS to Dominate, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at 20 (citing one
analyst’s belief that a recommendation by ISS can sway as much as twenty percent of
the vote in a proxy contest); Starkman, supra note 162 (noting the role played by ISS
in the 2004 ouster of Disney CEO Michael Eisner as well as in the 2002 proxy
campaign surrounding the proposed merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq). As
of 2005, ISS and “its analysts cover[ed] 28,000 listed companies on behalf of 1,300
institutional clients.” Sundeep Tucker, ISS Buys US Research Group IRRC, FIN. TIMES,
July 14, 2005, at 27.
166. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001).
167. For example, the combined ISS/IRRC canceled publication of Corporate
Governance Highlights and The Friday Report early in 2006 and instead merged the two
into Governance Weekly, thereby diminishing the number of publications that actively
follow proxy news. See Press Release, Institutional S’holder Servs., Institutional
Shareholder Services Introduces Governance Weekly (Jan. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GovernanceWeekly011106.pdf (introducing Governance
Weekly and noting that it continues in the steps of The Friday Report and Corporate
Governance Weekly).
168. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 10, 13 (listing figures for sponsorship of
governance proposals in 2005 and 2006).
169. See id. at 13 (displaying types of sponsors of governance proposals in 2005
and 2006); see also Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403 (noting that the average proxy
contest costs between $250,000 and $1 million).
170. See GEORGESON, supra note 130, at 13 (displaying types of sponsors of
governance proposals in 2005 and 2006). See generally Romano, supra note 82, at 796
(arguing that public pension fund managers “must navigate carefully around the
shoals of considerable political pressure to temper investment policies with local
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3.

Index funds
Another reason for the lack of monitoring by public equity funds
may be the revolution that has occurred with respect to indexed
investing since the early 1990s. Index mutual funds and their more
recent cousin, exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”), both hold investment
portfolios that are designed to match—rather than outperform—the
171
results of particular market indices.
Because they seek only to
mirror market performance, such funds cannot be expected to
172
engage in oversight activities or other activist trading strategies.
Thus, to the extent they expand their influence, such funds will suck
capital away from funds that might be more prone to engage in active
monitoring. Moreover, even those mutual funds that are not indexed

considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at
maximizing the value of their portfolios’ assets”).
Examples of the mix of politics and pension fund management are many. For
example, former California state treasurer Phil Angelides, who was considering
running for governor in 2006, was accused of causing the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) to engage in shareholder activism in
order to fuel his political ambitions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Pension Funds Play
Politics, TCS DAILY, Apr. 21, 2004, http://www.techcentralstation.com/042104G.html
(noting that unions and public pension funds, such as CalPERS, have political goals
as well as financial ones, and so are likely to be activist shareholders (quoting Aaron
Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Calpers Targets Directors Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 16, 2004, at C1)). Meanwhile, the Department of Labor under President
Clinton encouraged state and local pension funds to make “targeted investments”
intended to achieve some social goal rather than turn a profit. Jim Saxton, A Raid on
America’s Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1994, at A12. More recent examples of
the infusion of politics into public pension fund investing may be found in the
growing number of shareholder resolutions related to global warming, especially at
carbon-intensive companies such as ExxonMobil, Ford and General Motors. See, e.g.,
Steven Mufson, At Exxon Meeting, a Storm Outside but Calm Within, WASH. POST, May 31,
207, at D2 (stating that thirty-one percent of shareholders voted for a shareholder
resolution intended to force Exxon to reduce its carbon emissions and produce
technology to assist others to do the same). Companies that do business with states
that sponsor terrorism have also come under recent scrutiny by politicians hoping to
influence public pension fund managers. See, e.g., Craig Karmin, Missouri Treasurer’s
Demand: ‘Terror-Free’ Pension Funds, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2007, at C1 (discussing the
passage, in a dozen states, of legislation to compel pension funds to divest from
companies who do business with state sponsors of terrorism and noting that pension
funds are beginning to take the issue seriously); see also Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 77, 113–18 (2002) (discussing the history and events surrounding
“Campaign GM,” a push in the late-1960s and early-1970s which never gained more
than three percent of shareholder votes, to demand that corporations, most notably
General Motors, to adopt polices for social good).
171. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 31.
172. Indeed, much of the appeal of indexed investing is that it offers competitive
returns at extremely low cost. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, STANDARD & POOR’S
INDICES VERSUS ACTIVE FUNDS SCORECARD, FIRST QUARTER 2007 3 (Apr. 25, 2007),
available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/SPIVA_2007_q1.pdf
(reporting that, over the prior five years, the S&P 500 index had outperformed
approximately three-quarters of all actively managed funds).
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are heavily diversified, reducing their incentives to monitor in much
173
the same way.
The growth of indexed investing has been explosive. In 1976 there
was only one index fund, derided by some as “Bogle’s Folly,” and by
174
1984 there were still only two.
Today, however, over seventeen
percent of all equity fund assets—more than $1 trillion—is held by
175
index mutual funds.
Just over $31 billion in new cash flowed into
176
In an eerily similar pattern, it
index mutual funds during 2006.
took several years after the first ETF was founded in 1993 for the
177
second to be established.
However, today, there are at least 359
178
ETFs holding over $422 billion of assets. Moreover, pension plans
increasingly appear to be relying heavily on indexed investments as
179
well.
All told, institutional investors have thus far remained passive,
doing relatively little to change the fundamental nature of corporate
governance or to improve the performance of individual firms. In
fact, several empirical studies have found that what little institutional
investor monitoring there is has produced no measurable effect on
180
stock prices or earnings.
It is also true that, although there are
mutual funds that engage in active monitoring, their response to
evidence of poor performance is to exit the investment rather than to

173. See Black, supra note 11, at 834 (noting that some institutional investors “own
a thousand or more ‘names’”); see also LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN
CORPORATE FINANCE 217 (1991) (noting that one pension fund holds shares in 1400
different companies).
174. John C. Bogle, ‘Value’ Strategies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A11. Bogle, the
founder and long-time chief of Vanguard Group, launched the first index fund for
retail investors in 1975. See Len Costa, Power & Influence: Heart of the Matter,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 2007, at 100, 100–03 (discussing the creation and
growth of Vanguard Group).
175. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 39 (listing yearly net
cash flow to index mutual funds for 1993 through 2006).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 32 (listing yearly numbers of ETFs for 1993 through 2006).
178. See id. at 32–33 (listing yearly numbers of ETFs for 1993 through 2006 and
amount of assets in ETFs for 1993 through 2006).
179. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 863–64 (estimating that CalPERS
would soon devote as much as eighty-five percent of its portfolios to passive indexed
investments).
180. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the
United States, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 462
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (finding “no strong evidence of a correlation between
firm performance and percentage of shares owned by institutions”); Black, Empirical
Evidence, supra note 10, at 917–24 (finding minimal research into the impact of
oversight by institutional investors); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON
REG. 174, 177 (2001) (highlighting the dearth of studies that found oversight by
institutional investors to have a positive impact on stock prices).
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181

take action against management. Therefore, institutional investors
in general, and public equity funds in particular, have thus far failed
to seize their historic opportunity to become active monitors of
corporate wrongdoing.
II. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
In Part I of this Article, the focus was on public equity funds.
When one traces their recent history, it becomes readily apparent
that, despite their promise and despite several attempts by the SEC to
make the exercise of shareholder voice less burdensome, public
equity funds remain today extremely passive in their outlook. Rather
than expend resources on corporate oversight, most are either
indexed or widely diversified. They keep costs low and sell when
performance lags. The promise of institutional investor voice thus
remains largely unfulfilled.
182
Part II shifts the focus to private equity funds. It first provides an
overview of their typology and history, regulatory environment, and
legal structure. It then sets forth their unique compensation
structure.
A. Overview and History
An investment fund is a business entity whose only important asset
is its capital and whose primary business purpose is to acquire
183
securities or other assets in the hope that they will appreciate.
By
181. For an example of such a fund, see Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Value Fund,
http://personal.fidelity.com/products/funds/mfl_frame.shtml?316464106
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2007).
182. Omitted from the discussion in Part II are funds of funds, which invest
primarily in other private equity funds, as well as university endowments. For
corporate governance purposes, funds of funds are largely irrelevant. They simply
serve as a conduit for diversifying investments and so do little to change the
incentives of fund managers. University endowments are more complicated. Some
are quite large and sophisticated, but many are neither. As a result, they defy easy
classification and lack homogeneity. Depending upon their particular size and
investment outlook, then, they may be assumed to mimic the governance, behavior
and incentive structure of other categories of funds. See generally JAMES M. SCHELL,
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 1.06, at 1-32 to -35
(2006) (describing how a Fund of Funds is organized, operates, and invests);
THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J-CURVE: MANAGING A
PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS ch. 5 (2005).
183. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.03, at 8-36 to -38 (noting that investment
companies such as mutual funds and private equity funds engage primarily in the
business of investing and reinvesting in the securities of other companies). Note that
private equity funds typically pursue a long-only investment strategy. Unlike
traditional hedge funds, which may take both long and short positions in a given
stock, private equity funds seek to gain from capital appreciation only. See SCHELL,
supra note 182, § 1.03[1], at 1-19 (discussing the investment strategies of venture
capital funds).
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contrast, a bank or insurance company, while also being
predominantly a pool of cash, utilizes its capital to engage in a variety
of other businesses, such as loan origination and the underwriting of
184
risk. If an investment fund purchases primarily equity securities, as
opposed to real estate or other assets, it can be referred to as an
185
If it is exempt from most federal regulation, it is
equity fund.
commonly known as a private equity fund.
The term “private equity fund” is a business term, not a legal one.
Therefore, there is no one standard definition for this group of
investors. However, the term is generally used to refer to a category
of investment funds that seek to avoid regulation under various
federal securities laws, most notably the Investment Company Act and
186
the Investment Advisers Act.
Private equity funds also commonly
187
seek to acquire control over a limited portfolio of corporations.
Once control is established, they cause management to take actions
188
that favor shareholder interests, thus reducing agency costs.
In
order to pursue different investment strategies, private equity funds
have developed into several distinct categories—venture capital

184. See generally MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1995) (distinguishing investment funds from other financial entities
such as banks and insurance companies).
185. Thus, for example, a real estate investment trust or “REIT,” though also
primarily a pooled investment vehicle, differs from an equity fund in that it invests
primarily or exclusively in real estate. See generally SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.06[A],
at 1-38 to -39 (describing, among other things, the investment strategy and
organizational structure of real estate funds).
186. See infra Part II.B (describing the complexity of the regulatory environment
for equity funds).
187. JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS, ¶ 102, at 1–3 (2005); SCHELL, supra note 182,
§ 1.04[1], at 1-25 (2006); see George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of
Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1035–64 (1992) (describing methods by
which venture capital funds exercise de facto control over their portfolio of
companies without owning a majority of the shares). But see Brav, Jiang, Partnoy &
Thomas, supra note 7, at 4 (finding that most activist hedge funds do not seek to
acquire a majority of their targets’ stock). For a discussion of the unique nature of
hedge fund oversight, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1021 (arguing that hedge
fund monitoring is both strategic and ex ante, rather than incidental and ex post). For
examples of contractual terms that permit private equity funds with a minority
position to effectively wield power, see Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital
Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?,
65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 107–33 (1997); Shannon Wells Stevenson, The Venture Capital
Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139,
1155–64 (2001).
188. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 7, at 2–3, 37 (finding that
hedge fund activism “can reduce the agency costs of equity by focusing managers on
creating shareholder value instead of pursuing other agendas”).
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funds, leveraged buyout funds and, in certain cases, hedge funds.
190
There is also a great deal of variation within each category.
Venture capital funds typically invest in a limited number of early
191
stage companies with the expectation that most will ultimately fail.
However, given the potential for huge profits, it only takes one
192
Venture capital funds
Google to make an entire fund profitable.
189. For general background on the development and workings of the venture
capital industry, see generally THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER & JACK L. REVKIN, RISK AND
REWARD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S GREAT INDUSTRIES (1987)
(describing how venture capitalists’ resources, contacts, and flexibility are vital to the
success of innovative entrepreneurs); DONE DEALS: VENTURE CAPITALISTS TELL THEIR
STORIES (Udayan Gupta ed., 2000) (reviewing the careers of thirty-five successful
venture capitalists); PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d
ed. 2004) (outlining the development of the venture capital industry, and drawing
on original data to illustrate how venture capital funds operate through each stage of
the investment process); THE FIRST VENTURE CAPITALIST: GEORGES DORIOT ON
LEADERSHIP, CAPITAL, & BUSINESS OthRGANIZATION (Udayan Gupta ed., 2004) (a
biography of the pioneering mid-20 century venture capitalist); UNDERSTANDING
SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION (Martin Kenny ed.,
2000) (examining the history, development, and entrepreneurial dynamics of Silicon
Valley); Dent, supra note 187, at 1029 (defining and explaining the venture capital
system and its implications for corporate law). See also Small Business Innovation
Research: What is the Optimal Role of Venture Capital?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Environment, Technology, and Standards Of the H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. (2005)
(discussing the performance of the Small Business Innovation Research grant
program and suggesting that government and private venture capital efforts can
effectively complement each other); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital
Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069–76 (2003)
(tracing the development of the United States’ venture capital system and discussing
efforts by other countries to emulate America’s success).
Considerably less has been written on the history of the hedge fund industry. The
most notable (and controversial) exception is BARTON BIGGS, HEDGE HOGGING
(2006). Another colorful source is Joseph Nocera, The Strange Inner Workings of the
[Too-Good-to-Last?] Hedge-Fund Machine, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE: THE MONEY ISSUE, June
5, 2005, at 44.
For histories and background on LBOs, see generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE
DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE
CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998) (discussing key events in the twenty-year
history of the firm that pioneered leveraged buyouts); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN
HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990) (describing the
$25 billion LBO of RJR Nabisco). Cf. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989)
(describing how Michael Milken popularized the use of high-yield debt and helped
fuel the leveraged buyout boom).
190. For example, venture capital funds may invest primarily in early stage
companies or more mature companies. Likewise, their focus is often limited to a
particular industry or market segment.
191. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. A venture capital fund can
be profitable if as few as ten to thirty percent of its investments prove successful.
BRIAN E. HILL & DEE POWER, INSIDE SECRETS TO VENTURE CAPITAL 9–11 (2001).
192. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman, Silicon Valley’s Backers Grapple With Era of
Diminished Returns, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2006, at A1 (comparing current rates of
return with the profits generated by the Google IPO); Andrew Clark, Sequoia Grows
Another Golden Fruit for the Welshman with the Midas Touch, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19,
2006, at 29 (noting the enormous success of San Francisco based Sequoia Capital,
which made billions from its investment in Google); Gary Rivlin, So You Want to be a

2007]

WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA

271

are long-term investors, with a time horizon often ranging between
seven and ten years, and they generally prefer to acquire a majority of
193
the outstanding equity of a given portfolio company. Alternatively,
they often acquire a smaller stake coupled with various contractual
194
rights of control.
They generally seek to exit their investments by
means of an initial public offering or a sale or other business
195
combination involving the portfolio company.
Leveraged buyout funds generally seek to acquire control of more
mature companies, frequently in industries that are out of favor with
196
Wall Street. Often in conjunction with existing management, they
may take public corporations private or acquire divisions of public
197
They generally
companies in privately negotiated transactions.
utilize significant leverage, limiting the equity portion of the
198
purchase price to as little as twenty to forty percent or less.
LBO
funds frequently cause their target companies to sell various assets
Venture Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at C1 (quoting a prominent venture
capitalist on the success of early Google investors).
193. Typically, this is in the form of debentures and/or preferred stock that is
convertible into common stock. See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 202, at 2-9 to -25
(outlining a venture capital fund’s preferred investment structure with respect to a
hypothetical start-up transaction). One survey of venture capital investment terms
suggested that twenty-six percent of venture capital funds “always” or “often” demand
and receive a controlling interest, while another thirty-three percent “sometimes” do.
JOSEPH A. BARTLETT, ROSS BARRETT & MICHAEL BUTLER, ADVANCED PRIVATE EQUITY
TERM SHEETS AND SERIES A DOCUMENTS § 7.02, at 7-5 (2004).
194. See BARTLETT, BARRETT & BUTLER, supra note 193, § 7.03[4], at 7-10
(summarizing the results of a survey of the frequency with which venture capital
funds “always” or “often” demand and receive certain other control rights: board
seats (ninety-six percent), anti-dilution privileges (ninety-three percent), post-IPO
registration rights (eighty-nine percent), redemption rights (seventy-eight percent),
various negative covenants (seventy-three percent), and drag-along rights (sixty-five
percent)). Interestingly, however, only twenty-two percent of venture capital funds
“always” or “often” select the CEO. Id.
195. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.03[1], at 1-20. For a discussion of the exit and
control rights obtained by venture capital funds, see generally D. Gordon Smith, The
Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005).
196. DOW JONES, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS & CONDITIONS 18 (2007). It is
also critical for debt repayment purposes that the target has large and steady cash
flows. For this reason, LBOs tend to be concentrated in mature industries. JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 48 (2006).
197. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 297 (4th ed. 2007); cf. Michelle Haynes, Steve Thompson & Mike
Wright, Sources of Venture Capital Deals: MBOs, IBOs and Corporate Refocusing, in
MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND VENTURE CAPITAL: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 219 (Mike
Wright & Ken Robbie eds., 1999) (noting that many buyouts occur as a result of
management’s decision to refocus and narrow its strategy and summarizing research
regarding the causes of such a decision).
198. TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT DARTMOUTH, NOTE ON LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 3, 5
(2003), http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter/research/pdfs/LBO_Note.pdf.
Unsecured lenders to the transaction generally also receive warrants to purchase
common stock, bringing this portion of the debt closer to an equity-like position.
GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 313.
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shortly after closing in order to pay off a portion of the debt. The
200
Thereafter,
remainder is secured by the target companies’ assets.
they hope to fund the remaining debt payments from a combination
201
of corporate profits and tax savings. As an exit strategy, LBO funds
generally sell off their portfolio companies to another buyer or via a
202
public offering of stock, often after six or seven years.
Hedge funds have typically been thought to acquire more esoteric
investments, such as derivative securities, commodities and
203
currencies.
Indeed, hedge funds that engage in such investments
204
are not properly thought of as private equity funds. More recently,
however, as profitable investment opportunities have become
scarcer—even as more money has poured into the hedge fund
industry—many hedge funds have become more active in acquiring
205
corporate equities. One notable example of this trend is Cerberus
Capital Management, which recently agreed to acquire eighty percent
206
of Chrysler.
Another is ESL Investments which, in the past few
199. See ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 394–95 (2004)
(noting that LBOs are often concentrated in firms suffering from financial distress
which therefore lend themselves to improved efficiency and the disposition of
unnecessary assets).
200. GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 307.
201. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, at A1 (describing the tax savings obtained by Blackstone); Steven
Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes As a Source of Value, 44 J. FIN. 611, 611–
32 (1989) (noting the importance of tax benefits as a source of wealth gains in
management buyouts). For data on post-LBO corporate profits, see generally Steven
Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Efficiency Gains or Value Transfers 43–45 (University of
Chicago Working Paper No. 244, 1988) (“Post-buyout investors, in those buyout
companies which can be valued, earn returns in excess of the market return.”);
BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 ex. 3.11 (summarizing data on profits from five
separate empirical studies).
202. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J. FIN.
ECON. 287, 290 (1991) (finding that targets of LBOs remain private for a median of
6.82 years).
203. See, e.g., SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at viii (“Hedge funds utilize a
number of different investment styles and strategies and invest in a wide variety of
financial instruments. Hedge funds invest in equity and fixed income securities,
currencies, over-the-counter derivatives, futures contracts and other assets.”).
204. See id. (noting that, “although similar to hedge funds, there are other
unregistered pools of investments, including venture capital funds, private equity
funds and commodity pools that generally are not categorized as hedge funds”).
205. See id. at 33 (noting that a number of hedge funds “adopt traditional, longonly strategies similar to those used by most registered investment companies”); see
also Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 7, at 2 (reviewing the corporate
governance activities of 131 activist hedge funds); Gina Chon, Jason Singer & Jeffrey
McCracken, Driver’s Seat: Chrysler Deal Heralds New Direction for Detroit: Cerberus Takes
Gamble on Union Concessions; GM, Ford May Benefit, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at A1
(noting that “[p]rivate-equity firms like Cerberus, which often buy public equity
companies and slash costs, have amassed large war chests of capital and have been
aiming for bigger and bigger targets”).
206. See, e.g., Emily Thornton, What’s Bigger Than Cisco, Coke, or McDonald’s?,
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2005, at 100 (following the “secretive” Cerberus in its usual
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years, has purchased a controlling stake in such American icons as
207
Sears Roebuck and Kmart. Thus, to the extent hedge funds move
into the territory traditionally held by LBO and venture capital funds,
they may also be considered private equity funds.
Prior to the 1970s, private equity investing was extremely limited,
never exceeding more than a few hundred million dollars in any
208
given year.
Originally dominated by wealthy families such as the
Phippes, Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, and Whitneys, the industry
gradually gave way to more professional investors, with the first
formal private equity funds being organized in the years following
209
World War II. Although they scored some notable successes, these
early funds attracted relatively little capital from traditional
210
institutional investors.
All this began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as
211
institutional capital began to be available to private equity funds.
operations). With respect to Cerberus’ eighty-percent acquisition of Chrysler and
the deal in general, see Chon, Singer & McCracken, supra note 205, at A1
(“Daimler’s deal with Cerberus . . . represents a watershed moment for both the U.S.
auto industry and the burgeoning private-equity sector that is transforming global
finance . . . . With Chrysler, Cerberus is betting that it can run one of the nation’s
largest industrial companies more effectively as a private company.”); Divorced,
ECONOMIST, May 19, 2007, at 67 (noting that “Cerberus clinched the deal . . . mainly
because of the speed and certainty with which it will be able to complete the
transaction”); Gregory Zuckerman, Serena Ng & Dana Cimilluca, Cerberus Finds Luster
in Detroit, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at C1 (“With its acquisition of Chrysler, Cerberus
Capital Management isn’t just becoming a force in Detroit. It’s also becoming a
force on Wall Street, with a stable of financial institutions that make it by far the
biggest auto lender in the nation and a broader financial power around the globe.”).
In fact, the financial arrangements are so favorable to Cerberus that Daimler, in
effect, could end up paying as much as $670 million to get rid of Chrysler. Divorced,
supra, at 67.
207. Robert Berner, The Next Warren Buffett?, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 144
(noting as part of a cover story on fund manager Eddie Lampert that ESL’s
acquisitions of large retailers include not only Sears Roebuck and Kmart, but also
AutoZone and AutoNation, as well as long-distance telecom MCI); see also Sandra
Guy, Private Party for Sears? With Flat Quarter, Sears Might be Bought Outright by
Billionaire, Analyst Speculates, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 1, 2007, at 51 (speculating whether
ESL might be tempted to acquire that portion of Sears Roebuck that it does not
already own).
208. LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2.
209. Id. at 1–2. MIT President Karl Compton and Harvard Business School
Professor Georges F. Doriot are typically credited with founding the first formal
private equity fund—American Research and Development—in 1946. Id. at 2. Its
goal was to work with institutional investors rather than with wealthy families or
individuals. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73. The first venture capital
partnership was formed in 1958, with others soon following. LERNER, HARDYMON &
LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2.
210. LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 2. Prominent early successes
of investing in and advising business enterprises included AT&T, Eastern Airlines,
McDonnell Douglas, and Digital Equipment Company. Id.
211. Id. Many industry watchers attribute this to changes in the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of ERISA’s “prudent investor” standard.
Id.
Prior
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Although the flow of investment dollars ebbed and flowed unevenly,
this period saw the rise of the modern venture capital industry,
centered in large part on Sand Hill Road in California’s Silicon
212
Valley.
It was during this period that soon-to-be industry giants
such as Cisco, Genentech, Microsoft, and Sun Microsystems all
received their initial funding. Leading the way were venture capital
funds such as Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
213
Byers.
Meanwhile, LBO funds were cataloguing their own string of
214
successful turn-arounds, especially in the 1980s.
The combination
of cheap credit available through the issuance of junk bonds, lax
antitrust enforcement under the Reagan Administration, and
changing attitudes as to proper corporate behavior led to a boom of
215
takeovers, many of which were structured as leveraged buyouts.
Initially, LBO specialists like the Carlyle Group, the Blackstone
216
Group, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts were dominant.
Investment
217
banks have also joined the game using their own in-house capital.
Moreover, although private equity was for many years a largely
interpretations had left uncertain whether pension funds could safely invest in
venture capital and other high-risk asset classes. However, in 1979, the Department
of Labor issued a release that clarified the standard to permit such investments.
MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73. Another factor may have been the rise of
limited partnerships, which—unlike Small Business Investment Companies—were
not restricted in investment options, and which made possible performance-based
fee arrangements. Id.
212. Sand Hill Road, which connects El Camino Real with Interstate 280 in Menlo
Park, California, has come to symbolize the venture capital industry much in the way
that Wall Street symbolizes high finance. See Clark, supra note 192 (calling Sand Hill
Road “Silicon Valley’s equivalent of Wall Street”). It is home to some of the world’s
most famous venture capital funds, including Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and
Sequoia Capital. See Laura M. Holson, Investing; Still Feeding an Internet Frenzy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1999, (Sunday Business) at 1 (referring to Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers as “the godfather of Silicon Valley”).
213. See Erika Brown & Claire Cain Miller, Technology’s Top Dealmakers, FORBES, Feb.
12, 2007, at 49–54 (ranking the twenty-five “best dealmakers in tech and life
sciences,” a list that includes Michael Moritz of Sequoia Capital, John Doerr of
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and Larry Sonsini of the law firm Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati, among other industry notables).
214. See, e.g., LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 1–3 (summarizing the
history of the private equity industry in the United States, with particular emphasis
on the spike in activity in the early 1980s).
215. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 53-59 (providing data and historical analysis
regarding the “fourth wave” of merger activity occurring between 1981 and 1989).
216. See The PEI 50, PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, May 2007, at 62, reprinted at
http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=196487 (ranking The Carlyle
Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, and The Blackstone Group among the world’s four
largest private equity funds).
217. See id. at 64 (noting that some investment banks have invested their own
capital in private equity investments); see also Jenny Anderson, Goldman Bets Hedge
Money of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at C1 (describing Goldman Sachs’s
creation of, and investment in, a new hedge fund).
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American phenomenon, European firms have increasingly gained
218
ground.
The overall private equity market continues to be both vibrant and
growing. The past two years, for example, have witnessed nine of the
219
ten largest leveraged buyouts in history.
Only the epic $25 billion
220
buyout of RJR Nabisco in 1989 remains on the top-ten list.
Meanwhile, an estimated $215 billion flowed into the coffers of
private equity funds during 2006, an increase of thirty-three percent
over the prior year and far above the record $177 billion raised in
221
2000. In total, the industry is estimated to actively manage as much
222
as $3 trillion in investment capital.
B. Regulatory Environment
Under normal circumstances, an equity fund of any sort would be
the subject of multiple and extensive federal regulations. The
223
Investment Company Act of 1940 would govern the fund itself,
218. See generally PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 61–71
(contrasting European firms’ progress with American firms’ established practices
and suggesting actions that the European firms can take to narrow the gap even
more).
219. See Andrew R. Sorkin, The Money Binge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at H1
(reporting on record-setting LBOs, including the $45 billion buyout of TXU, the $33
billion buyout of HCA, and the $29 billion buyout of First Data); cf. Ip & Sender,
supra note 9 (noting that the just-announced acquisition of hospital chain HCA
would be the second-largest in history, as well as the second such acquisition of HCA
since 1989).
220. See Factbox—Top 10 Largest Leveraged Buyouts, REUTERS, Feb. 23, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN2335158320070224 (placing
the RJR Nabisco buyout in the number two spot of the top-ten list). This infamous
LBO has been immortalized in BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990). It was also made into an HBO movie.
BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (Columbia Pictures Television 1993). The recent LBO of
HCA, however—if one includes the $10.6 billion of debt to be assumed—would top
even the RJR Nabisco deal. See Randall Smith, Dennis K. Berman & Gautam Naik,
HCA Is in Talks on Buyout Offer Worth $21 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2006, at A1
(describing HCA’s buyout negotiations with Merrill Lynch, Kohlberg Kravis, and
Bain Capital).
221. Tennille Tracy, Private-Equity Firms Raked in Record Amounts Last Year, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 2007, at C6. Of this $215 billion, approximately $25 billion, or eleven
percent of the total, went to venture capital funds. Id. $149 billion, or sixty-nine
percent of the total, went to LBO funds. Id.
222. See Henny Sender, Investors Riding the ‘Cash’ Rapids, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007,
at C1 (citing data provided by J.P. Morgan Securities).
223. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (2000). The 1940 Act requires investment
companies to register with the SEC and to abide by extensive substantive rules that
are not generally compatible with the business plan and management structure of
most private equity funds. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.03, at 8-36 to -38
(explaining the policy behind the Investment Company Act and its impact on private
equity funds). The term “investment company” is defined in section 3(a)(1) of the
1940 Act to include any issuer that holds itself out as being engaged “primarily” in
the business of investing or trading securities, or that owns investment securities
whose value exceeds forty percent of the issuer’s total assets (exclusive of cash and
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while the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 would regulate the fund’s
managers. Offerings of fund securities to potential investors would
be subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
225
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In addition, depending on their
particular investment strategies and the nature of their investors,
investment funds could be subject to the Employee Retirement
226
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the Commodities Futures Trading
227
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization
Act,
228
229
Act, and even the USA PATRIOT Act, among other potentially

cash equivalents). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1). Thus, under either definition, a private
equity fund would normally qualify as an investment company subject to regulation
under the 1940 Act.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (2000). The “other” 1940 Act, as it is sometimes
called, requires investment advisers with more than $25 million in assets under
management to register with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a. This is important not only
because of the costs associated with filing, but because rules promulgated under the
Act place severe limits on adviser compensation, advertising, and related-party
transactions, among other compliance requirements. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204, 275.206
(2007). The term “investment adviser” is defined broadly in section 202(a)(11) of
the Act to include any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others with respect to investments in securities. In the case of a private
equity fund, it is the fund manager or general partner that makes investment
decisions with respect to the fund’s capital. As a result, the SEC takes the position
that the fund’s general partner should under normal circumstances be deemed to be
an investment adviser. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.02[1], at 8-12 to -15; see
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the general
partner was an investment adviser subject to regulation under the Act).
225. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires all securities offered or sold to
the public to be registered with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). Thus, the sale of
the fund’s limited partnership interests to investors would normally require
registration. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 391
(D. Del. 2000) (noting that courts generally treat passive interests in limited
partnerships as constituting securities for purposes of federal law). Similarly,
sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require all
“brokers” and “dealers” to register with the SEC pursuant to section 15(a)(1). 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4)–(5) (2000). Depending on the nature of their activities, the
fund’s managers could be deemed to be brokers and/or dealers of securities.
SCHELL, supra note 182, § 8.04[1], at 8-38.25 to -42.
226. A fund that receives a “significant” portion of its capital from ERISAregulated pension plans may itself be deemed to be an ERISA fiduciary. Rules and
Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Proposed Regulations Relating to Definition
of Plan Assets and to Establishment of Trust, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363 (proposed Aug. 28,
1979).
227. A fund that engages in currency hedging or similar investment strategies may
be deemed to be a “commodity pool” and subject to regulation by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(5) (2000).
228. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, among other things, requires funds to abide by privacy
rules. 15 U.S.C. § 6801-10 (2000).
229. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”)
requires most financial institutions to adopt and implement an anti-money
laundering program. 31 U.S.C.S. § 5318(h) (LexisNexis 2007).
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230

applicable federal statutes. State law also applies.
Public equity
funds may therefore be considered among the most highly regulated
231
of American businesses.
Private equity funds, by contrast, typically seek to avoid the brunt of
each of these regulatory schemes. By limiting themselves to fifteen
“clients,” for example, a private equity fund manager may be exempt
232
from regulation under the Investment Advisers Act.
Similarly, the
fund may avoid the limitations imposed by the Investment Company
Act by either permitting fewer than one hundred “accredited
investors” to purchase interests, or restricting membership to those
233
meeting the test for “qualified clients.”
Other structuring
techniques are available to avoid most of the other applicable
regulatory schemes, thereby making the private equity fund a largely
234
unregulated, if highly stylized, investment vehicle.
In fact,
230. See, e.g., CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION: A STEP-BY-STEP
GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW ch. 2A (2007) (discussing the application of state
law to investment advisers).
231. But see Conwill, supra note 34, at 664–65 (characterizing the regulation of
mutual funds as “mild,” at least in comparison to the original draft of the Investment
Company Act).
232. Investment advisers that would otherwise be subject to regulation under the
Investment Advisers Act are generally exempt from registration if they have fewer
than fifteen clients within a rolling one-year period. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
For purposes of the exemption, a private equity fund is normally treated as a single
client. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a) (2007). In practice, this means that a fund
manager can advise up to fifteen funds at any one time and still remain exempt from
federal registration.
233. Private equity funds typically utilize one of two different exemptions in order
to avoid registration under the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -52
(2000). So-called 3(c)(1) funds are prohibited from having more than one hundred
beneficial owners. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Although there are complicated lookthrough and integration rules to avoid manipulation, for purposes of this exemption,
investors that are entities or husband-and-wife teams are typically counted as a single
investor. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A). So-called 3(c)(7) funds are not limited in the
number of investors, but may only accept investments from qualified purchasers. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (adopted as part of the National Securities Markets
Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416). To be a “qualified
purchaser,” an individual must own at least $5 million in investments, and an entity
must own at least $25 million in investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51). The term
“investments,” for this purpose, does not include most cash or mixed-use assets such
as real estate that the investor uses as a residence or for business purposes. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a51-1 (2007). Interestingly, section 3(c)(7)(E) of the Act permits the creation
of side-by-side 3(c)(7) and 3(c)(1) funds—each with the same adviser—such that a
family of related funds is generally able to admit an unlimited number of qualified
purchasers and up to one hundred other investors. See infra notes 250–252 and
accompanying text (describing other uses for a dual-fund structure). Note, however,
that in order to utilize the rule 506 exemption from registration under Regulation D
of the Securities Act, even the investors who are not qualified purchasers must
nonetheless be “accredited investors.” See infra note 234 (outlining a venture capital
fund’s preferred investment structure).
234. For example, to avoid registration of the limited partnership interests under
the Securities Act, most funds avoid general solicitation and advertising and only
accept investments from accredited investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv)
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considering the lengths to which they contort themselves in order to
qualify for the various exemptions, private equity funds may arguably
be considered either highly regulated or highly unregulated.
Semantics aside, however, and despite increasing calls for greater
235
regulation—particularly of hedge funds —they remain at present
exempt from nearly all disclosure requirements and are free to
engage in any risky or exotic investment strategies to which their
236
investors consent.
C. Structure and Organization
As a result of their ability to avoid most federal disclosure
requirements, private equity funds are frequently able to avoid the
limelight, typically keeping their activities obscured from the general
public. Indeed, more than half of buyout funds require their
investors to agree to be kept in the dark regarding the nature of the
237
fund’s activities. Thus, data regarding private equity funds tends to
be either self-reported or estimated, and accurate empirical
(2006) (excluding accredited investors for purposes of calculating the number of
purchasers under rules 505(b) and 506(b)). The definition of “accredited investor”
includes banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, business entities having total
assets in excess of $5 million, and individuals with total assets in excess of $1 million.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). It is also necessary to have fewer than 500 investors in any
fund so as to avoid the public reporting requirements of the Securities Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 78(l)(g)(1)(B) (2000) (requiring firms with $1 million in assets and over
500 shareholders to file periodic reports with the SEC and the public). Having
ninety-nine or fewer investors also permits a fund to utilize a safe harbor to avoid
being taxed as a publicly traded partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1(h)(1). For a
general discussion of the taxation of publicly traded partnerships, including private
equity funds that do not satisfy the safe harbor requirements, see SCHELL, supra note
182, § 5.01[2], at 5-3 to -9.
235. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Roundtable (May 15, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge2trans.txt. For recent scholarship
assessing the need for greater regulation of hedge funds, see Troy A. Paredes, On the
Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975 (2006).
236. See infra Part IV.C.1 (comparing the disclosure rules applicable to private and
public equity funds). An interesting development on the disclosure side has arisen
due to a series of recent lawsuits filed under state Freedom of Information Acts. The
result is that state pension funds and university endowments are increasingly
required to disclose information regarding their investments in private equity funds.
See generally Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the System of
Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 254–59 (2005) (describing how
public institutional investors in Michigan, California, and Texas have been forced to
disclose details of their investments in private equity funds). Whether the funds will
acquiesce in such disclosures or instead prohibit investments from applicable state
pension funds and university endowments remains to be seen. See id. at 259–67
(detailing winners and losers in a system of increased disclosure).
237. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 58. This has
apparently occurred in response to recent attempts by certain public pension fund
managers to disclose publicly information regarding the private equity funds in
which they invest. Id. at 57–59.
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information regarding private equity markets is difficult to acquire.
Even the SEC remains unclear as to exactly how many private equity
239
funds exist, how large they are, and how often they fail. Partly as a
result of this secrecy, a discrete group of national law firms has thus
far been able to maintain a stranglehold on the market for private
240
equity legal work.
Paradoxically, although they operate in a secretive world, private
241
equity funds are subject to significant market forces.
This is
because they tend to compete for the investment dollars of the same
group of wealthy individuals and institutions. In fact, given that
interests in private equity funds are generally offered on a take-it-orleave-it basis, fund managers often find themselves negotiating

238. In an effort to acquire more accurate information about the market for
private equity investments, a group of nine state retirement and pension funds
commissioned a report in 1996 by the consulting firm William M. Mercer, Inc. See
MERCER REPORT, supra note 9 (exploring contractual issues and investment practices
in private equity funds and the relationship between general partners and limited
partners in those funds). Dow Jones, the publisher of The Private Equity Analyst, has
since undertaken an annual survey of prevailing terms and conditions among
venture capital and buyout funds. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra
note 196 (summarizing the typical terms of private equity partnerships, such as fund
formation, fees and expenses, profit sharing, and governance, among other issues).
Both are excellent sources for attorneys and other advisers to private equity funds.
239. SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at x (noting that the SEC “lacks
information about hedge fund advisers” and “has only indirect information about
these entities and their trading practices”). In order to improve its understanding of
the hedge fund industry, the SEC in 2004 expanded the definition of an investment
adviser in a manner intended to catch hedge funds but not private equity funds. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 275, 279 (2007) (re-defining “client” to be any natural person, thereby
effectively eliminating the fifteen client exemption for funds that permit
redemptions within the first two years of operation). The purpose of the rule was to
gather information about hedge funds by requiring their advisers to register with the
SEC. See generally Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register
with the SEC, But More Information and Other Alternatives are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV.
55 (2006) (providing an overview of the current hedge fund regulatory environment
and recommending policy changes to protect individual investors). However, the
rule was struck down in 2006 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, on the grounds that the SEC lacked the authority to change the
definition of a term contained in a federal statute. Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
240. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Cutting Hedge: Law Firm Grows with Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 3, 2006, at C1 (reporting on the increasingly large revenue source hedge funds
are proving to be for major law firms). For a list, see Most Active Law Firms, DOWJONES
PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST Apr. 2007, reprinted at http://webreprints.djreprints.com/16
86610715025.pdf (providing rankings of the most number of deals closed in 2005
based on self-reported data).
241. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.02, at 1-9 (noting that the relationship
between investors and fund managers in private equity funds is characterized by
voluntary agreement, rather than dictated by regulation, and so is the result of
negotiations that take place within a market for pooled investments). Market
information remains difficult to obtain, however. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra
note 5, at x (noting the SEC’s lack of information on hedge fund industry data).
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242

against themselves.
If their offering documents differ too much
from the market standard, for example, potential investors will simply
seek other investment opportunities. As a result of such market
forces, the legal structure and compensation arrangements of private
243
equity funds have become highly uniform.
This is even the case
across fund categories; the structure and fees of a typical hedge fund
244
look very much like those of a typical venture capital fund.
Private equity funds are typically structured as limited partnerships
245
Wealthy
with a limited liability company as the general partner.
investors contribute most of the capital and receive limited

242. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that existing “‘standards’ will
ebb and flow with market conditions and supply and demand forces”); see also TAMAR
FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL
FUNDS AND ADVISERS § 12.03[C], 12–67 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that investment adviser
fees are not negotiated at arm’s length).
243. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 70 (“The basic premise underlying our
[study] was that general partners will attempt to negotiate terms and conditions that
the market will bear.”).
244. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (giving a brief description of
the structure and purpose of a venture capital fund). The differences in fund
structure between venture capital, LBO, and hedge funds occur primarily as a result
of their different investment strategies. Thus, for example, because hedge funds
often purchase liquid securities, hedge funds are generally able to permit their
investors to make voluntary redemptions on a periodic basis after some initial lockup period. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 9.04, at 9-15 to -16. Venture capital and LBO
funds, on the other hand, make illiquid investments and so generally prohibit such
redemptions. Id. Similarly, hedge fund profits are easier to calculate on an ongoing
basis than venture capital or LBO profits because hedge fund investments are more
readily valued. Id. § 2.02[2][d], at 2-11 to -14. However, to the extent that a hedge
fund behaves more like a traditional private equity fund, it is likely to have terms that
are more similar to those traditionally adopted by venture capital and LBO funds.
Id.
245. Id. § 9.01, at 9-2; MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 29. Given the
flexibility of most modern limited liability company statutes, it is also possible that
the fund would be structured as an LLC. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 52–53
(discussing the benefits of an LLC for public funds). Still, the structure of such an
LLC would closely resemble that of a limited partnership, with the fund managers
retaining operational control over the fund and the remaining investors being
largely passive, and the tax and liability results would be essentially the same. Id.
Perhaps as a result, private equity funds have largely resisted what may be the general
market temptation to prefer LLCs over limited partnerships. Mutual funds, although
similar to private equity funds in being essentially pooled investment vehicles, are
more commonly organized as Massachusetts business trusts. See Sheldon A. Jones,
Laura M. Moret & James M. Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered
Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 422 (1988) (reporting that half of new
investment companies who registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940
from July 1985 to December 1987 were in the form of Massachusetts business trusts);
cf. Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 330 (2001) (noting that commercial and manufacturing
enterprises generally do not utilize the Delaware Business Trust Act because other
legal forms of organization are more amenable to change and the Delaware Act
offers no tax advantages).
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246

partnership or similar interests in return.
Such interests are
passive, with very few control rights, and highly illiquid. Depending
on the type of fund, a limited partner may be restricted from
247
redeeming her interest for as many as seven to ten years. The fund
managers, through their ownership of the fund’s general partner,
248
They also typically
control its affairs and investment decisions.
invest a significant portion of their personal net worth directly in the
fund as limited partners in order to discourage them from taking
249
excessive risks with the fund’s capital.
246. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.01[4], at 3-8 to -10.1. Traditionally, the passivity
of the limited partners was a response to the requirement that they be generally
passive in order to maintain their limited liability. Id. § 3.01[4], at 3-8. However, the
law in this regard has evolved toward a presumption of limited liability. Id. § 3.01[4],
at 3-8 to -9. The Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, for example,
contains a list of activities that fall within the statutory safe harbor and so do not
jeopardize the limited liability of limited partners. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)
(2007). Protected activities include, among other things, transacting business with
the limited partnership, advising the general partner with respect to the business of
the limited partnership, guaranteeing the debts of the limited partnership, serving
on a committee of the limited partnership, and voting on matters of limited
partnership business. Id.
247. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.04[1], at 2-20 (finding that “holding periods
of three to seven years are common”). The typical timeline for a venture capital
fund, for example, is such that it might take three to five years for all of the capital to
be invested, after which point the fund changes to a liquidation mode. Id. § 2.05[2],
at 2-30 to -31. During that time, it is hoped that one or more of the investments
results in a profitable exit. HILL & POWER, supra note 191, at 11. However, the bulk
of the investments are expected to take as many as seven to ten years to pay off. Id.
Thus, venture capital funds typically prohibit redemptions during that period, but
may make early payouts to the extent the fund returns a profit prior to being wound
up. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.03[7], at 1-24, 2.04[2], at 2-22. See generally PRIVATE
EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 17–20 (reporting that most private
equity partnerships have a term of ten years and an investment period of five or
more years). Some funds also provide for extensions of two or three years. MERCER
REPORT, supra note 9, at 45.
Traditional hedge funds, which invest primarily in liquid, marketable securities,
are able to permit redemptions at almost any time. SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra
note 5, at ix. For administrative convenience, however, they generally require that
redemptions be made only on set dates, often quarterly. Id. In addition, to ensure
the viability of the fund, redemptions are generally prohibited during the first year
or so of the fund’s existence. Id. Such hedge funds, however, are not properly
thought of as private equity funds within the meaning of this Article. See supra notes
203–207 and accompanying text (explaining that hedge funds have greater liquidity
than most private equity funds). Thus, their shorter time horizon and greater
flexibility with respect to redemptions are outside the norm of the private equity
community. Presumably, hedge funds that operate more like private equity funds
would require a longer lock-up period. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.05[7], at 1-32
(noting that, although typical lock-up periods may last from one to three years, “to
the extent a particular Hedge Fund is allowed to invest in non-marketable securities
or other non-marketable assets, the ability to fund redemption requests on short
notice may be impaired”).
248. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403(a) (2007) (granting general partners in a
limited partnership the same rights and powers as partners in a partnership).
249. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-21. Historically, for tax purposes,
general partners were required to contribute at least one percent of the fund’s
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For regulatory purposes, a single “fund” is often actually structured
as a family of several funds, each with the same fund
250
manager/general partner but each with different limited partners.
For example, funds that sell interests to not-for-profit corporations,
non-U.S. entities, and/or ERISA pension plans may seek to isolate
251
such investors in separate legal entities.
Each separate limited
partnership would then make the same investments, pro rata, to
252
account for their differing sizes.
As a result, from an economic
standpoint, the funds operate as one, even though they are
structured as distinct legal entities for regulatory purposes.
D. Alignment of Interests
The overriding goal of private equity fund governance is to align
the interests of the fund managers with the interests of their
253
investors.
In fact, the alignment of interests within private equity
254
funds is much closer than in a typical corporation. As a result, the
255
internal agency costs are generally much lower.

capital. Id. More recently, this tradition has continued as a way to ensure that fund
managers have some downside risk, so that they will not lose their aversion to
excessive risk whenever the fund’s value drops below its historical value. See generally
infra notes 263–267 and accompanying text.
250. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[4], at 3-25 to -26.
251. See id. §§ 5.04[2], at 5-26 to -28 (tax-exempt investors), 8.07[1]-[4], at 8-66 to 72 (non-U.S. investors), 8.06[4], at 8-63 to -65 (ERISA plan investors).
252. Id. § 3.02[4], at 3-26.
253. See, e.g., id. § 1.02[3], at 1-14 (“The concept of alignment of interest can
provide an important element of consistency to the consideration of the numerous
financial and other terms embedded in the contracts governing the organization and
operation of a private equity fund. It can also provide a basis for identifying
economic and other terms that, even if widely accepted as ‘market,’ should be
resisted when possible.”); MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 2 (“The carried interest
represents a financial alignment of interests.”); PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS,
supra note 196, at 7 (“Private equity finance derives its strength from an
organizational characteristic that sets it apart from most other types of finance: It is
structured so that the entrepreneurs, the investment managers, and the providers of
capital all benefit in very material ways from the success of the businesses receiving
financing. This alignment of interest ensures, at least in theory, that all decisions are
made in a way that is likely to maximize the success of the business being financed.”).
254. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. The alignment of interests
between the portfolio company and the private equity fund are also quite strong. See
Gilson, supra note 189, at 1083–84 (“Perhaps more starkly than any other
organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company’s compensation
structure creates extremely high-powered performance incentives that serve to align
the incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture capital
fund.”).
255. See Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with their
close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public
corporations); see also BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 (summarizing several empirical
studies that found increased value in transactions where managers had more at stake,
including leveraged buyouts); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 924 (noting
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The linchpin of private equity fund compensation is the so-called
256
The concept behind a carried interest is a
“carried interest.”
formula for dividing profits that has developed as the marketplace
257
norm.
A fund’s investors are typically entitled to receive
distributions equal to their pro rata portion of one hundred percent
of the profits of the fund until their investments are completely paid
258
back.
To use a numerical example, if investors purchase interests
equal to $10 million and the fund returns only $10 million, the
investors go home even, having neither gained nor lost anything.
However, once their initial investment has been returned in full, they
are entitled to only eighty percent of any profits thereafter, leaving
259
Thus, to continue the
twenty percent for the fund managers.
example, if the fund yielded a net profit of $5 million (after the
initial $10 million was recouped), the investors would receive
collectively $14 million (their initial $10 million investment plus $4
million of the profit) and the managers would receive $1 million. If
the profit in this example were repeated the following year, the split
would again be $4 million for the limited partners and $1 million for
the fund managers, making the overall two-year split $18 million for
260
the investors and $2 million for the managers.
the existence of “substantial evidence suggesting that LBOs often led to improved
corporate performance, at least up through about 1986”).
256. This is sometimes also referred to as a “promote,” “promoted interest,” or an
“override.” SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02, at 2-5. See generally MERCER REPORT, supra
note 9, at 12-14 (defining a carried interest as “the share of the partnership profits
received by the general partner” and discussing how the carried interest motivates
the general partner).
257. See Schell, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-5 (noting a carried interest of twenty
percent is the current market standard for hedge funds). Increasingly, many funds
also vary the percentage payable to the fund advisers depending on the fund’s
performance. For example, a firm might charge a twenty percent carried interest if
the internal rate of return is below twenty percent, but a twenty-five percent carried
interest if performance exceeds the twenty-five percent level. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS
& CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 39.
258. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-7. Occasionally, this structure leads to
complicated timing questions, especially in venture capital funds where an early
investment might pay off quickly while others die a slower death. The result is that
fund managers and investors have developed a complicated set of provisions—
including so-called “clawbacks”—that ensure that the economics of the fund balance
correctly over its life, even if one party or another is inadvertently paid too much at
one time or another. See id. § 2.04, at 2-23 (explaining that a typical clawback
provision may require the general partner to return excess distributions of carried
interest).
259. Id. § 2.02[1], at 2-5 to -8. In fact, the actual percentage may in many cases be
far higher, as it is industry practice for the fund managers to invest a portion of their
own net worth in the funds they manage. Id. § 3.02[2], at 3-22. Thus, not only are
they likely to receive their twenty percent share of the profits, but they are also likely
to receive an additional eighty percent share with respect to any capital they invested.
260. During the 1980s, buyout fund advisers typically calculated their carried
interest on each individual investment. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra
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The result of this scheme is such that the fund managers have a
strong incentive to make profitable investments. If there is no profit,
261
as in the first example above, the fund managers are paid nothing.
Moreover, because the fund managers earn an extra twenty cents for
every additional dollar they are able to squeeze out of their
investments, the incentives continue to operate even after the fund
262
has returned a profit.
In other words, the incentive never
disappears or decreases, no matter how high the profits. Thus, the
interests of private equity fund investors and fund managers are
closely aligned—both primarily seek profit enhancement.
The basic structure of the carried interest does have two flaws,
however, which serve to undermine somewhat this otherwise elegant
alignment of interests. As a result, the typical compensation structure
of private equity managers has evolved two additional elements aimed
at ameliorating such flaws.
The first risk is that a straight carried interest, without more, could
encourage excessive risk taking, especially when a fund’s activities are
263
yielding a loss. At that point, one might worry that a fund manager
would engage in highly risky speculation since she would have
nothing more to risk. For a manager who is only paid a percentage
of the profit, a large loss is the same as a small one—both equal no
264
compensation for the manager.

note 196, at 7. This meant that they could earn a profit on successful investments
while avoiding any major loss on unsuccessful ones. Id. Over time, however, the
operation of private equity capital markets resulted in the current practice of
charging the carried interest on the aggregate of all fund investments, as had been
the tradition among venture capital funds. Id.; MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
261. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 2.02[1], at 2-5 to -8. It should be noted, however,
that private equity funds typically charge, in addition to the incentive-based carried
interest, a flat management fee. Id. § 2.05[1], at 2-27. The management fee is
intended to be just large enough to cover the expenses of the fund. Id. It is usually
based on the total assets under management and typically ranges between 1.5% and
2.5%, depending on the size of the fund. Id. Thus, in the example in the text,
although the fund managers do not take home any profit, the management fee
should be sufficient to cover their expenses such that they do not suffer a financial
loss. In addition, because fund managers are generally expected to invest a sizeable
portion of their net worth in the fund, the fund managers also risk losing their own
capital. See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
262. These incentives can be quite large in practice. Witness the incredible pay
packages for the top hedge fund managers. See Taub, supra note 9, at 41–42
(reporting that the top twenty-five hedge fund managers each earned over $240
million in 2006).
263. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-22 (noting many investors see large
capital contributions by the general partner as fundamental to ensuring a fund’s
success).
264. Id.
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To address this possibility, fund managers are usually required to
265
invest a significant portion of their personal wealth in the fund. In
addition, they also frequently co-invest their own capital in portfolio
266
companies alongside the fund.
Thus, the typical private equity
compensation structure already accounts for the down-side risk by
267
The fund managers are
giving the managers something to lose.
themselves investors with their own capital at risk.
The second additional element limits the ability of private equity
fund managers to receive the benefit of general market movements.
For example, the carried interest would presumably yield a relatively
high profit for the fund managers even if they simply purchased low268
yield treasury bills or passive index funds. But why should investors
pay a premium for an investment strategy that they could easily
duplicate at a much lower cost? Again, the market for private equity
fund fees has produced an answer.
Many fund managers, including most of the bigger and more
profitable ones, charge a carried interest only to the extent that fund
profits exceed a so-called “hurdle rate” or “priority return” (such as
the London Interbank Offered Rate or the yield on twelve-month
269
treasury bills).
Thus, the fund managers receive their twenty
265. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 23 (reporting that
the mean contribution by advisers in the survey was 3.25% for buyout funds and
2.1% for venture capital funds). Historically, the typical investment by the general
partners was slightly lower. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 9–10 (noting that the
industry standard is that general partners commit one percent of the fund in either
cash or capital); MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 34–35 (stating that a one
percent investment is typical). Note, however, that such an investment by a public
equity fund manager would probably violate the prohibition against self-dealing. See
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000) (explaining the duties of a fiduciary to act “solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries”).
266. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 24–25 (reporting
that thirty percent of buyout fund advisers, and 15.7% of venture capital fund
advisers, retain the option of co-investing).
267. SCHELL, supra note 182, § 3.02[2], at 3-21 to -23.
268. See id. § 2.03, at 2-15 (arguing that investors are less likely to contribute
capital unless the carried interest is linked to superior performance because money
market funds would produce the same results with less risk). However, some fund
advisers have argued that priority returns force them to make more conservative
investments than they might otherwise, thereby reducing the profits for fund
investors. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 42.
269. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 41–42 (reporting
that eighty-eight percent of buyout funds, and forty-two percent of venture capital
funds, in the survey provided for the payment of priority returns before the advisers
earned their carried interest). See generally MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 25–28
(discussing hurdle rates and noting that they have reached as high as twenty-five
percent); MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 33–34 (stating that the rationale for
preferred returns is to ensure general partners are only compensated for superior
performance). But see Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77,
86 (2005) (noting that venture capital funds, unlike leveraged buyout funds, typically
do not calculate fund manager compensation by reference to a preferred return).
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percent profits interest only to the extent they are able to produce
270
returns that exceed the yield on debt securities. The portion of the
fund’s success that is not attributable to the fund’s performance is
factored out of the equation unless and until the priority return is
271
met. In this sense, private equity fund fees are far superior to most
corporate stock options which allow corporate managers to share in
272
the upside of general market movements.
Private equity funds also typically charge their investors a
273
management fee that is intended to pay for the firm’s expenses.
These fees are generally in the range of two to three percent, with
smaller funds charging larger fees, but with downward pressure on
274
management fees overall. Additionally, many funds are structured
such that the fund’s advisers must return the management fees to
their investors, in addition to the investors’ invested capital, before

270. Thus, for example, if a $10 million fund returned $15 million during its first
year, and if the hurdle rate were set at five percent, the first $10 million would be
returned to the investors as repayment of their initial capital, as would five percent of
the $5 million profit (or $250,000). The remaining $4.75 million—which is
attributable to the effort and skill of the fund managers—would then be split eightytwenty between the fund investors and the fund managers. At the end of the day,
then, the investors would receive $14.05 million ($10 million plus $250,000 plus $3.8
million) while the fund managers would receive $950,000.
271. Most funds that provide for priority returns also adjust the calculation of the
carried interest to permit the fund advisers to “catch up” once they have satisfied the
priority amount. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 42
(providing a mathematical example).
272. See Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with their
close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public
corporations); Mark Maremont & Charles Forelle, Bosses’ Pay: How Stock Options
Become Part of the Problem, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing the related
problems of stock reloads, re-pricings and backdating). Stock options also create
significant opportunities for fraud. See, e.g., Walter M. Cadette, How Stock Options
Lead to Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A19 (describing the powerful incentives
that options create to produce fraudulent accountings); Hannah Clark, Stock Scandal:
Who’s Next?, FORBES, July 24, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/home/leaders
hip/2006/07/24/leadership-brocade-backdating-cx_hc_0724stockscandalwhosnext.h
tml (reporting that more than eighty companies are under investigation by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and many more are likely to follow); Aaron
Siegel, Backdating Scandals Seen as Tapering Off, INVESTMENT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, at 14,
available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070115/
REG/70111011/-1/INIssueAlert04&ht= (detailing the recent backdating scandals of
many major corporations).
273. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 30; see MEYER &
MATHONET, supra note 182, at 33 (quoting industry wisdom that fund managers
generally “eat sandwiches on the management charges, and eat caviar on the carry”).
See generally MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 19–24 (defining and discussing
traditional fees, budgeted fees, sliding-fee scales, and transaction fees).
274. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 30–31 (noting
that Blackstone Group’s newest fund will charge a management fee of 1.5% for the
first $6 billion and one percent for the remainder of the fund).
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275

taking their carried interest. Thus, management fees are intended
to have a neutral impact on the fundamental alignment of interests
between fund managers and fund investors.
A final source of income for private equity fund managers—which
276
is not necessarily tied to fund performance—is transaction fees.
They include break-up fees for transactions that are not
277
consummated, investment banking fees, and consulting fees. These
are typically charged to portfolio companies and so are not paid
278
Until the early 1990s, fund managers
directly by fund investors.
279
generally retained the entire amount of such fees.
More recently,
however, fund investors have begun to claim as much as eighty
percent of such fees so as to neutralize their impact on the incentives
280
of the fund advisers.
Performance therefore remains by far the
most significant element in the compensation of private equity fund
managers.
III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS COMPARED—INTERNAL
CHARACTERISTICS
As described in Part II, private equity funds are active investors who
seek to bring discipline to the companies in which they invest. Their
particular investment strategy involves acquiring control of a target
company and then utilizing that control position to reduce corporate
agency costs. In this respect, at least, they are an ideal corporate
281
monitor. Public equity funds, meanwhile, are passive investors who
do little or no monitoring.
Despite their resources and
sophistication, they prefer to sell when a portfolio company’s
performance lags rather than expend effort at improving such
performance.
This juxtaposition creates a near-perfect natural experiment. To
better understand the incentives of public equity funds, there is no
need to contrast them to their foreign counterparts, where language,
culture and history make such comparisons difficult and at times
suspect. Rather, a cleaner approach would be to compare the
275. See id. at 38 (noting that eighty-seven percent of funds surveyed calculated the
carried interest net of management fees and other expenses).
276. Id. at 35.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 35–36.
281. The larger question of whether it would be desirable from an overall
standpoint to enlist public equity funds as monitors remains open, however. For a
discussion of some of the concerns that have been voiced with respect to institutional
investor monitoring, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1329–36.
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characteristics and regulation of public equity funds with those of
private equity funds. Both are pools of money that professional fund
282
managers use to purchase securities on behalf of passive investors.
Both would therefore appear to have the potential to act as monitors
of errant corporate managers. However, only private equity funds do
so. Why, then, the difference?
Parts III and IV compare and contrast the internal characteristics
and external regulatory regimes that impact public and private equity
funds. In doing so, they attempt to uncover the factors that explain
the funds’ different investment strategies. My goal is to explore ways
in which the law could be amended to incentivize public equity funds
to join their private counterparts by participating in a deeper market
for good corporate governance.
A. Size and Resources
Perhaps the most obvious trait that distinguishes most public and
private equity funds is their relative size. In one study, the average
283
sized venture capital fund had as little as $122 million in capital.
For buyout funds, the numbers were larger, with the average fund
284
managing slightly over $1 billion.
However, because of the
presence in the sample of several enormous funds, the median
285
Thus, most private equity
buyout fund held only $415 million.
286
funds remain relatively modest in size. Moreover, there appears to

282. See LERNER, HARDYMON & LEAMON, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining how private
equity funds usually form by seeking prospective investors much in the same manner
as public funds); INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 145 (“An
investment company is a corporation, trust, or partnership organized under state law
that invests pooled shareholder dollars in securities appropriate to the entity’s—and
its shareholders’—investment objective.”).
283. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 11.
284. Id.
285. Id. According to a recent survey by Private Equity International, for example,
six buyout funds had assets in excess of $20 billion, with another sixteen having assets
in excess of $10 billion. PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 216, at 62–63.
The top six were, in order: The Carlyle Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Goldman
Sachs Principal Investment Area, The Blackstone Group, TPG, and Permira. Id. at
62. Meanwhile, seven hedge funds managed assets in excess of $20 billion. Britt
Erica Tunick, Capital Gains, ALPHA, May 2007, at 39 (ranking the world’s one
hundred largest hedge funds).
286. Blackstone Group may be the largest U.S. buyout fund, having raised over
$15 billion in 2006. See Dennis K. Berman & Nicole Lee, Blackstone Fund Sets a Record
at $15.6 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2006, at C4 (charting the fund-raising success of
so-called “megafunds”—funds with assets in excess of $3 billion). Europe’s largest
appears to be Permira Advisers Ltd., with $14 billion. Id. The largest ever first-time
fund was Centerbridge Partners LP, which raised $3.2 billion in 2006. Henny
Sender, EGL Nears Buyout Led by Its Chief, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2007, at B6.
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be a trend among venture capital funds toward slightly smaller asset
287
pools.
At first glance, mutual funds do not appear to be significantly
larger than private equity funds. For example, according to the
Investment Company Institute, the median sized mutual fund
managed $221 million in assets, while the top ten percent of mutual
288
funds averaged $2.2 billion in capital.
These numbers are misleading, however, because mutual fund
complexes tend to be broken down into a number of individual subfunds, each with its own investment objective. These might include,
for example, growth funds, aggressive growth funds, sector funds,
289
income equity funds and international equity funds. Thus, a single
sponsor, such as Fidelity, might operate hundreds of sub-funds, each
a legally distinct entity, but each operating as part of a larger unit and
290
subject to the ultimate control of Fidelity’s senior management. As
a result, for purposes of monitoring potential, a more significant
number is the size of a mutual fund complex, where the numbers are
291
much larger.
Thus, for example, three mutual fund families—
Fidelity, Vanguard, and American Funds—each manage over $1
292
trillion in assets.
Individual pension funds, meanwhile, are generally not subdivided
in the manner of the mutual fund industry. However, their greater
293
number and variety tends to make for a more varied landscape.
287. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 6.
288. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 52.
289. Id. at 51.
290. According to its website, Fidelity boasts of sponsoring over 2300 funds. See
Fidelity Investments, http://personal.fidelity.com/products/wealth/content/howit
works/how_investment_team.shtml.cvsr (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (“In-depth
research and analysis results in a pool of over 2300 funds and other investments that
make up our managed portfolios.”).
291. Thus, while the median sized mutual fund has only $221 million, and the
largest ten percent of mutual funds average only $2.2 billion, INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 52, several mutual fund complexes have over $1 trillion.
Infra note 292 and accompanying text.
292. See Muralikumar Anantharaman, Fidelity Lags Main Rivals But Slow Recovery
Seen, REUTERS, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/
idUSN1031582020070110 (reporting that the Fidelity family of funds manages about
$1.3 trillion of assets, Vanguard more than $1.1 trillion, and American Funds about
$1 trillion); Murray Coleman, Profit Rises at Four Mutual-Fund Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr.
27, 2007, at C11 (reporting that Fidelity’s assets had risen nineteen percent to $1.77
trillion, American Funds had exceeded $1 trillion in stock and bond mutual fund
assets, and Vanguard had $989 billion under management); see also INVESTMENT
COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 16 (noting that the share of assets managed by
the twenty-five largest mutual funds has been above seventy percent since at least
1985).
293. See Roe, supra note 2, at 23–24 (noting that the pension fund industry is
highly fragmented). Pension funds, for example, may be sponsored either by a state
or local governmental entity, in which case they are referred to as public pension
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Although many are quite small, the nation’s largest public pension
fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
294
(“CalPERS”), has about $244 billion in total assets.
In addition to having larger individual funds, the public equity
fund industry is also much larger than the private equity fund
industry. U.S.-registered investment companies managed over $11
trillion at year-end 2006, with mutual funds accounting for ninety295
three percent of the total.
At the same time, approximately $3
296
Private equity funds, in
trillion was held by public pension funds.
297
contrast, appear to have managed closer to $1.8 trillion.
Size, however, would appear to favor public equity funds—rather
than private ones—as effective corporate monitors. The sheer size of
a large mutual fund complex should provide it with both the
sophistication and the financial resources to engage in an active
investment strategy. Moreover, the economies of scale that would
accrue to a large fund would likely be sufficient for it to devote
298
consistent and broad-based efforts toward corporate monitoring.
Thus, it is unlikely that the larger size of public equity funds can
adequately explain their passivity.
Larger funds would also appear to be better able to balance active
investment strategies with a preference for diversification. Venture
capital funds, for example, are often thought to invest in as few as ten
299
companies.
A large mutual fund or public pension fund, on the
other hand, would be able to invest in many more. The average size
of the top one hundred companies listed on the New York Stock

funds, or by a union or corporate employer, in which case they are referred to as
private pension funds. Another difference among pension funds arises due to the
differing political leanings of corporate and union sponsors of private pension funds.
See generally Camara, supra note 4, at 235, 239–41 (categorizing different types of
institutional investors).
294. Karmin, supra note 170, at C1.
295. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 7; see Tamar Frankel, The
Scope and Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 939,
944 (2005) (“At the end of 1974, the total net assets of mutual funds was $46 billion;
at the end of 2000 it had reached $12 trillion.”).
296. Daisy Maxey, Pension Funds May Feel Little Subprime Strain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,
2007, at C15. But see Neil King, Jr., Should States Sell Stocks to Protest Links to Iran?,
WALL ST. J., June 14, 2007, at A1 (estimating the size of the industry at closer to $1
trillion).
297. See PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 7 (reporting that
private equity funds had raised approximately $1.8 trillion over the prior decade).
Because private equity funds have a definite term, after which they are wound up and
liquidated, it is difficult to measure the total assets under management. Thus,
because the term of most funds is ten years or less, the best gauge of the industry’s
size may be the amount of funds raised over a rolling ten-year period.
298. Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91.
299. E.g., HILL & POWER, supra note 191, at 9–11.
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Exchange, measured in terms of market capitalization, is a little
300
under $6 billion. This number is dwarfed by the size of many of the
301
Thus, even
large pension funds and mutual fund complexes.
without the boost that would come from leverage, a large pension
fund or mutual fund complex (if legally permitted) could buy
outright a large number of such companies and still remain
302
adequately diversified.
The larger the fund, the easier it would
appear to be to engage in active corporate monitoring while avoiding
the downside risks associated with an overly concentrated investment
portfolio. If anything, then, size would appear to have an inverse
relationship to passivity.
A different possibility, however, is that size operates in a more
subtle fashion, incentivizing smaller funds to be more active investors.
Perhaps the relatively smaller size of private equity funds forces them
to invest in fewer companies, thereby making it more critical that
303
they closely monitor those few companies.
In other words, active
monitoring by private equity funds might be more of a necessity than
a choice.
Intriguing though this possibility may be, it does not hold up to
close scrutiny. Modern corporate finance theory suggests that ninetyfive percent of the benefits from diversification can be obtained by
owning as few as twenty different stocks, while ninety-nine percent of
304
the benefits attain from owning as few as one hundred. Thus, even
300. According to the New York Stock Exchange, the one hundred largest listed
companies have a combined market capitalization of $5.95 trillion, making the mean
average $5.95 billion. NYSE U.S. 100 Index,http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/index
es/nyid.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
301. See Coleman, supra note 292, at C11 (providing examples of three mutual
funds with assets totaling $989 billion, $1.77 trillion, and $1 trillion, respectively).
302. For a $1 trillion mutual fund complex, purchasing one hundred companies
for $6 billion each—assuming this could be accomplished—would cost $600 billion,
leaving $400 billion to invest in other assets. Modern corporate finance theory holds
that ninety-nine percent of the benefits that accrue from diversification are obtained
by owning as few as one hundred different stocks. See John L. Evans & Stephen H.
Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis, 23 J. FIN.
761, 767 (1968) (arguing, based on empirical analysis, that there are doubts as to
whether increasing portfolio diversity beyond ten securities is economically justified);
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 89 (1952) (explaining that the
benefits of diversification do not depend solely on the number of different stocks
held but also on holding stocks in diverse industries). Thus, even a massive
acquisition program would be unlikely to have much impact on the diversification of
such a large fund.
303. This approach was espoused by no worse an entrepreneur than Andrew
Carnegie. See ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE EMPIRE OF BUSINESS 17 (1902) (“The concerns
which fail are those which have scattered their capital, which means that they have
scattered their brains also. . . . ‘Don’t put all your eggs in one basket’ is all wrong. I
tell you ‘put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket.’”).
304. Notably, some finance textbooks state that as few as eight stocks are sufficient
to provide reasonable diversity. See Gerald D. Newbould & Percy S. Poon, The
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a relatively small $100 million private equity fund is more than large
305
enough to pursue a strategy of low-cost, passive diversification.
Moreover, if smallness truly does lead to activism, it does not explain
why mutual fund complexes do not engage partly in activist
monitoring and partly in diversified investing. Raw size, in other
words, appears to have little impact on monitoring ability.
B. Use of Leverage
Closely related to the relative size of public and private equity
funds is their differing use of the power of leverage. Mutual funds
and pension funds are prohibited from using borrowed capital to
306
purchase securities.
It is considered by regulators to be too risky.
307
Venture capital funds similarly abstain from the use of leverage.
Leverage buyout funds, by contrast, use primarily borrowed capital
308
to purchase control over large corporate enterprises.
As the term
suggests, their use of leverage significantly magnifies the power and
309
impact of their equity.
Through leverage, LBO funds are able to
acquire control of much larger companies than would otherwise be
310
As a result, they are often involved in “going private”
possible.
Minimum Number of Stocks Needed for Diversification, 3 FIN. PRAC. & EDUC. 85, 85 (1993)
(surveying the recommendations of twelve prominent finance textbooks). The idea
is that firm-specific risks will be minimized or even eliminated in a balanced portfolio
of stocks whose risks are negatively correlated, leaving only market-wide risks. For a
classic example, assume that high oil prices will be good for oil stocks but bad for
airline stocks. Presumably, the changes in the price of the two stocks will offset one
another. A sagging economy, by contrast, will be bad for both. See generally
Markowitz, supra note 302, at 87–89 (arguing investors should diversify over different
economic sectors to lessen their economic risk); Evans & Archer, supra note 302, at
761 (finding that an investor may be sufficiently diversified while possessing as few as
ten different securities).
305. See generally Evans & Archer, supra note 302, at 761 (finding a stable
relationship between the number of securities in a portfolio and the level of portfolio
dispersion); Markowitz, supra note 302, at 87–89 (finding that holding a variety of
securities is just as important for diversification purposes as examining the individual
securities’ interrelationships in the marketplace).
306. Although the Investment Company Act does not expressly prohibit the use of
leverage, the SEC has interpreted its prohibition against open-end mutual funds
issuing “senior securities” broadly to include debt or preferred stock. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-18(f) (2000). See generally KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.5, at 11-11.
307. One notable, but isolated, exception is the use of short-term bridge loans
that are sometimes used to cover firm expenses between scheduled capital calls.
SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.03[8], at 1-24.
308. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 314–21 (discussing financing sources and
techniques for leveraged buyouts and noting that common stock may account for as
little as one to twenty percent of the total capital).
309. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 454–57 (1996) (discussing the impact of leverage on earnings).
310. One of the major results of the innovations leading to leveraged buyouts was
that smaller companies, through the issuance of junk bonds and other financing
techniques, could acquire larger ones.
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transactions, wherein the fund, generally with the assistance of
management, refinances a public company with debt and then
311
purchases the remaining equity.
Much like size, however, leverage does not seem to offer an
adequate explanation for the relative passivity of public equity funds.
Although such funds typically do not use leverage, their immense
resources nonetheless provide them the capacity to acquire
312
controlling positions in quite large companies.
Admittedly, an
additional benefit of leverage is that it permits LBO funds to commit
313
less of their capital to any one project.
Again, however, public
equity funds are large enough that even an acquisition of one
hundred percent of the equity of a medium-sized public company
would not commit a disproportionately large percentage of their
314
capital.
Moreover, because public equity funds regularly purchase
equity securities from corporations which themselves are partly
financed with debt, one could even argue that mutual funds and
pension funds are themselves partly leveraged. However one looks at
the matter, leverage alone does not seem to be enough to explain the
different monitoring strategies of public and private equity funds.
One impact that leverage may have, however, is in the nature of
monitoring that public and private equity funds would undertake.
One of the central insights of corporate finance theory is that equity
holders in a highly leveraged firm should prefer the firm to engage in
higher risk strategies than would equity holders in a less leveraged
315
firm.
Thus, were public equity funds to engage in greater
monitoring, they might encourage the firms in which they invest to
take on relatively less risk than would highly leveraged private equity
investors.
C. Need for Liquidity
Another plausible explanation for the continued passivity of public
equity funds vis-à-vis their private counterparts may lie in their
311. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 297-300 (describing management buyouts);
Haynes, Thompson & Wright, supra note 197, at 219 (noting that many buyouts
occur as a result of management’s decision to refocus and narrow its strategy and
summarizing research regarding the causes of such a decision).
312. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (providing details regarding the
size of the world’s largest mutual funds).
313. This, in turn, minimizes the impact of any one acquisition on a fund’s ability
to diversify its risk.
314. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (explaining the effect acquisitions
have on diversification).
315. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1333 (applying the work of Stephen Prowse to the
question of institutional investor monitoring).
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greater liquidity requirements. Unlike private equity funds, mutual
funds and pension funds must be ready to redeem their investors’
capital on short notice. Open-end mutual funds—the most popular
and common of mutual funds—must be ready to redeem their shares
on a daily basis and to pay redeeming shareholders within seven days
316
of receiving a request. To satisfy such requirements, mutual funds
317
must therefore retain a high degree of liquidity. Although there is
no express statutory requirement as to the required level, the SEC has
stated that it would be prudent for a mutual fund to limit its holdings
318
of illiquid securities to fifteen percent of the fund’s net assets.
Pension funds are similarly constrained in that they must retain
319
These limitations are
sufficient liquidity to meet plan obligations.
in sharp contrast to the illiquid nature of most private equity funds,
which commonly prohibit redemptions for as many as seven to ten
320
years.
As Coffee pointed out, the need for liquidity over the short term
321
makes active monitoring both less attractive and less viable.
Monitoring is less attractive to a short-term investor because the
benefits from improved corporate governance are likely to accrue
322
over the long-term.
Moreover, monitoring is less viable because a
short-term investor may not retain her stake in a given company long
enough to take successful action against underperforming managers
323
(or to make a credible threat of such action). To use the language

316. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2000).
317. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.3, at 11-10 (“[T]o meet the redemption
requests, a mutual fund must maintain a high degree of portfolio liquidity.”).
318. Id. (citing 1992 revisions to the Guidelines to Form N-1A).
319. See Susan P. Serota, Introduction, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 20–21 (Susan P.
Serota ed., 1995) (describing specific factors that a plan fiduciary should consider).
320. See Is Private Equity a Good Investment?, MONEYWEEK, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://www.moneyweek.com/file/27707/is-private-equity-a-good-investment-.html
(noting the lock-up of capital for seven to ten years).
321. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1318–21 (describing the impact that a lack of liquidity
or thin equity may have on a fund’s monitoring ability).
322. In this way, liquidity is closely related to investment horizons. An investor
willing to maintain a given position for a long period may obtain a better return but
at the cost of lower liquidity. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 180 (explaining
that investors require a higher return for a given investment in order to compensate
for greater risk); BRUNER, supra note 199, at 457 (“Whenever liquidity and/or control
change, value changes.”); see also University Endowments: The Ivory Trade, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 20, 2007, at 81–82 (noting that large university endowments earned average
returns of over fifteen percent in 2006, largely because of their extremely long-time
investment horizons).
323. The SEC’s proposed rule 14a-11, for example, applied only to investors who
were able (and willing) to hold their interest for over two years. Security Holder
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,206, [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101,
at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003).
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of Albert Hirschman, as exit becomes more viable, voice becomes less
324
Public equity funds may therefore be passive for the simple
so.
reason that they must remain liquid.
Public equity funds do not require so much liquidity as to interfere
with their monitoring ability, however. From a statutory standpoint,
public equity funds are not required to maintain any particular level
325
of liquidity. Rather, their need for liquidity arises from their need
to satisfy redemption requests. However, many—perhaps even
most—investors in mutual funds are retail investors with long-term
326
goals.
They tend to be saving for retirement or perhaps for a
child’s education. Thus, on any given day, relatively few mutual fund
327
A public equity fund could
investors will redeem their shares.
therefore conduct an actuarial analysis to determine what level of
328
liquidity is actually necessary.
Just as a bank does not in practice
need to stand ready to return all of its depositors’ cash on any given
day, a mutual fund or pension fund need retain only a portion of its
329
investments in liquid form.
Additionally, the scale of many public equity funds already reduces
their liquidity because there is an inherent trade-off between liquidity
330
and the size of an investment.
Once an investment becomes too
large, the number of potential purchasers—and hence the market for
such security—becomes smaller. Thus, even a small fractional stake
in a public company would be too large to exit quickly. Likewise, one
is left to wonder to whom Cerberus will be able to sell Chrysler, even
if it is successful in turning around the failing automobile
331
manufacturer.
The number of potential buyers is not large. As a

324. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 29, at 3–5 (introducing the interplay
between exit and voice).
325. See KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 11:3.3, at 11–10 (noting that, although the SEC
at one point stated that it would be prudent for mutual funds to limit illiquid
securities to ten percent, a later statement suggested that a fifteen percent level
would also be prudent (citing 1992 changes to the Guidelines to Form N-1A)).
326. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 15 (noting that “U.S.
households’ growing reliance on stock, bond, and hybrid mutual funds reflects
investor desire to meet long-term personal financial objectives such as preparing for
retirement”).
327. Cf. id. at 107 (showing historic liquidity ratios for mutual funds from 1984 to
2006).
328. Cf. id. at 117 (showing historic redemption rates for long-term mutual funds
from 1985 to 2006).
329. See id. at 107 (reporting that mutual funds have seldom maintained more
than ten percent of their assets in liquid form).
330. See TIROLE, supra note 196, at 207–13 (calculating the decrease in liquidity
that results from an increase in investment size).
331. See supra note 206 (describing the conditions under which Cerberus bought
Chrysler from Daimler).
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result, the larger mutual funds are already forced to make very
332
illiquid investments to invest all of their capital.
Their greater apparent need for liquidity does not therefore
suggest that public equity funds are incapable of long-term monitoring
so much as it suggests that they are incapable of only monitoring.
Certainly, some degree of liquidity must be maintained. However,
the size of most public equity funds is such that their need for
liquidity, like their preference for diversification, can easily co-exist
with a strategy of active monitoring. For example, even if a Fidelity or
Vanguard were to conclude that seventy-five percent of its assets
might be subject to call on any given day—an amount that seems
clearly excessive—that would still leave each with as much as $250
billion of capital that could be actively invested (and monitored) over
the long-term.
What this analysis misses, however, is that liquidity itself, at any
level, is a choice. Within statutory limits, public equity funds could
easily contract to limit the withdrawal rights of their investors.
Certainly, such a fund would be less attractive because its relative lack
of liquidity would increase its level of risk. In the event an investment
went sour, investors would find it more difficult to exit at a time of
their choosing or at all. For this reason, closed-end mutual funds
333
trade at a significant discount to open-end mutual funds. However,
this is simply a function of the fundamental relationship between risk
and reward. As the risk caused by short-term illiquidity increases, a
greater potential reward is needed to induce investors to hazard an
334
investment. Thus, a public equity fund could successfully contract
for fewer redemption rights only if it offered its investors the promise
of a greater return.
In fact, this is exactly the strategy pursued by private equity funds.
Investors in such funds agree to have their assets locked up for
lengthy periods only because the fund managers promise to translate
their freedom to make long-term investments into proportionately

332. See Black, supra note 2, at 568 (describing the substantial stakes that many
institutions own in single companies).
333. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously:
The Implications of
‘Discounted’ Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 901–08 (1988)
(reporting discounts as high as twenty percent that were attributable to a decrease in
liquidity).
334. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 173–203 (discussing the relationship
between risk and return); see also MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 74 (“Most private
equity investors expect to earn 15% to 20% in order to be compensated for the
added risks and illiquid nature of private equity.”).
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335

greater annual returns.
Put differently, private equity funds choose
their illiquidity and then use it to create increased profits through
corporate monitoring. Within limits, public equity funds could make
the same choice.
What this means for corporate governance is that their preference
for liquidity does not cause public equity funds to be passive. Rather,
public equity funds choose to be passive because they believe it is
more profitable for them to offer their investors a low-risk, low336
reward investment strategy.
Their preference for liquidity is not a
necessary precondition of their status. It is, instead, nothing more
than a response to prevailing market forces. Private equity funds are
more aggressive monitors, then, not because they lack liquidity or
because public equity funds require it. Rather, they are more active
because they believe it to be a more profitable strategy. The need for
liquidity, then, does not explain the different investment strategies of
public and private equity funds. Instead, the different investment
strategies explain their different approaches to liquidity.
D. Investment Culture
The culture of mutual funds and pension funds is very different
from the culture of private equity funds. Public equity fund
managers typically invest with the goal of slow, steady returns, and
337
their outlook reflects this attitude.
Unlike managers of private
equity funds, they are not used to active monitoring and are unlikely
to view their jobs as involving efforts to improve the performance of
338
the companies in which they invest.
Even the language they use
reflects this difference in attitude and outlook. The name Fidelity,
for example, “implies strict and continuing faithfulness to an
339
obligation, trust, or duty.”
In contrast, Cerberus is the name that
335. See MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 74 (noting that “annual returns range
from 0% to more than 30%, with an average of 10% to 20%, far surpassing that 9%
to 10% average returns historically realized by common stock investors”).
336. In other words, the retail investment market currently offers only one basic
choice for retirement savings in terms of the risk-reward tradeoff. The goal of
deregulating public equity fund compensation would be to permit the market to
offer true alternatives.
337. See Black, supra note 11, at 885 (“Despite the recent surge of interest in
corporate governance, many money managers still hope to beat the market by
trading rather than by monitoring corporate managers.”).
338. See id. at 886 (describing how cultural factors delay monitoring); see also
Coffee, supra note 12, at 859 (comparing fund managers to civil servants in a large
bureaucracy and observing that “they have a rational reason to be risk averse,
because a visible mistake could be embarrassing (if a large investment were to fail),
but a below-market performance will not cost them their jobs”).
339. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 (10th ed. 1998) (defining
fidelity as synonymous with “allegiance, fealty, loyalty, devotion, piety”).
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Greek mythology gives to the three-headed dog that guards the gates
340
Indeed, one could even question whether public equity
of hell.
fund managers are capable of effective monitoring. Though they are
sophisticated players in financial markets, few have honed the skill set
341
necessary to bring discipline to errant corporate managers.
Culture, however, is less likely to explain the difference in outlook
and behavior between public and private equity funds as it is to
reflect such difference. Moreover, although culture may present an
impediment to active monitoring, it is one that would probably be
342
overcome in time were other obstacles removed. Wall Street would
hardly overlook an opportunity for significant profit simply because
such opportunity had not been pursued in the past. Certainly the
relatively staid culture of bond traders changed in the early 1980s
after Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker announced that
343
interest rates—and hence bond prices—would no longer be fixed.
Similarly, and more relevant to my thesis, when the U.S. Department
of Labor agreed in 1979 to permit pension funds to invest in venture
capital funds, pension fund managers quickly changed their behavior
and poured money into the more risky venture funds, thereby greatly
344
accelerating the growth of the private equity market. Thus, culture,
while perhaps likely to slow the pace of change, is nonetheless
inadequate to explain the drastically different approaches to
monitoring taken by public and private equity funds.

340. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY: THE AGE OF FABLE, THE AGE OF
CHIVALRY, LEGENDS OF CHARLEMAGNE 83 (1993). For the etymology of the name, see
William Safire, On Language: A Sop to Cerberus, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2007, at 16
(“There were six guys when we started, and the name sounded pretty cool, but
nobody really researched it.” (quoting Tim Price, one of the managing directors of
Cerberus Capital)).
341. See Black, supra note 11, at 886 (noting that the culture of money managers is
such that most have not developed the skills necessary to monitor corporate
managers).
342. See id. (“Cultural factors, though, are more likely to delay monitoring than to
prevent it altogether.”).
343. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 173, at 1–5 (describing the transformation of
financial markets that took place in the 1970s and 1980s); Boyer, supra note 21, at
1000 (“After Volcker’s speech . . . the bond market was transformed from a
backwater into a casino.” (quoting MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH
THE WRECKAGE ON WALL STREET 35 (1989))). Lewis’s book describes in colorful detail
the aggressive, macho culture that developed at the bond trading desk of Solomon
Brothers after Federal Reserve announced that the money supply would be fixed and
interest rates would float. LEWIS, supra, at 35. The story of JM’s subsequent career as
a principal of the notoriously failed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management is
continued in ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONGTERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) [hereinafter LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED].
344. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73–74.

2007]

WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA

299

IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS COMPARED—EXTERNAL
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Part III of this Article examined various internal characteristics that
differentiate public and private equity funds, including their size, use
of leverage, need for liquidity and investment culture. In each case, I
concluded that these characteristics are a result, rather than the
cause, of the funds’ initial choice of investment strategy. Such
differences therefore do not seem sufficient to explain the funds’
different approaches to monitoring. Thus, the real question remains:
why did public equity funds develop a passive strategy while private
equity funds developed an active one?
Black and Roe posited that the most important explanation for
institutional investor passivity was the web of legal rules that make
345
monitoring burdensome and expensive.
Part IV tests this
hypothesis by comparing the legal regimes that impact public and
private equity funds. To the extent legal rules create different
incentives for the two categories of funds, it may be possible to infer
that such rules are the cause of their different investment strategies.
The legal rules affecting public equity fund monitoring may be
divided into three categories. The first includes those rules that
create impediments to the exercise of shareholder voice, primarily
with respect to the proxy system. They are discussed in Part IV.A.
The second includes those rules that may limit the ability of certain
funds to acquire a controlling stake in a particular corporation. They
are discussed in Part IV.B. The third are those rules that regulate the
internal structure and governance of the funds themselves, including
their compensation structures. They are discussed in Part IV.C.
In Part IV, I conclude that, just as Black and Roe posited, legal
rules are critical to a fund’s decision of whether to actively monitor its
investments. Without some degree of reform, active monitoring is
likely to remain out of reach for most public equity funds. However,
the crucial set of rules are those that govern the compensation of
fund managers. Private equity fund managers are active monitors
because the lack of regulation has allowed a market to develop that
creates incentives for such managers to engage in active oversight.
Public equity fund managers, however, are largely prohibited from
entering that market. While the removal of legal barriers may be a
necessary precondition to their entering the market, they are likely to

345. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (illustrating the various ways in
which legal rules make exercising shareholder voice expensive).
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continue their strategy of passive investing unless they are given clear
incentives to do otherwise.
A. Rules Limiting Voice
Corporate law is replete with rules that limit the ability of investors
to actively exercise their voice. For the most part, these have already
been catalogued by Black and Roe, and so there is little to be gained
346
by simply repeating the list here. Suffice it to say that the law limits
voice in two primary ways. First, it makes communication among
347
Second, it imposes burdens and risks on
shareholders expensive.
shareholders who acquire more than five (or sometimes ten) percent
348
of the stock of a particular company.
In the first place, federal proxy rules have generally imposed
significant expenses on shareholders who seek to communicate with
349
one another regarding an outstanding proxy proposal.
Despite
350
regulatory reforms over the past two decades, they also make it
difficult for shareholders to make proxy proposals on their own.
Such proposals tend to either be limited to an advisory role or
require a full-blown proxy contest, with associated costs frequently
351
reaching seven figures.
The second set of legal impediments are those that make it
burdensome or risky for an investor to acquire more than five (or
sometimes ten) percent of the equity of a given public company.
352
Most notable among these is Exchange Act § 16(b). It prohibits a
ten-percent shareholder from purchasing and selling securities of a
single issuer within a rolling six-month period, thereby drastically
346. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 530–66 (discussing the many rules and
procedures governing shareholder voting); Roe, supra note 2, at 16–31 (discussing
the various regulatory impediments to activism on the part of institutional investors);
see also supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text (describing the monetary
constraints on shareholder activism).
347. Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (listing requirements that apply
to shareholders who acquire more than five and ten percent of a given company’s
stock).
349. See Black, supra note 2, at 536 (maintaining that the proxy rules impose costs,
delays, and risks on communication efforts). But see generally supra Part I.C (finding
that the ease with which shareholders may communicate with one another has
improved since Black was writing in 1991).
350. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 840–41 (noting that “proxy reform has radically
reduced the cost of shareholder communications” since 1990).
351. See Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403 (revealing that the average contest is
estimated to range between $250,000 and $1 million). Meanwhile, the recent proxy
fight over the merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq is estimated to have cost over
$100 million. Steve Lohr, He Said. She Said. It Just Gets Uglier., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2002, at B1.
352. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
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353

reducing such shareholder’s short-term liquidity. Other important
hurdles include rule 10b-5, which makes it risky for an institutional
investor to control one of the issuer’s board seats lest they be deemed
354
to be engaged in insider trading.
State antitakeover statutes also
discourage investors from amassing too great a share of a given
355
stock.
Although the rules affecting the acquisition and exercise of
influence over corporate policy are real, numerous and oftentimes
onerous, they do not explain the relative passivity of public equity
funds vis-à-vis private equity funds. This is because, on their face, the
same rules apply equally to any investor. For example, anyone who
acquires ten percent of a public company, including any private
equity fund, must confront the limited liquidity imposed by section
356
16(b).
Thus, private equity funds appear to be engaged in active
357
monitoring despite the cumulative impact of these rules. The rules
353. Id. The same rule applies if the sale precedes the purchase during the rolling
six-month period. Id.
354. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). The risk is that the knowledge of the director
will be imputed to the institution, whether or not such knowledge is actually
transferred. As a result, an otherwise innocent trade might be deemed to have been
made on the basis of non-public information in contravention of insider trading
rules. Black, supra note 2, at 545–48.
355. Currently, over forty states have some form of antitakeover legislation. See
Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. REG. 209, 215 tbl.1 (2006). State antitakeover laws come
in four basic forms: control share acquisition statutes, fair price provisions, rights of
redemption, and business combination statutes. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683
F. Supp. 458, 463 (D. Del. 1988). Of particular importance for corporate governance
purposes are the control share acquisition statutes, like the one at issue in BNS.
Typically, such statutes work much like a poison pill, imposing massive dilution on,
or removing voting rights from, shareholders who acquire more than a fixed
percentage of the issuer’s stock without prior approval of the issuer’s board of
directors. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-3, 23-1-42-7, 23-1-42-10(b) (West 2007).
Delaware’s control statute takes a different approach, prohibiting “business
combinations” between unapproved stockholders and the target corporation for
three years following the initial purchase. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (2007). It
is modeled after New York’s statute. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 2007).
Initially, many such statutes were effectively invalidated on Commerce Clause
grounds by the Supreme Court’s decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982). However, the so-called “second generation” statutes, which were re-drafted
in light of Edgar, have thus far passed constitutional muster. See, e.g., BNS, 683 F.
Supp. at 472–73 (upholding the constitutionality of the Delaware antitakeover
statute).
356. See Black, supra note 2, at 545–47 (noting that Exchange Act section 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000), requires a company’s ten percent shareholders to report to
the SEC their purchases and sales of such company’s stock and to forfeit any profits
that result from any “short-swing” trades they make during any given six-month
period).
357. As an alternative explanation, one might argue that the failure of private
equity funds to invest in public equities other than to acquire control suggests that
section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 do indeed serve as deterrents to corporate monitoring.
However, this phenomenon is probably better understood as being the result of a
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themselves, however burdensome, are therefore insufficient to
explain the continued passivity of public equity funds.
Before dismissing the impact of this set of legal rules altogether,
however, it is worth asking how private equity funds address the risks
and burdens these rules pose. In fact, private equity funds avoid the
direct impact of many of these rules by leapfrogging over mere
358
influence and instead acquiring outright control.
Put differently,
the rules appear to constitute a much greater hurdle in a system
characterized by limited shareholder voice than by one characterized
by full-blown shareholder control. This operates in two ways.
First, unlike public equity funds, private equity funds have already
chosen to sacrifice liquidity and so are not negatively impacted by
359
rules that reduce their ability to exit a given investment.
Put
concretely, an LBO fund with a seven-year investment horizon is not
inconvenienced by the six-month delay caused by purchasing shares
subject to section 16(b).
Second, many of the rules that make the acquisition and exercise
of influence burdensome apply only to targets that are publicly
360
traded.
Private equity funds, however, generally purchase
companies that do not list their shares on a national exchange, such
361
as early stage companies and subsidiaries of public companies.
preference for control acquisitions intended to take full advantage of the carried
interest. Supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text.
358. See generally Part II.A (providing an overview of private equity funds).
359. See generally Part II.C (detailing the typical governance structure of private
equity funds).
360. See, e.g., Black, supra note 2, at 536–50 (cataloguing the effects on a fund’s
monitoring ability of federal proxy and insider trading rules that apply only to
publicly traded companies). One example of this relates to insider trading liability
under section 10b-5. The risk here is that a director who is appointed by an
institutional investor would occasionally be privy to non-public information
regarding the portfolio company. That information would then be imputed to the
institution, even if the director did not in fact pass it along. Thus, the institution
would constantly risk violating the insider trading rules by innocently making a sale
or purchase while the director (and the director alone) is in possession of material
non-public information. Id. at 547–48. One impact of the various federal anti-fraud
provisions is to impose a duty on insiders who are deemed to possess non-public
information to disclose such information publicly or to abstain from trading. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied Kline v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). For private equity funds, however, part of the purpose of acquiring
control over a company is to obtain non-public information. Therefore, a disconnect
between what the fund knows and what its portfolio company managers know would
be much less likely. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that “management
would more willingly reveal proprietary information to the large long-term
shareholder, who has the incentive to maintain secrecy”). Inadvertent insider
trading would therefore not be much of a risk.
361. Haynes, Thompson & Wright, supra note 197, at 219 (noting that many
buyouts occur as a result of management’s decision to refocus and narrow its
strategy, and summarizing research regarding the causes of such a decision).
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Alternatively, when private equity funds do acquire public companies,
it is often in a going-private transaction that results in the company
362
no longer being listed on a national securities exchange. Thus, by
acquiring control, private equity funds completely negate the impact
of many otherwise burdensome securities rules.
The legal rules identified by Black and Roe are therefore more
likely to deter investors who seek to exercise voice, as opposed to
363
control.
Voice contemplates a cooperative effort by large but
364
fractional shareholders to exercise influence short of control.
Voice, in other words, impacts the margin, shifting a relatively
impotent investor into a position of real, but limited, power.
The goal of many proponents of voice, however, is expressly to add
to the power of fractional shareholders to influence management. In
a sense, they seem to want to have it both ways—limit shareholders’
power by forcing them to maintain small fractional stakes, but
increase their power by bestowing greater influence upon such
stakes. Undoubtedly, at some level, whether at five percent, ten
percent or higher, shareholder influence becomes strong enough
that rules like section 16(b) are needed to limit abuse. Arguments to
lessen the impact of these rules may therefore be simply delaying the
moment of reckoning. If section 16(b) should be changed to
exclude certain categories of ten-percent investors, it should still
apply to fifteen-percent investors, and so on. The real problem, in
other words, is that rules like section 16(b) accomplish what they
were intended to accomplish: they limit the liquidity of shareholders
365
who attain influence short of control.
In fact, the problem with voice may be that it adds too little power.
Shareholders who cross the five-percent threshold by only a small
margin gain few of the benefits of increased influence while suffering
a significant loss in liquidity. The power of shareholder control, the
investment strategy pursued by private equity funds, is that the loss of
liquidity is coupled with a dramatic, not incremental, increase in
influence—influence that can be converted directly into higher
profits. The implication, then, is that a system of institutional
362. See GAUGHAN, supra note 197, at 291 (noting that a typical leveraged buyout
“frequently involves taking a public company private”).
363. See Gilson, Gordon & Pound, supra note 67, at 33 (arguing that it is more
difficult for a shareholder to elect a minority of the directors than to replace the
entire board).
364. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining institutional voice in
contrast to institutional control).
365. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1343 (noting that the “threat of a six-month
period of illiquidity deters most institutional holders from crossing the ten percent
threshold”).
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investor voice may be attractive but not feasible. Policymakers may
therefore be forced to confront the difficult choice of accepting the
current system of institutional investor passivity or enabling public
equity funds to actually take control of the reins of corporate
366
America.
None of this, however, explains the different trading strategies of
public and private equity funds. Rather, the discussion echoes the
367
discussion of liquidity in Part III.C.
Shareholder passivity is not
caused by the rules. Rather, it follows from the initial choice of
whether to pursue a low-reward strategy that benefits from low cost,
low risk, and high liquidity, or a high-reward strategy that must
overcome high cost, high risk, and low liquidity. Once that initial
decision is made, presumably on the basis of market factors, the
impact of the rules on either strategy is minimal. The extremes of
passivity and control are unaffected by these legal rules. Rather, what
the rules do is place burdens on the middle ground of voice. Thus,
the rules explain why public equity funds do not exercise voice, but
they do not explain why they shun control.
It should be noted, however, that while most of these rules have
little impact on a fund’s decision to choose between passivity and
control, they do have the impact of limiting control to friendly
control. As Grundfest and others have noted, truly hostile takeovers
368
are largely impossible under today’s legal regime.
Thus, if public
equity funds were to enter the world of LBOs, they would be able to

366. Interestingly, evidence of this possibility may be found in John Coffee’s 1991
survey of the corporate governance systems that were prevalent in the United States,
Japan, Germany, Sweden, Canada, and the United Kingdom. See id. at 1290–1318
(contrasting the role of investors in countries with external versus internal capital
markets). Coffee tentatively put these countries on a continuum, with one pole
representing systems that privilege liquidity but inhibit institutional investor control,
and the other pole representing systems that permit financial institutions to
dominate industrial countries but at the expense of decreased liquidity. Id. at 1287.
In fact, however, his results suggested that there was very little middle ground.
Instead, most of the countries were on one pole or the other. Id. at 1290–1318.
Even Sweden and Canada, the two countries he placed nearest the middle of the
continuum, were actually just mixtures of the two poles, with some Swedish and
Canadian entities benefiting from control but not liquidity, while other entities
reflected the opposite approach. Id. at 1306–09. What was missing was the true
middle ground of voice—a system characterized by financial institutions that exercise
moderate influence at the expense of some liquidity.
367. See supra Part III.C (noting that public equity funds choose greater liquidity—
in part because investors prefer low-risk and low-reward investments—a strategy
which inhibits effective monitoring).
368. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 52, at 889–91
(examining data from 1996–2000 and noting the frequency with which staggered
boards of directors prevented hostile bids).
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369

invest only in deals where management acquiesced. Certainly, this
would pose a significant limitation on the impact that such
investments could have on the overall market for good corporate
governance. Presumably, the worst-run companies would be the least
likely to agree to an acquisition as their managers would be in the
greatest peril of losing their jobs.
However, while this may limit the ability of public equity funds to
change underperforming management, it does not necessarily mean
that they cannot improve management performance. For example,
there are a number of empirical studies that have found that
leveraged buyouts create strong efficiency gains, even if the buyout
370
has the blessing of management.
LBOs and other private equity
acquisitions also invariably involve a substantial premium over the
371
target’s market price.
Presumably, the size of this premium is
related to the purchaser’s expectations regarding its ability to reduce
agency costs. Thus, the management of many underperforming
companies may be more than willing to accept such a premium.
Certainly, that seems to be the case today, with nine of the ten largest
372
LBOs in history being announced over the prior two years.
Although a regime of institutional investor control could never
encompass all American companies, the more it improved
performance at some companies, the starker the difference would be
vis-à-vis other underperforming companies, and the greater the
pressure that would build on the poor performers to improve.
Indeed, a study of the impact of the shareholder activist group
United Shareholders Association suggested that the $22.75 million it
spent in monitoring a targeted group of underperforming companies
373
contributed to a general net wealth gain of $1.3 billion. Thus, even

369. Hostile takeover attempts, unless they are later converted into friendly bids,
are today generally impossible given the strength and array of management’s
defenses. See id. (examining the effectiveness of staggered boards of directors as
impediments to takeovers).
370. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 7, at 65 (arguing that post-LBO companies, with
their close monitoring, have an incentive structure that is superior to that of public
corporations); see also BRUNER, supra note 199, at 56 (summarizing several empirical
studies that found increased value in transactions where managers had more at stake,
including leveraged buyouts); Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 924 (noting
the existence of “substantial evidence suggesting that LBOs often led to improved
corporate performance, at least up through about 1986”).
371. See John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where
Do We Stand?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 783, 794 (2000) (citing a study by J.P. Morgan that
average premiums paid to companies with poison pills was fifty-one percent and
average premiums paid to companies without poison pills was thirty-six percent).
372. Sorkin, supra note 219.
373. Strickland, Wiles & Zenner, supra note 161, at 336.
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by monitoring only the poorest performers, public equity funds have
the power to improve the operations of the entire marketplace.
B. Rules Limiting Control
Although many legal rules appear to impact both public and
private equity funds in a similar manner, many do not. Chief among
those whose impact is disparate are rules that restrict mutual funds
and pension funds from engaging in certain types of investments. To
the extent such investment restrictions block public equity funds (but
not private equity funds) from acquiring control over a given
corporation, they might explain the public equity funds’ continued
passivity. If such were the case, the rules would need to be relaxed—
or a safe harbor created—before mutual fund and pension fund
managers could become active in the oversight of corporate
managers.
Their amendment, in other words, would be a
precondition to the ability of public equity funds to engage in active
oversight of corporate managers. Their removal, however, would not
create any direct incentives to monitor.
The following two Sections, respectively, address the impact of
ERISA on pension funds and of the Investment Company Act and
Investment Advisers Act on mutual funds. Private equity funds,
meanwhile, are generally structured so as to be exempt from these
374
two regulatory schemes.
1.

ERISA
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in
1974 in response to concerns that pension funds were not being
375
sufficiently regulated by the states.
The goal of ERISA was to
statutorily extend the common law of trusts to union- and employer376
sponsored pension plans. Among other things, it made the security
of pension promises a basic goal of federal policy by regulating the
riskiness of pension investments and by providing a government-run
377
insurance program for all qualifying pensions.
Pension funds’ relationship with private equity investments has
always been complicated. Initially, for example, many observers read
374. See supra Part II.B (noting that private equity funds avoid the limitations and
regulations to which public equity funds are subject by, inter alia, limiting
membership and clientele).
375. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
376. Id.
377. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 3
(2004). For a political history of the regulation of pension funds, see generally Roe,
Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 75.
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ERISA as prohibiting pension funds from investing in private equity
378
funds. In 1979, however, the Department of Labor issued a ruling
that expressly permitted such investments, provided the pension fund
379
remained sufficiently diversified.
More recently, private equity
funds that wished to accept investments from pension plans had to be
380
structured around ERISA’s broad definition of a fund manager.
This meant structuring the private equity fund as a “venture capital
operating company” or limiting the amount of capital it received
from all pension funds to twenty-five percent or less of the total fund
381
commitments.
These rules were loosened somewhat in 2006,
however, by exempting funds of funds and making it easier for
private equity funds to accept subscriptions from non-ERISA pension
382
plans.
ERISA does not contain a comprehensive list of specific rules
relating to investment risk. Rather, it relies upon two broad and
relatively vague fiduciary requirements to regulate the behavior of
ERISA fund managers. First, it requires ERISA fund managers to act
“with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
383
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” This fiduciary
384
standard has been called “the highest known to law.”
Second,
ERISA fund managers are required to diversify the investments of the
385
plan “so as to minimize the risk of large losses.” By contrast, private

378. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.
379. Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,363
(proposed Aug. 28, 1979); see also Frankel, supra note 295, at 944–52 (describing the
period from 1975 to 2000 as one in which federal regulators largely cooperated with
fund managers).
380. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 27–28.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000). The prudent investor standard was first
enunciated in Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). For a
discussion by two CalPERS executives of the continuing duty of fund managers to
monitor investments in index funds, see generally Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L.
Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund
Through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413 (1995).
384. Reich v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)).
385. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). The duty can be traced back to the common law.
See Appeal of Dickinson, 25 N.E. 99 (Mass. 1890) (holding that trustees may not take
the same risks as owners in search of greater profit). ERISA fiduciaries are also
required to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” of the
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). For purposes of this Article, however, the “solely in
the interest” requirement is less significant as it is assumed that private equity
investments are in fact made primarily for the benefit of fund investors. Meanwhile,

308

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:225

equity fund managers, while being fiduciaries under state partnership
law, are not required to satisfy ERISA’s prudence standard or its
386
diversification requirement.
Neither the prudence standard nor the diversification requirement
are likely to interfere directly with an ERISA plan manager’s desire to
exercise voice. As contemplated by its proponents, shareholder voice
involves shareholders with small fractional stakes—generally under
five percent—using the proxy process to influence management,
387
either on their own or collectively with other similar shareholders.
Thus, unless the pension plan were quite small, acquiring a fractional
share of a public company would seem unlikely to impact the plan’s
diversification in any meaningful way. Similarly, inexpensive or
informal attempts to influence management conduct would not seem
388
particularly imprudent.
In fact, pension plan advisers may even find it less risky to adopt a
strategy of profit-driven monitoring than to use fund assets to pursue
389
particular social goals.
Indeed, one of the bright spots on the
horizon of shareholder activism is the role being played by the large
390
public pension plans such as CalPERS.
Such funds have acted as
leaders among shareholder activists and have been the catalysts for

the Act permits deviation from the diversification requirement only if it is clearly
prudent. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
386. Because most private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships, with
the fund corpus being the partnership itself and the fund managers serving as the
general partner, the fund managers are generally subject to the normal fiduciary
duties of partners. These are generally thought to entail “[n]ot honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (N.Y. 1928). Nonetheless, though a high standard, it is generally thought to be a
lower standard than ERISA’s “prudent investor” standard. See Reich, 837 F. Supp. at
1273 (describing ERISA’s fiduciary standard as “the highest known to law” (quoting
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982))).
387. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (defining institutional voice in
contrast to institutional control).
388. Indeed, the most recent Restatement of Trusts expressly approves of ERISA
funds seeking out “individual bargains within the highly efficient markets as well as
in the less efficient ones.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE
§ 227, general note to cmts. e-h (1992) (emphasis added).
389. See Leon E. Irish & Arthur G. Kent, The Social Investing Quandary, in ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at 237–38 (discussing the impact of ERISA’s “solely in
the interest” requirement on social investing).
390. See Romano, supra note 82, at 797 (acknowledging that public pension funds
have been “more active than other institutional investors in corporate governance
over the past few years, offering shareholder proposals and engaging in other highly
publicized activities to influence management actions”).
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391

much change. It is for this reason that Coffee and others focused
392
their reform efforts on public pension funds.
Private equity investments, on the other hand, involve quite a bit
more than mere influence. They involve the acquisition and exercise
of some degree of control. Thus, in order to uncover why public
equity funds behave differently than private equity funds, one must
consider the impact of ERISA’s prudence standard and diversification
requirement on control acquisitions.
As a technical legal matter, it is unclear whether an acquisition of
control by a pension plan would violate ERISA. Courts have
393
consistently limited the prudence standard to a procedural test.
Thus, liability will not turn on the success of a particular investment,
394
but on the quality of the investigation.
Likewise, Department of
Labor regulations state that the prudence standard requires
consideration only of whether the particular investment strategy is
reasonably designed to further the purposes of the plan, including
395
with respect to the overall projected return.
It does not specify
what those purposes must be. In fact, ERISA fund managers are
396
already permitted to invest in private equity funds.
Provided they
maintain a proper level of diversification, it does not appear to be
significantly less prudent to make such investments directly rather
than through an intermediary. It may even be less expensive.
A similar analysis seems to apply to the diversification requirement.
It is a tenet of modern finance theory that a well-designed portfolio
containing as few as twenty stocks can provide ninety-five percent of

391. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 846 (predicting that public pension funds will act
as catalysts of corporate governance reform).
392. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2, at 1336 (suggesting that public pension funds
might be the “optimal corporate monitors” because they are relatively free from
conflicts of interest, have large enough stakes in corporations, and prefer longer
investment horizons).
393. See, e.g., Brock v. Robbins, 830 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding a
violation of the prudence requirement where the fund managers approved a $10
million investment in under ten minutes without any investigation); Ulico Cas. Co. v.
Clover Capital Mgmt., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (requiring
fund managers “(1) to employ proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure
the investment; (2) to act in a manner as would others who have a capacity and
familiarity with such matters; and (3) to exercise independent judgment when
making investment decisions”).
394. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the
Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 779–80 (1991)
(citing Donovan v. Walton, 609 F. Supp. 1221, 1222–28 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff’d, 794
F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986)).
395. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2007). The Department of Labor, in public
statements, has also appeared to approve of the modern portfolio approach to
investments. Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 437.
396. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 73.
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397

the benefits that arise from diversification.
Thus, provided the
pension fund is large enough relative to the target company, it would
seem logical that it could safely engage in a control acquisition
398
without sacrificing the overall diversity of its portfolio.
For corporate governance purposes, however, the real impediment
is the non-obvious reading sometimes given to the prudence standard
and diversification requirement. Prudence, though defined, is
399
defined broadly and subject to interpretation.
For example, Roe
argues that a fund manager who sat on the board of a portfolio
company would be open to lawsuits seeking to apply ERISA’s
400
heightened fiduciary standard to her actions on the board.
Moreover, the definition expressly contemplates a comparison of the
fund manager’s conduct to that of other fund managers “acting in a
401
like capacity.” This creates the risk (or at least the perception) that
the first pension fund manager to engage in an LBO or like
transaction could be held to have violated the prudence standard for
no other reason than because she was the first. In other words, if no
one else is engaging in such transactions, then there is the real
402
possibility that the novelty alone would be cause for a violation.

397. See supra note 304 (referencing textbooks which state that as few as eight
stocks can provide sufficient diversity and suggesting that this holds true when
portfolios hold stocks whose risks are negatively correlated).
398. Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 437 (“Thus, under ERISA, trustees may
prudently choose to make new or non-traditional investments if certain factors are
met. DOL regulations specify these factors. For one thing, expected returns must
justify the additional risk, taking into account the overall purpose of the pension
plan. Also, the portfolio as a whole must be adequately diversified and sufficiently
liquid to meet payout requirements.”); see also Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at
97 (arguing that the diversification requirement, in light of modern portfolio theory,
is not a significant barrier to pension fund activism).
399. See generally Serota, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at 4, 19–20
(citing the standard and explaining the prudence rule).
400. Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 102–03.
401. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
402. See ROBERT A. HAUGEN, THE NEW FINANCE: THE CASE AGAINST EFFICIENT
MARKETS 114–16 (1995) (noting that fund managers may seek to avoid taking actions
that might differentiate them from other fund managers); Roe, supra note 2, at 24
(“Commentators suggest that the rule looks to prevailing investment practices, to the
average, but with a substantial conservative drag: preservation of principal, even in
the face of reduced return, is critical.” (citing B. LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 21, 29, 39–40 (1986))); Roe, Private
Pensions, supra note 66, at 97–99 (arguing that ERISA creates a conservative feedback
loop that reinforces existing practices, whatever they may be). But see Steven L.
Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement
Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 143–44 (1998) (discussing a 1997 Uniform Law
Commissioners model act that was “designed to permit and encourage” the
application of modern portfolio theory by pension fund managers).
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And even if such were not truly the case, it would be reasonable for a
403
risk-averse fund manager to fear that it might be.
The same is true of diversification. Though a diversified portfolio
might not be inconsistent with the occasional acquisition of control,
404
the fact is that most funds are, if anything, over-diversified.
Some
funds, for example, appear to hold more than a thousand different
405
stocks, when no more than twenty are absolutely necessary.
Moreover, the language of the statute makes the issue even cloudier.
The degree of diversification that is required is that which is
406
necessary “to minimize the risk of large losses.” Read broadly, this
could easily be interpreted to mean that any large investment—even
one below the five-percent threshold—would violate ERISA because
407
the losses could potentially be large.
Alternatively, it could be
interpreted to mean that any risk of loss that is objectively large
would be improper, even if the loss would be subjectively small
408
relative to the size of the overall fund.
One explanation for the continued passivity of public pension
funds may therefore lie in a risk-averse interpretation of ERISA’s
prudence standard and diversification requirement. Whether or not
they would be violated by an activist monitoring strategy, such rules
appear to impose significant risks (and hence costs) on pension fund
managers. Unless and until Congress and/or the Department of
Labor clarifies their application to LBOs and similar transactions,
these rules will continue to limit the ability of public pension fund
managers to engage in control acquisitions.
That being said, these requirements by themselves do not appear
to constitute a sufficient explanation for the general passivity of most
public pension fund managers. For example, mutual funds, which
are exempt from ERISA but which mimic public pension funds in
most other ways, are nonetheless passive investors. It is likely, in
other words, that even if an appropriate safe harbor were designed to
403. See Black, supra note 2, at 562–64 (discussing the culture of fund managers
that makes them averse to legal risk).
404. See Black, supra note 11, at 834 (noting that even a relatively small portfolio
with as few as one hundred stocks would protect institutions from most firm-specific
risk).
405. See id.; see also supra note 304 (suggesting that, so long as a fund holds stocks
whose risks are negatively correlated, a small number is sufficient for diversification
purposes).
406. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
407. See also Koppes & Reilly, supra note 383, at 436 (noting that, at common law,
prudence is measured each transaction at a time).
408. See Roe, Private Pensions, supra note 66, at 99–101 (discussing the impact of
anti-netting rules that in certain cases prohibit managers from offsetting a significant
loss against a significant gain).
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permit ERISA-regulated pension plans to invest in private equity-type
transactions, public pension fund managers would continue to see
little profit potential in active monitoring. In other words, ERISA
may explain why public pension fund managers believe they cannot
invest directly in private equity-style transactions, but it does not shed
any light on whether they would desire to do so.
2.

The 1940 Acts
Mutual funds are governed primarily by the Investment Company
409
Act of 1940, while mutual fund managers—also referred to as
410
advisers—are governed by the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Both Acts had their roots in the original New Deal securities
legislation of the 1930s, and both impose broad and detailed
411
regulatory schemes.
Thus, a mutual fund manager must comply
with an extensive body of regulation, covering not merely fraud but
everything from registration and disclosure obligations to
recordkeeping requirements and limitations on incentive
412
compensation and permissible investments. Private equity funds, by
contrast, are structured so as to be largely exempt from all but the
413
fraud requirements of these two statutes.
Although the two 1940 Acts, like ERISA, subject mutual funds to a
system of broad and onerous regulation, their impact on corporate
monitoring is likely to be less significant. In the first place, it is
doubtful that mutual fund managers owe fiduciary duties to their
investors that are significantly higher than the duties owed by private
414
equity fund managers.
In the second place, the Investment
Company Act’s diversification requirement is fairly easily
circumvented.

409. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2000).
410. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000).
411. For a political history of the Acts, see generally Roe, Mutual Funds, supra note
66, at 1469. For a description of the history and development of the mutual fund
industry, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, STEVEN M. GOLDFELD, LILLI A. GORDON & MICHAEL F.
KOEHN, THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUAL FUND MARKETS:
COMPETITION VERSUS
REGULATION ch. 1 (1990).
412. See generally Clifford E. Kirsch, An Introduction to Mutual Funds, in MUTUAL
FUND REGULATION §§ 1:4.1, at 1-13, 1:4.2, at 1-13 to -16 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed.
2007) (describing the regulatory framework to which fund advisers must submit).
413. See supra Part II.B (noting that private equity funds avoid the limitations and
regulations to which public equity funds are subject by, inter alia, limiting
membership to a selected clientele).
414. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 194 (1963) (imposing “an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, and full and
fair disclosure of all material facts’” on a mutual fund adviser (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 534–35 (1955))).
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Currently, most mutual funds prefer to be categorized as
“diversified” because investors generally consider such funds to be
415
less risky. To qualify as such, a fund is required to devote seventyfive percent of its assets to diversified investments. It is then
prohibited from using these monies to acquire more than ten
percent of any one company or to acquire an interest in a single
416
company that would exceed five percent of the fund’s total assets.
However, a diversified mutual fund is permitted to invest the
unregulated twenty-five percent of its assets in any manner it chooses,
417
including in a single, non-diversified security.
Given the neargargantuan size of many mutual fund complexes, even this twenty-five
percent would be enough to make a number of significant control
acquisitions. Moreover, if a fund were to choose to adopt a strategy
of seeking to control a limited portfolio of target companies, it would
want to advertise that fact. Thus, it would probably desire to buck
tradition and adopt the non-diversified label. Doing so would
therefore exempt such fund from any limitations on the
418
concentration of its investments.
Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code, which applies to
mutual funds, presents much the same story. Generally speaking,
mutual funds seek to be treated as “regulated investment companies”
under section 851 of the Code so as to be eligible for pass-through
419
tax treatment.
Without such treatment, dividends earned by the
mutual fund would be taxed three times: once at the company level,
again at the level of the mutual fund, and a third time when
420
distributed to the mutual funds’ investors.
A mutual fund that
421
satisfies the Code’s diversification requirement is taxed only twice.
Like the Investment Company Act, the Code divides the assets of a
regulated investment company into two pools. The first pool must be
invested in a diversified portfolio, such that not more than five
415. See Roe, supra note 2, at 20 (“Mutual funds are designed for unsophisticated
investors who cannot assemble a diversified portfolio or evaluate the mutual fund’s
portfolio.”).
416. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(1) (2000).
417. Id. § 80b-5(b)(2).
418. See Audrey C. Talley & James L. Love, Restrictions on Investments, in MUTUAL
FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, § 8:2.2, at 8-9 to -10 (explaining the requirements
for a diversified classification and further noting that non-diversified funds may
invest more than five percent of their total assets in any one issuer).
419. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (2007); Talley & Love, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra
note 412, at § 8:2.2, 8-9 to -10; see Roe, Mutual Funds, supra note 66, at 1478–80
(examining subchapter M of the Code and noting that only diversified mutual funds
are eligible for pass-through tax treatment).
420. Roe, supra note 2, at 20–21.
421. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (2007).
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percent of the fund’s total assets are invested in any one company
and such that the fund does not own more than ten percent of the
422
Obviously, this presents a real
equity of any one company.
limitation on the ability of such a fund to adopt a strategy of control
acquisitions. However, the other pool is unregulated, except that the
fund is generally prohibited from investing more than twenty-five
423
percent of its total assets in any one company. Thus, although most
mutual funds, for tax purposes, elect to keep at least half of their
assets diversified, there is nothing to stop them from investing the
424
other half in a few highly concentrated investments.
Again, given
that some mutual fund complexes have enormous sums at their
disposal, this would not seem to be an overly tight restriction on their
ability to engage in active oversight strategies. Moreover, as taxes on
capital gains approach zero, it is possible that an aggressive mutual
fund might be willing to forego pass-through treatment and devote a
425
greater portion of its assets to active corporate monitoring.
Slightly more significant for corporate governance purposes are
the Investment Company Act’s prohibitions against certain
transactions. These apparently represent a policy choice to limit the
risk to which mutual fund investors are exposed. In particular,
section 12(a) of the Investment Company Act generally prohibits
registered investment companies—i.e., mutual funds but not private
equity funds—from effecting short sales of securities and from
426
purchasing securities on margin.
However, because the SEC has
thus far failed to adopt the necessary implementing rules, mutual
427
funds are currently free to participate in these practices.
In fact,
many mutual funds have been formed for the express purpose of
selling securities short or for hedging their investments by means of a
428
long-short strategy.
Even if such rules were actively enforced, however, the inability of
public equity funds to make such investments would not adequately
422. Id. § 851(b)(3)(A).
423. Id. § 851(b)(3)(B).
424. Roe, supra note 2, at 20.
425. See id. at 20–21 (demonstrating that the marginal tax burden applicable to
non-exempt mutual funds is relatively small).
426. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1)-(2) (2000). Exceptions exist for short sales “in
connection with an underwriting in which such registered company is a participant”
and for purchases on margin where “such short-term credits as are necessary for the
clearance of transactions.” Id.
427. Talley & Love, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 418, § 8:3.1, at 8-11
to -13.
428. Adam Shell, Investors Add a Bit of Hedge Fund to Portfolio Mix, USA TODAY, Dec.
8, 2006, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2006-1208-hedge-fund-strategy_x.htm.
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explain their passivity. In fact, although private equity funds may
429
Rather, when
make such investments, they typically do not.
acquiring a company, they generally invest in its common stock in
order to take control, or in preferred stock that is convertible into
430
common.
Additionally, venture capital funds also frequently
431
Each of these
acquire debentures or other debt securities.
securities is, of course, a permissible form of investment under the
Investment Company Act.
Thus, while the rules regarding
permissible investments may appear to point to a potential distinction
between public and private equity funds, in practice any such
distinction is probably quite minor.
C. Governance Rules
The third category of legal rules that could explain the different
investment strategies of public and private equity funds is the set of
rules applicable to fund governance. Rules regarding disclosure, for
example, as well as rules relating to who is eligible to invest in a fund,
differ markedly between public and private equity funds. More
importantly, rules regarding the permissibility of incentive fee
arrangements differ, providing what appears to be the most likely
explanation for the activist monitoring undertaken by private equity
funds and the passivity that is prevalent among public equity funds.
Each of these sets of rules is discussed separately below.
1.

Disclosure rules
Private equity funds are typically structured so as to be exempt
432
from all but the most basic of disclosure requirements.
Mutual
funds, on the other hand, must register with the SEC and make
ongoing and extensive disclosures regarding their structure and

429. Hedge funds that routinely invest in short sales and other derivative securities
are expressly not categorized as private equity funds for purposes of this Article. See
supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
430. See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 202, at 2-9 to -25 (outlining a venture capital
fund’s preferred investment structure with respect to a hypothetical start-up
transaction).
431. See id. (describing certain tax advantages that arise from holding debt rather
than equity).
432. Private equity funds generally seek exemptions from the disclosure
requirements of the Investment Company Act, the Investment Advisers Act, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SCHELL, supra note
182, §§ 8.01-.04, at 8-3 to -45. Admittedly, some funds do pursue strategies that
require them to register under the Investment Advisers Act. Id. § 8.02[3], at 8-23 to 35. However, under most circumstances, these disclosures require little substantive
information from such advisers and no information regarding investment strategies
or techniques or other similarly sensitive information. Id.
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433

operation.
Pension funds have similarly extensive disclosure
434
requirements. Despite these differences, however, disclosure rules
appear largely unconnected to monitoring ability.
Admittedly, the behavior of different fund managers might differ if
they were required to disclose sensitive investment policies. Thus, for
example, secrecy may be very important for hedge funds that engage
in proprietary trading strategies that could easily be copied by others
with the same information. In fact, such funds frequently decline to
435
disclose their trading positions even to their own investors.
For most public and private equity funds, however, a requirement
to disclose the types of transactions in which a fund seeks to invest
would not seem particularly onerous given that the strategy itself is
fairly obvious. The value lies in the execution. Thus, the risk of
disclosure would seem unlikely to be significant. Moreover, to the
extent a public or private equity fund were to seek to acquire control
of a public company, section 13(d) of the Securities Act would
436
require prompt disclosure of its intention.
Thus, again, the rules
do not appear to operate in a manner that would privilege corporate
monitoring activities by private equity funds over public equity funds.
Their impact is instead mostly neutral.
2.

Eligible investor rules
From a securities law standpoint, anyone can invest in a mutual
437
fund or pension fund, regardless of their wealth or sophistication.
Private equity funds, on the other hand, in order to remain exempt
from various regulations, generally limit their investors to those who

433. See generally Michael Glazer, Prospectus Disclosure and Delivery Requirements,
Shareholder Reports, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, at chs. 4–5
(detailing the federal registration and prospectus disclosure requirements for mutual
funds under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and discussing the requirements mutual funds
must meet in providing reports to their shareholders).
434. See generally Peter O. Shinevar, W. Fulton Broemer & Jayne Zanglein, Reporting
and Disclosure, in 1 ERISA BASICS D-1 to -57 (American Bar Association 2000)
(outlining the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on pension funds by
ERISA and highlighting the requirements of the annual report provisions).
435. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 5, at 49–50 (noting that hedge fund
managers frequently choose not to share securities positions and holdings with their
own investors because such information does not benefit the investors and may
compromise the hedge fund’s competitive advantage in the market).
436. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2000).
437. The one proviso to this is that the investor must be eligible to participate in
the particular pension fund or mutual fund. Thus, for example, if a pension fund is
sponsored by General Motors, it is likely to be limited to employees of General
Motors. However, among those employees, there is no requirement that they be
wealthy or sophisticated in order to participate.
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are “qualified purchasers” (or at least “accredited investors”).
Participation in a private equity fund is therefore limited in practice
to wealthy investors and fund insiders. Most retail investors are
ineligible. In fact, many funds actually require their investors to
439
satisfy wealth requirements that exceed the statutory minimums.
How this distinction impacts monitoring ability, however, is
unclear. One possibility is that private equity funds can take on
greater risk because their more wealthy investors are likely to be
better diversified and thus are better able to suffer a complete loss of
440
their private equity investment.
As this Article has demonstrated,
however, a large public equity fund that devoted a portion of its assets
to an active monitoring strategy could nevertheless remain
441
completely diversified, thus diminishing the risk of a total loss.
Moreover, it would still be possible for a retail investor to allocate her
442
assets partly to activist funds and partly to other asset categories.
Another possibility is that the smaller number and greater
sophistication of private equity fund investors means that they will be
superior monitors of the fund managers. As a result, the fund
managers can be trusted to take greater risks with the knowledge that
their investors will not tolerate shirking. However, this again appears
to be more a function of market forces than an explanation for the
variance in investment strategies. If the alignment of interests
between the fund managers and the fund investors is sufficiently
great, the number of investors and their level of sophistication should
be irrelevant. Certainly, private equity funds have fewer and
wealthier investors, but such difference on its own is insufficient to
explain their aggressive oversight strategies nor the continued
passivity of public equity funds.

438. By limiting their investors to only “qualified purchasers,” private equity funds
can qualify for an exemption pursuant to section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000). Funds that prefer to take advantage of a
different exemption from the Investment Company Act generally still require their
investors to be “accredited” in order to be exempt from the Securities Act of 1933
pursuant to rule 506 of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.506 (2007).
439. Others, however, are seeking to increase their size by reducing eligible
investor requirements to the statutory minimum. E.g., Eleanor Laise, Private Equity
Targets Littler Guy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2006, at D1.
440. Indeed, most private equity funds require their investors, in order to be
eligible, to represent that they are capable of suffering a complete loss of their
investment.
441. See supra note 304 (recognizing the benefits of a diverse portfolio and
realizing that holding shares in as few as eight companies may be sufficient to reap
those benefits).
442. See id. (providing an example of how portfolios can be diverse and still find a
balance between risky and more predictable investments).
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3.

Limits on incentive compensation
Managers of mutual funds and pension funds face severe
limitations on the types of fees they are permitted to charge. These
are imposed, respectively, by the Investment Advisers Act and ERISA.
The goal of this policy is to minimize incentives for fund managers to
443
take overly speculative risks with client savings. Private equity fund
managers, by contrast, are subject to no such restrictions.
Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act prohibits a
registered investment adviser from receiving compensation “on the
basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the
444
funds or any portion of the funds of the client.”
In general, this
means that a manager of a mutual fund may not charge a fee based
445
Also prohibited by section 205(a)(1)
on the fund’s performance.
446
are contingency fees.
Instead, the manager would be limited to
transaction fees and/or management fees that are based on the value
of the assets being managed. Although the SEC chose not to require
that the fees be “reasonable,” as was once proposed, it did impose a
447
fiduciary standard on fund managers when establishing the fees. As
a result, mutual fund fees cannot be excessive.
At the same time, although ERISA does not specifically prohibit
performance fees, the Department of Labor has interpreted the Act
as banning most incentive compensation arrangements that do not
448
meet each of eight specified criteria.
Most importantly for
443. 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-59. Interestingly,
prior to 1970, performance fees were common among advisers to institutional
investors. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64, pt. 2, at 254 (1971). It was not until 1970 that
Congress applied the Investment Advisers Act to advisers of mutual funds. 2 FRANKEL
& SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[F], at 12-106.6 to -109.
444. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2000). Note, however, that fees based on a
percentage of the assets under management are not deemed to be “on the basis of a
share of . . . capital appreciation,” even though the fees would necessarily increase as
the account appreciates. Id.; KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[A], at 9-16.
445. Note, however, that this section does not prohibit fees based on other
measures of performance. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4, at 9-6.
446. See Contingent Advisory Compensation Arrangements, 45 Fed. Reg. 34,876
(May 23, 1980) (interpreting the Investment Advisers Act as not allowing managers
to collect commissions); see also Trainer, Wortham & Co., Froley, Revy Inv. Co.,
Starbuck, Tisdale & Assoc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 3127379, at *1, 2004 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 925, at *8 (Dec. 6, 2004).
447. See generally 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[D], at 12-76 to -97
(explaining that the fiduciary duty standard is one of common-law reasonableness
and discussing factors that must be considered to determine if fees comply with this
standard).
448. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Dep’t. of Labor Op. 89-31A, 1989 ERISA LEXIS
29, 1989 WL 224560 (Oct. 11, 1989); BDN Advisers Inc., Dept. of Labor Op. 86-20A,
1986 ERISA LEXIS 9, 1986 WL 38857 (Aug. 29, 1986); Batterymarch Financial
Management, Dept. of Labor Op. 86-21A, 1986 ERISA LEXIS 8, 1986 WL 38858
(Aug. 29, 1986).
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corporate governance purposes, the compensation must be based on
the net appreciation of plan assets during a pre-established valuation
449
period. In other words, pension fund managers, like the managers
of mutual funds, are generally prohibited from charging
performance-based fees.
There are two exceptions to the general prohibition against
performance fees that apply in the mutual fund context. The first is
450
for funds that limit their membership to “qualified clients.” These
include individuals and companies (not including other mutual
funds) with a net worth in excess of $1.5 million or at least $750,000
451
under the management of the investment adviser. For purposes of
this exception, each investor in a mutual fund would need to satisfy
the wealth requirements in order for the manager to charge a
452
performance fee.
The second is for so-called “fulcrum fee”
arrangements, which permit the manager of a mutual fund to adjust
the base advisory fee depending on how the fund performs relative to
453
a stipulated market index.
The key to the fulcrum fee is that the
percentage charged cannot merely increase when performance
exceeds expectations—it must also decrease proportionately when
454
performance lags.
These exceptions have relatively little impact on the ability of
public equity funds to engage in a strategy of active corporate
governance, however. In the first place, in order to qualify for the
wealth exception, a mutual fund would have to refuse subscriptions
from all but highly wealthy investors. Given that the primary purpose
(and value) of most mutual funds is to invest retail dollars, this
449. See KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:5, at 9-21 to -22 (listing the other criteria set
forth by the Department of Labor as: (1) the plan assets must be large;
(2) investment should be in securities with available market quotations; (3) when
market quotations for securities are not available, valuation must be done by a third
party; (4) arrangement must comply with Advisers Act rule 205-3; (5) a sophisticated
fiduciary must approve the compensation agreement; (6) the agreement must be
reasonable; and (7) compensation payments must be predetermined).
450. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2007). This rule was amended in 1998 to remove
several additional requirements for advisers to qualified clients, including the
requirement that the advisory contract be negotiated at arm’s length, and to increase
the dollar thresholds. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[C], at 9-19 to -20.
451. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (2007). It also includes individuals and entities
that qualify as “qualified purchasers” under the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000), as well as individuals who are officers or directors of the
mutual fund. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.205-3(d)(ii)(B), 275.205-3(d)(1)(iii) (2007).
452. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b) (2007).
453. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (2000). This exception was created in 1970, at the
same time that the general prohibition against incentive compensation was extended
to mutual fund advisers. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 238 (1992).
454. KIRSCH, supra note 230, § 9:4.3[B], at 9-16 to -17.
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prospect appears neither practical nor desirable. In fact, such a
requirement would effectively convert a mutual fund into a private
equity fund. In the second place, fulcrum fees are in practice
generally limited to much smaller percentages than a typical carried
455
interest.
In addition, the SEC has promulgated extensive
456
regulations regarding when such fees may be considered fair. As a
457
result, their impact on monitoring ability is severely muted.
Mutual funds generally charge their shareholders two types of
458
Sales loads are a type of brokerage fee intended to
fees.
459
compensate financial advisers for a particular transaction. They are
paid either at the time of purchase (front loads) or occasionally when
the shares are redeemed (back loads). However, as more and more
investors have purchased mutual funds through employer-sponsored
savings plans, sales loads have decreased in frequency and amount;
460
More common are
hence, their significance has generally waned.
fees for ongoing expenses. These are paid from fund assets, rather
than directly by the shareholders, and tend to decrease as the fund
461
achieves economies of scale.
Total mutual fund fees—ongoing
expenses plus an annualized portion of any sales loads—decreased
from an average of 2.32% of fund assets in 1980 to 1.07% of fund
462
assets in 2006.
Pension fund managers are generally limited to fees for ongoing
expenses. This is because transaction fees of the kind charged by
mutual funds would likely violate ERISA’s strict prohibition against

455. 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-59.
456. See generally id. § 12.03[F][5], at 12-118 to -122 (expanding upon the factors
the SEC considers to determine the fairness of fees, including, generally, the fairness
of the fulcrum fee, the index used to determine performance for the fulcrum fee,
and the time period over which performance is calculated).
457. See Eisinger, supra note 13, at C1 (noting that, as of 2005, only three percent
of mutual funds charged a performance fee and that such funds accounted for less
than eight percent of all mutual fund assets).
458. See 2 FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 242, § 12.03[A], at 12-58 to -61
(discussing the development of “wrap fee” arrangements and other advisory fees).
See generally James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A
Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005) (providing a recent analysis of
mutual fund fees).
459. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 22, 47.
460. See id. at 48 (finding the growth of no-load funds and increased competition
in the mutual fund industry as additional causes of the decline in the use of sales
loads).
461. Id. at 47–48, 52. Fees for ongoing expenses typically include an advisory fee,
an administrative fee, and so-called 12b-1 fees designed to offset the costs of
marketing and distribution of fund shares. John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation
Practices for Retail Sale of Mutual Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 693–96 (2007).
462. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 47.
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463

related party transactions.
Thus, most pension fund managers
receive a salary or other compensation based on a percentage of the
464
assets under management.
Both of these structures are in sharp contrast to the compensation
paid to private equity fund managers. As was discussed in greater
detail above, private equity funds typically charge their investors a
carried interest that represents a twenty-percent equity stake in any
465
profits that result from the fund’s investments. Although in many
cases the twenty-percent fee applies to all of the fund’s profits, many
larger and more successful funds apply the carried interest only to
466
the extent fund profits exceed a specified benchmark rate. In fact,
this appears increasingly to be the trend in private equity fund
formation. Either way, if the fund does not yield profits (or profits
above the level of the benchmark), then the fund’s managers receive
467
no compensation.
On the other hand, to the extent the fund is
successful, the carried interest can create significant wealth for the
468
managers.
Thus, there are strong and direct incentives for
managers to enhance fund performance.
463. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000); Donald J. Myers & Michael B. Richman, Class
Exemptions from Prohibited Transactions, in ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 319, at
267–68, 283–94. This restriction would also apply to transaction, consulting and
other fees that many private equity fund managers charge their target companies as
compensation for brokering a leveraged buyout. Supra notes 276–280 and
accompanying text. Thus, a pension fund that engaged in a leveraged buyout would
not have access to such fees, thereby decreasing its overall profit from the deal. On
the other hand, the same underlying economics could probably be achieved by
simply adjusting the parties’ allocation of profits. Moreover, investors have
increasingly demanded that most or all of such fees be paid to the investors rather
than retained by the fund managers. MERCER REPORT, supra note 9, at 19–24.
464. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 862–66 (discussing the compensation of external
fund managers); John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees:
The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 627–32 (2001) (finding that mutual
fund managers receive fees double the amount of those received by pension fund
managers).
465. See supra Part II.D (expanding upon the use of carried interest to compensate
managers and explaining how such a system aligns manager’s interests with those of
investors and provides incentive for high-yield investments).
466. See supra notes 269–271 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of
such benchmarks ensures that private equity fund managers do not benefit from
general market movements and will only receive their share of profit after the
“hurdle rate” is met).
467. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. However, private equity funds
also typically charge a management fee intended to cover the fund’s expenses. See
supra notes 273–275 and accompanying text (noting that private equity fund
managers usually charge a management fee of two to three percent). Thus, although
fund managers are unlikely to profit from an underperforming fund, they are also
unlikely to suffer a loss.
468. See Taub, supra note 9, at 42 (reporting that the highest paid hedge fund
manager received $1.7 billion in annual compensation in 2006); see also Jenny
Anderson, Blackstone Founders Due Billions, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2007, at C1 (reporting
that the two founders of the private equity fund are due to receive approximately $8

322

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:225

The ability to charge incentive compensation goes straight to the
issue of incentives—as opposed to barriers—and so appears to be the
key difference that explains why private equity funds pursue an
activist investment strategy while public equity funds shun most such
469
monitoring activities.
Much like the stock options granted to
corporate management, a carried interest generates significant
470
incentives to improve performance.
It therefore appears that
private equity fund managers monitor and discipline corporate
471
managers because they are paid by their investors to do so. Public
equity fund managers receive no such compensation and so have no
such incentive.
If public equity fund managers are not incentivized by their
compensation structure to engage in monitoring, the question
remains what are their incentives. Part V explores the incentives
created by a system of flat fees.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM
In Parts III and IV, I drew the preliminary conclusion that the key
distinction that explains the different approaches that public and
private equity funds take to monitoring is the general prohibition
against incentive compensation for the managers of mutual funds
and pension funds. This finding would have important implications
for corporate governance.
In particular, it suggests that if
policymakers were to deregulate fund manager fees—while at the
same time adjusting any regulations that might limit the exercise of
institutional investor control—the behavior of public equity funds
472
might change. Indeed, were their managers incentivized to pursue
billion and $2 billion, respectively, as a result of the fund’s IPO); Henny Sender, How
Blackstone Will Divvy Up Its IPO Riches, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C1 (noting that
the two founders will receive over $9 billion in stock in connection with their firm’s
IPO); Henny Sender & Monica Langley, How Blackstone’s Chief Became $7 Billion Man,
WALL ST. J., June 13, 2007, at A1 (same). To put these amounts in perspective,
consider by comparison that the highest paid corporate CEO in 2006, Apple
Computer’s Steve Jobs, received a mere $650 million. Big Paychecks, FORBES, May 21,
2007, at 112.
469. See LEVIN, supra note 187, ¶ 103, at 1-3 to -6 (characterizing incentive
compensation as a primary distinguishing factor of private equity investing).
470. Unlike corporate stock options, however, a carried interest is more difficult
to manipulate and is more closely tied to actual firm performance. See supra note 272
(noting that a lack of similar restrictions on stock options presents a greater
opportunity for fraud).
471. See SCHELL, supra note 182, § 1.02[3], at 1-12 to -14 (noting that private equity
funds are structured to maximize the alignment of interest between a fund’s
managers and its equity investors).
472. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63 (recommending that pension fund fees
be deregulated in order to encourage more activist investment strategies).
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control acquisitions of underperforming companies, they might
evolve into the active corporate monitors that many have hoped they
473
Even better, they might help to foster a deeper
would become.
market for good corporate governance.
Part V.A therefore explores the incentives that the legal
prohibition against incentive compensation creates for public equity
fund managers. In it, I conclude that the legal framework plays a
significant role in shaping their incentives and that efforts to alter the
framework could in fact help to foster a deeper and more active
market for corporate control. Indeed, from a corporate governance
standpoint, the current regulatory regime creates exactly the wrong
incentives for public equity fund managers, encouraging them to
shun monitoring rather than to embrace it.
Finally, Part V.B reviews the corporate governance implications of
the existing incentives. In it, I conclude that one impact of
regulatory efforts aimed at deregulating public equity fund
compensation would be to deepen and intensify the market for
corporate monitoring.
A. Existing Incentives for Fund Managers
Like corporations, mutual funds and pension funds are themselves
fictional legal entities that suffer from their own internal agency
costs. The interests of a fund’s managers, in other words, may differ
474
from the interests of a fund’s investors, often substantially. Thus, in
order to understand the monitoring and investment behavior of
public equity funds, one must first consider the incentives facing the
individuals who manage such funds. Presumably, such individuals
will seek to maximize their level of compensation, even if their
475
conduct is partially at odds with the best interests of the fund.
Simply removing barriers to the exercise of influence is therefore
unlikely to change fund behavior, as some have suggested, unless
there are adequate incentives for managers to expend the time and
476
It is not
resources necessary to discipline corporate managers.
473. See id. at 1366–67 (concluding that pension funds could be an optimal
corporate monitor if given the proper incentive through deregulation); Black, supra
note 11, at 815–16 (arguing that with the proper reforms and deregulation, public
equity funds could cooperate to act as institutional monitors).
474. Rock, supra note 1, at 469–72.
475. See id. (noting that public fund managers face many competing interests—
including pressure from corporate managers and/or state and local governments—
and fund managers often choose to advance their own interests rather than acting
for the collective good).
476. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 173, at 234–38 (discussing the incentives of
pension fund managers). But see Black, supra note 11, at 873 (“Money managers will
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enough that funds be capable of monitoring. The fund managers
must also desire to monitor.
The general subject of money manager incentives is not a new one
477
and much ground has previously been covered. My goal in Part V.A
is therefore not to revisit all of the overlapping incentives facing fund
managers, but to focus on those related to the structure of their
compensation. To the extent their fees create disincentives for
monitoring, this would bolster my tentative conclusion in Parts III
and IV that deregulating such fees would encourage fund managers
to reshape mutual funds and public pension funds into active
corporate monitors.
The managers of mutual funds and pension funds, as was
previously noted, generally charge their clients a fee based on the
478
assets that they manage.
Thus, regardless of the manager’s
479
In other words,
performance, a larger fund means a larger fee.
mutual funds are primarily aggregators of capital. For purposes of
corporate governance, then, fund managers will be incentivized to
engage in oversight activities only to the extent they believe that their
efforts will lead to a larger pool of assets and, thus, a larger
management fee. Monitoring is expensive, burdensome, and at times
480
risky.
Unless they believe that they can profit personally from an
active investment strategy, fund managers will continue to pursue
passive diversification.
There are two basic methods for public equity funds to achieve
asset growth, neither of which hold much promise for improved
corporate governance. First, they can realize growth by generating
481
increased profits, provided those profits are reinvested in the fund.
Second, they can realize growth by attracting new investors (or
surely do more monitoring if legal reform facilitates institutional voice. The only
question is how much more.”).
477. See, e.g., BAUMOL, GOLDFELD, GORDON & KOEHN, supra note 411, at ch. 5
(contemplating whether the competitive nature of the market is enough to drive
managers to act in accordance with investor interests or if regulation is needed to
monitor manager behavior); Black, supra note 11, at 873–82 (asserting that public
equity fund money managers have some incentives to monitor, including the desire
to perform well, to receive peer recognition, and to gain positive publicity for high
returns); Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–66 (arguing in favor of incentive
compensation for pension fund managers).
478. See generally supra Part IV.C.3 (explaining that public fund managers are
severely restricted by the Investment Advisers Act and ERISA from charging fees
based on performance).
479. Due to scale economies, however, the relative size of the fee decreases as the
size of the fund increases. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1362–63.
480. Black, supra note 2, at 523.
481. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Competition and Change in the Mutual Fund
Industry, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES 181, 182 (Samuel L.
Hayes III ed., 1993).

2007]

WHAT HEDGE FUNDS CAN TEACH CORPORATE AMERICA

325

482

additional dollars from existing investors).
In fact, given that the
true role played by public equity funds in financial markets is simply
to aggregate investments at a low cost and so efficiently provide the
benefits of diversification to retail investors, the real incentive for
483
public equity fund managers may be to focus on cost-cutting. These
issues are discussed in turn below.
Note, however, that the subject is made somewhat cloudier by the
fact that many funds effectively subcontract many of their investment
484
decisions to numerous outside managers.
Thus, the incentives of
these sub-managers may differ at times from those of the managers
ultimately charged with a fund’s administration. Still, for corporate
governance purposes, it is the incentives of those ultimately in
485
control that count. If the senior managers see value in monitoring,
they will direct the behavior of their sub-managers accordingly.
Likewise, if they view monitoring as a distraction or unnecessary cost,
their instructions to their sub-managers will reflect this attitude as
well.
1.

Profit growth
Profits, of course, will lead to a larger fund and yield a larger fee.
Thus, for example, if a $1 billion fund were to grow by five percent
due to the investment decisions of its managers, the fund would
thenceforth have assets totaling $1.05 billion and the management
fee would increase proportionately. Note, however, that such growth
only occurs if the profits are reinvested in the fund. Were the
additional monies to be withdrawn from the fund in the form of a
dividend or other distribution, then the managers’ successful
investment would have no impact on the size of the fund (and hence
on the size of their annual management fee).
A strategy of profit growth, however, is unlikely to lead to any
significant amount of monitoring. If one assumes an annual
management fee in the range of one percent, the addition of $50
million in the example above would thenceforth increase the annual
482. Alan Rosenblat & Martin E. Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities
Laws Regulating External Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal
Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 587, 594 (1976).
483. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 10–11, 143; see also supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
484. See generally Rock, supra note 1, at 464–78 (examining the agency costs
associated with intermediaries and questioning whether agents’ interests are aligned
with their principals’ interests).
485. But see Coffee, supra note 12, at 845, 862–66 (arguing that the important
agency problem is not at the corporate manager level, but at the financial
intermediary level).
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management fee payable to the fund’s managers by only $500,000. A
change in investment strategy that produces a five percent return—
such as a decision to become an active monitor of the fund’s
investment portfolio—is therefore profitable only to the extent it
486
costs the fund managers less than $500,000 to produce. Given that
mutual funds may hold as many as a thousand different stocks at any
given time, $500,000 would be likely to purchase only the most
487
general level of oversight for any one company.
It is uncertain,
however, whether such minimal monitoring could produce enough
of a boost to performance to justify the expense.
In fact, the likelihood that fund managers will provide oversight
over any one company becomes even smaller when one considers
that the fund is unlikely to own more than five percent of any such
488
company.
Thus, if a mutual fund tried to discipline a $1 billion
manufacturing company of which it held four percent, and if such
efforts doubled the value of the company—an unlikely scenario to be
sure—the mutual fund would only garner four percent of the extra
$1 billion, or $40 million. Thus, the result of this incredible
achievement would be to add $400,000 to the annual management
fee. If, however, such efforts yielded a more realistic ten percent
increase in the value of the manufacturing company, the fund would
receive only $4 million for its efforts and the management fee would
increase by a mere $40,000. Considering that a contentious proxy
489
contest can easily cost upwards of seven figures, such numbers
suggest that there is little incentive for fund managers to engage in
costly—not to mention uncertain—monitoring when they personally
490
have so little to gain. Rather, they are likely to see greater value in a

486. Of course, if the gain accrues on an annual basis, the effort to monitor would
be worthwhile to the extent the current expense is less than the present value of the
future stream of profits.
Thus, permanent improvements gained through
monitoring can justify a much higher expenditure on oversight than temporary or
one-time improvements.
487. This may account for the scholarly interest in promoting institutional
investor voice, as opposed to control, and in utilizing economies of scale to achieve
greater monitoring.
488. See Black, supra note 2, at 530 (“Owning 5% is easy if you’re passive; hard if
you’re active. Owning 10% is hard even if you’re passive, but much harder if you’re
active.”).
489. The average contest is estimated to range between $250,000 and $1 million.
Bratton, supra note 10, at 1403. Meanwhile, the recent proxy fight over the merger
of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq is estimated to have cost over $100 million. Lohr,
supra note 351, at 31.
490. In contrast, a private equity fund manager earning a twenty-percent fee
would have received an $8 million fee in the first example and an $800,000 fee in the
second.
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more passive investment strategy, selling—rather than reforming—
investments that turn sour.
Of course, one might object to these examples by suggesting that
many mutual fund complexes are much larger, thereby increasing
the magnitude of even minor fluctuations in value. A $1 trillion
mutual fund complex, for example, might be able to absorb the cost
of a little monitoring, even if a $1 billion fund might not be.
Moreover, as Black and others have suggested, certain types of
oversight—such as monitoring board composition and structure—
491
might lend themselves to economies of scale.
The point of these observations, however, is not to suggest that
there are no incentives to increase profits. Surely, such incentives do
exist. Rather, the point is that such incentives are unlikely to be large
or transparent, even to sophisticated fund managers. The results of
monitoring will be both uncertain and uneven, but their costs
immediate and concrete. Therefore, in a world of flat fees, even
those fund managers who are inclined to take a more active role in
oversight must conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
such efforts are likely to be rewarded.
2.

Growth through advertising
Public equity fund managers can also achieve growth by
substituting advertising for profits. This is because the size of the
fund will increase as it attracts new investors or additional capital
contributions from existing investors. For example, if the average
mutual fund investor maintains a balance of $48,000, then the
addition of ten new investors through advertising would contribute
$480,000 to the fund’s assets, thereby adding an additional $4,800 to
492
its annual management fee.
New capital, in other words, leads to
increased fees for the fund managers just as surely as do increased
profits. The only question is the relative cost and impact of
advertising, something knowable only on a case-by-case basis.
Certainly, fund performance—achieved in some cases through
better monitoring—matters for advertising. This is especially true for
those investors who compare data on results when selecting an
493
investment fund.
In this way, a fund’s profits might be used to

491. Black, supra note 2, at 580–84, 589–91.
492. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 57 (reporting that the
median amount households with mutual funds invest in them is $48,000).
493. For a discussion of this relationship, see generally Rock, supra note 1, at 445.
See also Prem C. Jian & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence
of Future Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 938 (2000) (noting that
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signal the quality of its managers and thus retain current investors or
494
It would be difficult, therefore, for a fund to
attract new ones.
completely ignore performance.
An advertising campaign, however, does not need to be linked
entirely to performance data in order to be successful in attracting
additional capital. Instead, a fund may attempt to attract new
investors based on its perceived reputation for integrity, its particular
investment strategy, or some other unusual or defining
495
characteristic.
It is also possible for investors to be swayed by the
same type of advertising techniques that are used by Madison Avenue
to sell other products. Were this not the case, we would see fewer
television commercials featuring famous spokespeople from the
1960s as well as graphics and music that are so obviously intended to
496
appeal to the crucial Baby Boom generation.
In fact, there is

advertisements can provide investors with information as they decide where to place
their money).
494. Several empirical studies suggest that mutual funds increase their advertising
following a year with strong performance. Cf. id. at 937 (finding funds that advertise
perform better than those that do not advertise).
495. TD Waterhouse, for example, which recently merged with Ameritrade, has
used several actors from the TV drama Law & Order as spokesmen in order to sell a
reputation for fair and honest dealing. The first, Steven Hill, played the role of
Manhattan District Attorney (“DA”). More recently, Sam Waterston, who portrayed
the DA’s chief prosecutor, has taken over the role. See Gothamist.com, Sam
Waterston TV Commercial, http://gothamist.com/2003/11/18/sam_waterston_tv_c
ommercial.php (Nov. 18, 2003) (last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
496. Appeals to the Baby Boom generation through references to the pop culture
of the 1960s and 1970s have become de rigueur in mutual fund advertising. For
example, one television commercial currently airing for Ameriprise Financial
features an aging Dennis Hopper—an actor best known for his role as Billy in the
1969 counter-cultural road film “Easy Rider”—standing in a field of yellow flowers
while music from The Spencer Davis Group’s 1967 hit “Gimme Some Lovin’” plays
loudly in the background. Its tag line: “Flower power was then. Your dreams are
now.” See Ameriprise Financial, Commercial: Wildflower, http://www.ameriprise.co
m/amp/global/about-ameriprise/commercials.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
Another television commercial—this one for Fidelity Investments—plays The
Zombies’ 1968 single “Time of the Season” while various slogans and tag lines float
by on the bubbles of what turns out to be a lava lamp. See YouTube.com, Fidelity
Investments “Time of the Season” Ad (2005), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jjV
kuTZBrA (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). Still another Fidelity commercial shows rate and
fee information on a background of psychedelic flowers while Iron Butterfly plays
their 1968 rock anthem—the first ever to be awarded a Platinum album—In-AGadda-Da-Vita. Its tag line: “Need a little flower power? Our retirement specialists
can help.” See YouTube.com, Animated Flowers, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
chIgcMqdK_k (last visited Oct. 1, 2007); see also Michael Stetz, Iron Butterfly’s in an
IRA Ad? Bummer, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 2, 2006, at B1, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060402/news_1m2iron.html
(quoting the band’s drummer, Ron Bushy, now 64, as saying “I guess the method to
their madness is that all the baby boomers who got stoned listening to that song are
now all grown up and have money”).
For a parody of this trend, see Diane Rohde, There’s No More Reassuring Voice in
Retirement Planning than Dennis Hopper, THE ONION, May 30, 2007, http://www.th
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empirical evidence to suggest that the size of investments in mutual
497
The one
funds is largely unrelated to their level of performance.
main exception to this observation is for the best-performing funds,
exactly the ones most likely to attract capital from investors who
498
closely track the data.
More importantly, as an advertising device, profits matter only on a
relative basis, not an absolute one. How well a fund performed in a
given period is irrelevant. What matters is whether the fund
499
outperformed its competitors. Or, to be more exact, what matters
is that mutual fund and pension fund investors be unaware of
differences in performance. So long as a fund’s results are roughly
equivalent to those of its competitors, performance ceases to be a
500
distinguishing characteristic.
In fact, a cynic might interpret the
fragmentation of most large mutual fund complexes into
multitudinous sub-funds and share classes as a means for impeding
501
easy comparisons of returns. So many data points, each fluctuating
constantly, remove the transparency that might otherwise be present
502
in mutual fund returns.
What this ascendancy of advertising over performance means for
corporate governance is that public equity fund managers are
unlikely to see much value in attempts to compete based on their
ability to bring discipline to corporate managers. Why expend the
eonion.com/content/opinion/theres_no_more_reassuring_voice. (last visited Oct.
1, 2007) (“Dennis Hopper’s television spots for Ameriprise Financial are so
reassuring . . . . When I hear him in those commercials, it’s the familiar voice of a
coke-dealing, LSD-fueled hippie cowboy biker putting me at ease.”).
497. Sirri & Tufano, supra note 481, at 190.
498. See id. (noting that consumers tend to react to very high performance but not
very low performance).
499. See Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN.
1589, 1620 (1998) (finding that consumer reaction to fund performance is stronger
for funds which spend more on marketing).
500. See Sirri & Tufano, supra note 481, at 190–98 (identifying new products,
distribution methods and low fees as differentiation strategies).
501. At the end of 2006, for example, there were 8,120 U.S. mutual funds offering
investors 21,260 share classes, or an average of 2.6 share classes per fund.
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 93. Moreover, the average fund
complex sponsors many sub-funds. Vanguard, for example, offers its investors no
fewer than three hundred investment choices. Vanguard.com, Find Similar
Vanguard Funds, https://personal.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/funds/tools/findsi
milarfund (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
502. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that investors are very slow to redeem their
shares after periods of substandard performance. See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito,
Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35
J.L. & ECON. 45, 61 (1992) (reporting a 0.35% decrease in growth rate following poor
fund performance compared to a 0.90% increase in growth rate following high
positive performance); Sirri & Tufano, supra note 499 (explaining that gathering
and analyzing data about mutual funds requires consumer time and effort and
analyzing the consumer costs associated with investment decision making).

330

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:225

resources on risky and uncertain monitoring when the results may
have no more of an effect on the managers’ compensation than does
503
their spokesperson’s particular karma with Baby Boomers?
Admittedly, the best funds are probably those that privilege
performance above all else. However, at a minimum, this ability to
hide lackluster results in a slick advertising campaign mutes the
incentives to engage in active oversight.
3.

Incentives to cut costs
The ability to attract new capital through advertising may also tend
to shift the focus of fund managers away from performance and onto
cost. This is because comparing performance is difficult, while
comparing fees is not. For one thing, profits fluctuate from period to
period, as do general economic conditions. Even personnel may
504
change.
Keeping up with such changes may be an enjoyable
diversion for some, and may seem like second nature to finance
professionals, but is likely to be beyond the capacity and interest of
505
most public equity fund investors. Moreover, each of these factors
is exacerbated by the plethora of options now available to investors,
even within the same family of funds. An informal review of the
Vanguard website, for example, shows hundreds of sub-funds, each of
which can be combined at various percentage levels with other sub506
funds, and most of which have multiple asset classes.
Choice, in
other words, can become bewildering. Even those investors who are
sophisticated enough to slog their way through the performance data
face a significant challenge. As we lawyers are fond of reminding
507
people, past performance is not a guarantee of future profits.

503. Fidelity Investments took 1960s nostalgia to its logical extreme when it hired
former Beatles singer and songwriter Sir Paul McCartney to be its chief spokesperson
in 2005. Jenn Abelson, Brand on the Run, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2005, at F1; see
YouTube.com, [Ads] – Superbowl 2006 – Fidelity Investments – This is Paul,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyJ_w15D8kk (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
504. See Jennifer Levitz, When a Fund Manager Leaves Investors Fret—For Good Reason,
WALL ST. J., June 4, 2007, at R1 (reporting that “manager musical chairs,” in the
words of one investor, is a common concern among mutual fund investors).
505. This may be one reason for the growth of funds of funds: investment funds
that diversify not by acquiring a portfolio of securities but by acquiring a portfolio of
other investment funds. See INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 26
(noting that U.S.-registered funds of funds have increased from 45 in 1996 to 604 in
2006, while their assets have increased over the same period from $13 billion to $471
billion).
506. Vanguard.com, Find Similar Vanguard Funds, https://personal.vanguard.co
m/VGApp/hnw/funds/tools/findsimilarfund (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
507. It is, of course, common practice in the securities industry to print such
warnings in boldface or other large-type on the cover of offering documents.
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Indeed, this focus on cost appears to be bolstered by the revolution
in corporate finance that has taken place over the past few decades.
According to the efficient capital markets hypothesis, markets for
508
many corporate securities are sufficiently liquid as to be efficient.
The implication of this finding is that for large, widely followed
stocks, the price incorporates all of the available information and
509
thus its future direction will be random. The price, in other words,
is a consensus price that cannot be consistently bested by an investor
510
unless that investor has access to information that the market lacks.
The underlying lesson for retail investors is therefore roughly as
follows: You cannot consistently beat the market, and neither can
511
your financial adviser. Thus, you should avoid paying a high fee for
investment advisory services that cannot be rendered. Instead, you
should seek out a reputable firm and invest your savings in a safe, low512
cost, diversified public equity fund.
The focus of mutual fund advertising on the size of fees rather than
on the quality of returns thus appears to have some basis in sound
economic theory. Proof that investors have learned this lesson can be
found not only in the nature of fund advertising but also in the
explosion of index funds and ETFs, which expressly shun active
513
management.
Rather than seek to achieve profit growth through
stock picking acumen, they embrace the lessons of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis and reject any efforts to actively follow

508. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 324 (noting that the article in which
the theory first appeared was Maurice G. Kendall, The Analysis of Economic Time-Series,
Part I: Prices, 96 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 11 (1953)). Harry Roberts has identified three
forms of the efficient capital markets hypothesis: weak, semistrong, and strong. Id.
§ 13-2, at 329. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 546, 551–70 (1994) (tracing the history and development of the efficient capital
market theory).
509. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 328 (explaining that since prices are
based on all relevant information, they change when new information is available
and the unpredictability of this new information’s arrival makes the changes
unpredictable).
510. Id. at 336 (noting that, although there is disagreement at the margins, “we
believe that there is now widespread agreement that capital markets function well
and that opportunities for easy profits are rare”).
511. See id. at 337 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound
all available information about the value of each security. This means that in an
efficient market there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior
rates of return. To do so, you not only need to know more than anyone else; you
need to know more than everyone else.”).
512. See id. at 344 (“In an efficient market investors will not pay others for what
they can do equally well themselves.”).
513. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 34–35.
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514

their investments.
Instead, they purchase a portfolio of stocks
intended to mimic the results of some market index or category, such
as the S&P 500 or the Nasdaq. Their chief value is not in exceeding
the returns of actively managed funds, but in mirroring them at a
515
lower cost. Currently, it is estimated that over ten percent of equity
516
fund assets—more than $1 trillion—are held by index funds.
Cost cutting, of course, is anathema to monitoring. Even if
corporate oversight were to become less costly and burdensome as a
result of proxy reform, some risk and expense would always remain.
Thus, even those public equity fund managers who might be inclined
to discipline errant corporate managers would be faced with the
question of whether the lower cost route of exit would be preferable.
In fact, for an index fund, any effort to actively manage investments is
counter to its stated goal of mimicking the market.
Thus,
monitoring, however cheap and easy it may become as a result of
517
proposed legal reforms, is unlikely to coexist comfortably with a
regime characterized by competition over low fees.
B. The Promise of Public Equity Fund Oversight
As demonstrated by Part V.A, public equity fund managers are not
paid to monitor their investments. They are paid to attract new
capital through a combination of advertising and cost-cutting. So
long as a fund’s profits are in the vicinity of those of its competitors,
performance—and hence monitoring—matters to public equity fund
managers only to the extent it provides fodder for further advertising.
Indeed, there is a sort of symbiosis among profits, advertising and
cost-cutting. Low costs and high profits are both worthy ends in their
own right, but both also provide fuel for advertising campaigns.
Advertising, for its part, can be used to signal the high quality of a
fund’s investments or to obscure less-than-inspiring results. By
restricting public equity fund managers to a percentage of the assets
they manage, legal rules distort the market’s incentives and shift the
focus of fund managers away from the quality of their investment
decisions. Profits become a means rather than an end.
Moreover, the quality of public equity fund governance has itself
been seriously questioned. For example, scholars have for many
514. Id.; see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 865 (noting the impact of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis on institutional investors).
515. See Diya Gullapalli, ETF Price War Looms as Vanguard Looks to Catch Up, WALL
ST. J., July 7–8, 2007, at B1 (reporting on Vanguard’s plan to market an ETF similar
to a Barclay Global Investors ETF but at lower cost).
516. INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 33, at 35.
517. See generally supra Part I.D.
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years doubted whether the fiduciary duties applicable to mutual fund
518
As a result, many have advocated an
managers are adequate.
519
Meanwhile,
increased monitoring role for disinterested directors.
Joel Seligman has pointed out that SEC oversight of the mutual fund
520
industry has often proved lax.
In fact, peaking around 2003 but
continuing to the present, the mutual fund industry has been rocked
by a series of scandals related to late trading, market timing, and the
521
selective disclosure of information to investors. The result has been
522
a flurry of hearings, litigation and rulemaking.

518. See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1017 (noting that the abuses of 2003
reignited long-standing concerns about enforcing fiduciary obligations in mutual
funds).
519. See, e.g., Rosenblat & Lybecker, supra note 482, at 649–54 (proposing a role
for disinterested directors in regulating joint transactions between investment
companies and their affiliates); Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies be Subject to
a New Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1115, 1126 (2005)
(advocating the imposition of a statutory self-regulatory organization to oversee the
mutual fund industry). But see Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1019 (questioning the
efficacy of disinterested directors in disciplining mutual fund managers); Martin E.
Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed Concept that
Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1047–50 (2005) (arguing that
recent governance reforms regarding mutual funds were both unjustified and of
questionable efficacy).
520. See Seligman, supra note 519, at 1115 (citing a report by the General
Accounting Office that, prior to 1998, “each mutual fund was inspected an average of
once every twelve to twenty-four years”).
521. See Mutual Funds: Trading Practices and Abuses that Harm Investors: Hearing
Before the Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, & the Int’l Sec. Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement of Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div.
of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (reporting the preliminary results of
investigations into abuses by mutual fund complexes, brokerage firms and insurance
companies selling mutual funds); Lybecker, supra note 519, at 1061–79 (discussing
the 2003 and 2004 market-timing, revenue-sharing and directed brokerage scandals
and the resulting settlements); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 176–80 (detailing legal
and regulatory strategies to address improper mutual fund trading by fund
managers, brokers and traders). Other problems have arisen as well, including issues
of variable products, director independence, soft dollars, volume discounts, portfolio
manager conflicts, and revenue sharing with broker-dealers. Seligman, supra note
519, at 1116–17.
522. E.g., Review of Current Investigations and Regulatory Actions Regarding the Mutual
Fund Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 108th
Cong. (2004); see also Heather Timmons, 2 Fund Groups Agree to Pay $450 Million to
End Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at C1 (reporting a settlement with regulators
after two of Amvescap’s companies were accused of improperly allowing market
timing); Janus Settlement Complete, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at C6 (announcing that
the Janus Capital Group had reached a $226.2 million settlement with state and
federal regulators after allegations of improper trading). For a description and
assessment of the SEC’s rulemaking efforts in response to the mutual fund scandals,
see generally Christopher S. Petito & Audrey L. Cheng, The Regulatory Response to
Mutual Fund Scandals, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, supra note 412, ch. 28
(providing an overview of mutual fund abuses, regulatory responses and legislative
proposals); Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons
from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 19–53
(2006).
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The point of this is not to prove, or even argue, that there are
substantial agency costs in mutual funds and public pension funds.
523
The point is to
This is obvious and generally well understood.
suggest that the incentives facing fund managers are at best opaque,
even to the managers themselves. At worst, the incentives are exactly
the opposite of what advocates of institutional investor monitoring
would hope for. Public equity fund managers remain passive in their
investment philosophy because they are paid not to monitor but to
cut costs.
Compare this to an incentive fee world such as exists for private
equity funds. There, growing the fund is largely irrelevant, except to
the extent that it allows fund managers to work with more money.
Neither cutting costs nor advertising improve the managers’ bottom
line. However, they receive a twenty-percent share of any increases in
performance. Whereas a public equity fund manager would just as
soon exit an underperforming investment, a private equity fund
manager earns her living by improving such performance.
The most likely result of deregulating public equity fund
compensation would therefore be the expansion of the market for
good corporate governance. Public equity funds, like their private
brethren, would be empowered to compete based on their ability to
identify and reform underperforming companies. To the extent a
given company suffered from significant agency costs, it could expect
to receive offers from a variety of potential suitors, each promising its
own set of cures for the company’s perceived ills. Those public equity
funds that were best able to bring about positive change in the
performance of their portfolios would produce the highest returns
and attract the most capital. Thus, retail dollars could be expected to
join the assets of the more well-heeled in the fight to bring discipline
to corporate managers.
Indeed, public equity funds that charged a fee based on
performance would be doubly incentivized to take an active role in
corporate monitoring. First, they would have greater reason to
improve their funds’ performance because they would personally and
524
directly benefit from such improvements.
Second, and perhaps

523. Some of these costs may be political. See supra note 170 (providing examples
of how politics may influence investment decisions). But see Camara, supra note 4, at
236–39 (describing “investors [who] are insulated from market and political forces
by some combination of wealth, social position, training, and disposition”).
524. See generally supra notes 261–262 and accompanying text.
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more importantly, they would need to achieve greater returns in
525
order to justify their higher fees and avoid a flight of capital.
A fee structure that rewards success is both more equitable and
better able to align the interests of fund managers and fund investors
than is one which is uncoupled from performance. Thus, regulatory
efforts intended to deregulate public equity fund compensation are
526
likely to expand and intensify the oversight of corporate America.
Investors in mutual funds and public pension funds could therefore
benefit twice, as both fund managers and corporate managers
compete to improve their results.
As an ancillary matter, however, it is worth noting that even if all of
the hurdles to the exercise of shareholder voice were removed, and
even if public equity fund managers were permitted to share in the
benefits from monitoring, there simply may not be a market for
increased corporate governance. It may well be that most retail
investors would prefer the existing low-risk, low-reward strategy of
public equity funds and would reject any offering of high-risk, highmonitoring strategies.
In this regard, efforts to deregulate
shareholder activism have little downside risk. If there is no market
for monitoring, nothing will change if the rules are altered. On the
other hand, if there is an untapped potential to reduce agency costs
through improved corporate governance—whether at the level of
voice or control—it would presumably be fostered by efforts to
enable that market. The beauty of any proposal to deregulate fund
compensation is therefore that its primary function would not be to
dictate any particular conduct but merely to create the preconditions
for a deeper market for good corporate governance. Currently,
public equity funds have only one viable model—low-cost
diversification with little or no monitoring. Were they permitted to
experiment with a high-cost, high-return model, we would soon
discover whether additional active monitoring is indeed economically
efficient.

525. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 309, at 181 (“Wise investors don’t take risks
just for fun. They are playing with real money. Therefore, they require a . . . risk
premium.”).
526. See MEYER & MATHONET, supra note 182, at 27 (noting that “the ‘growth of
private equity is a classic example of how organizational innovation, aided by
regulatory and tax changes, can ignite activity in a particular market’” (quoting
Stephen D. Prowse, The Economics of the Private Equity Market, ECON. REV. 21, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas (1998))).
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CONCLUSION
Policymakers should permit mutual fund and public pension fund
managers to charge incentive-based compensation similar to that
currently charged by private equity fund managers. By doing so, they
would create direct incentives for public equity fund managers to
adopt a strategy of active oversight. Monitoring would cease to be a
distraction and an obstacle to cost-cutting and would instead become
a primary means of competition. By bringing the vast resources of
retail investors into the market for corporate governance, incentive
pay would fundamentally alter the relationship of corporate
managers and their shareholders. The pendulum would swing.
Managers would become more accountable.
Admittedly, private equity funds are not without their critics. For
527
528
example, both their growing wealth and newfound political clout
have come under attack of late. In presidential politics, Republican
hopeful Mitt Romney has been both extolled and criticized for his
529
role as a founder of Bain Capital.
Like corporations, investment
530
funds have also had their share of scandal. And with a Democratic
527. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Gilded Once More, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at
A27 (noting that the 2006 annual income of the twenty-five highest paid hedge fund
managers was “more than it would cost to provide health care for a year to eight
million children—the number of children in America who, unlike children in any
other advanced country, don’t have health insurance”). The survey, which appeared
in the April 2007 issue of Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine, has been widely
reported in the regular media. See Taub, supra note 9, at 41–42 (reporting that the
top twenty-five hedge fund managers each earned over $240 million in 2006). To
their credit, however, the managers’ philanthropy does appear to be increasing,
although perhaps not as quickly as their wealth. See, e.g., Hedge Fundraising: The New
Moneymen Give Some Back, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, at 80 (noting that “[h]edge-fund
managers seem to be following the well-trodden charitable trail blazed by 19thcentury industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie and modern-day billionaires like Bill
Gates”); Jennifer Levitz, Hedge Funds Roil Charity Fund-Raising, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2007, at B1 (reporting on an annual charity fund-raiser for Big Brothers Big Sisters of
Massachusetts Bay that had traditionally netted approximately $200,000 but instead
raised $1.8 million once several hedge fund managers joined the charity’s board).
528. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Wealthy Enclave Offers Windfall for Candidates, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A1 (reporting that, as a result of the concentration of private
equity funds there, Greenwich, Connecticut had joined New York, Los Angeles and
Silicon Valley as an important campaign fundraising stop for presidential hopefuls);
Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Coming of Age Politically, WALL ST. J., Apr.
19, 2007, at A6 (noting that political donations by executives at the twenty-five largest
hedge funds had increased from $576,000 in 2000 to nearly $2.3 million in 2004).
529. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Romney Political Fortunes Tied to Riches He Gained in
Business, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at A1 (describing the political fallout from
Romney’s previous career at Bain Capital). According to a ranking by Private Equity
International, Bain Capital is now the nation’s eighth largest private equity fund,
with $17.3 billion under management. PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, supra note
216, at 62.
530. See Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C1 (detailing negotiations between lenders and two
flailing hedge funds on the verge of having to sell mortgage securities in the open
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Congress and the widely publicized IPO of Blackstone Group, federal
policymakers have begun rethinking their laissez-faire approach to
531
the regulation of private equity funds. Even Hollywood has joined
market); Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at A1 (comparing the 2007 $3.2 billion bailout by Bear
Stearns Companies investment bank to the more infamous $3.6 billion bailout of
Long-Term Capital Management by over a dozen lenders in 1998); Julie Creswell, A
New Genre of Wall St.: Bailout Blog, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at C1 (noting that the
SEC had initiated an inquiry into the losses at two Bear Stearns hedge funds); Kate
Kelly & Serena Ng, Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund With Big Loan, WALL ST. J., June 23–24,
2007, at A1 (highlighting that the funds’ liquidation could have panicked an already
nervous mortgage-bond market).
Interestingly, though, most of the scandals thus far have occurred among
traditional hedge funds, rather than private equity funds. The best known was of
course the collapse due to hubris of Long-Term Capital Management, which was
immortalized in Roger Lowenstein’s superb treatment. See generally LOWENSTEIN,
WHEN GENUIS FAILED, supra note 343 (chronicling the details of Long-Term Capital
Management’s crash based on interviews with insiders at the firm and major
investment banks). Meanwhile, Amaranth Advisors famously lost over $3 billion in a
few short weeks in 2006. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s
Loss Rattles Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at C1 (attributing the fund’s decline to
a fall in natural gas prices). The most notable pure fraud may have occurred when
the principals of Bayou Group disappeared in 2005 with approximately $300 million
of their investors’ funds. See Ian McDonald, Bayou Drained Accounts in ‘04 of $161
Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2005, at C1 (tracing Bayou’s transfers of funds to and
among banks around the world); Ian McDonald, John R. Emshwiller & Ianthe
Jeanne Dugan, Bayou Transfers Set Off Alarms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at C1
(explaining that the fraud scheme operated by tricking low-level bank employees
into accepting funds by confusing them with technical financial language); Gretchen
Morgenson, Jenny Anderson, Geraldine Fabrikant & Riva D. Atlas, What Really
Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at C1 (detailing the unraveling of a
complex $300 million fraud scheme at the Bayou Group hedge fund firm).
531. For example, at the time of this writing, bills aimed at increasing the taxes on
private equity funds had passed in both houses of Congress. See Jenny Anderson &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Tax Gap Puts Private Equity Firms on Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2007, at C1 (noting that recent interest in changing the tax code was prompted
by the increasing prominence and wealth of private equity firms); Jenny Anderson &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘Tax Equity’ Is Battle Cry in New Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2007, at
C1 (announcing that the proposed democratic bill would tax private equity firms at
the standard income tax rate of thirty-five percent rather than the fifteen-percent
capital gains tax they currently enjoy); Sarah Lueck, Jesse Drucker & Brody Mullins,
Congress Hunts for Tax Targets Among the Rich, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2007, at A1
(reporting that the Senate might introduce a series of multiple narrow tax reform
bills rather than one broad bill like the one being considered by the House of
Representatives); Henny Sender & Sarah Lueck, Tax Plan Adds to the Pressures on
Buyout Firms, WALL ST. J., June 16–17, 2007, at A1 (reporting on a Senate bill to tax
publicly traded private equity advisers as if they were corporations). For an academic
study on the impact of such tax reform, see Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private
Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary
Income, (U. Penn. Law Sch., Scholarship at Penn. Law, Paper No. 172, 2007), available
at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/172 (last visited Oct. 8, 2007)
(presenting five potential ways to reform tax policy including a new cost-of-capital
approach). See also Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, __ N.Y.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=892440. Regulators are also investigating whether private
equity funds are involved in a disproportionate number of insider-trading and/or
antitrust cases. PRIVATE EQUITY TERMS & CONDITIONS, supra note 196, at 50.
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the act, casting Matt Damon as a morally dubious hedge fund
532
manager in the Oscar-nominated movie Syriana.
And yet, despite their growing influence and the interest of
Hollywood and the press, legal scholars have thus far paid scant
attention to the role private equity funds play in America’s system of
533
corporate governance. This is a mistake, however, as private equity
funds have embraced corporate oversight as their primary investment
objective. Not only do their actions benefit overall corporate
governance by improving the performance of underperforming
firms, but they also provide an important model for broader
534
governance reform. Hostile takeovers failed as a monitoring device
and institutional investor voice remains an unfulfilled promise.
Public equity fund control, by contrast, has not even been
considered.
In fact, institutional investor control may already be on the march.
Acquisitions by private equity funds are rising as a percentage of total
deal flow, such that fully twenty percent of global M&A activity, as
535
measured by value, is now undertaken by private equity funds.
Additionally, several prominent private equity advisers, most notably
Blackstone Group and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, have either sold
subscriptions to the general public or announced that they will soon
536
do so. This will enable such funds to partially tap the retail dollars
532. SYRIANA (Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. 2005); see The Uneasy Crown, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 10, 2007, at 74 (“Sharp criticism has become a daily nuisance for the privateequity industry.”).
533. Three very worthwhile exceptions to this are Bratton, supra note 10, at 1375
(analyzing the results of hedge fund activism on the governance of 130 domestic
firms); Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 7, at 2 (measuring the value of
hedge funds as corporate monitors by examining a sample of 888 events launched by
131 funds during the period 2001 through 2005); and Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at
1022 (examining the nature of hedge fund activism and its role in corporate
governance and regulatory reform). See also Hu & Black, supra note 10, at 811
(discussing the role of hedge funds in the practice of vote buying).
534. See Steven Kaplan, Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes As a Source of Value,
3 J. FIN. 611–32 (1989) (analyzing seventy-six management buyouts from publicly
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currently available only to public equity funds and to use them as an
important additional source for the financing of corporate
monitoring. Their aim—like that of the reforms considered in this
Article—is convergence: joining retail dollars to the fight for
improved corporate discipline.
There can be no guarantee of what would happen if public equity
fund compensation were to be deregulated. However, there is reason
to believe that the result would be increased corporate oversight by
mutual funds and public pension funds. Risk and reward would be
left to mediate between themselves, with different funds offering
their investors different choices with respect to their preferred level
of monitoring. Were that to occur, one might even imagine that
some public equity funds might join private equity funds in
competition to squeeze agency costs out of inefficient companies.
The result would be a deeper and more active market for good
corporate governance. Their fees deregulated, public equity funds
might yet be capable of fulfilling their promise as the ideal corporate
monitor.
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